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ABSTRACT
THE POTENTIAL FOR DECENTRALIZED
COMIMNITY INDUSTRI ES
by
Parry A. Stein
This study explores the potential utility of strategies
for the economic development of depressed areas based on in-
dustrial plants located in and controlled by communities. Two
specific aspects are studied; the relevance of size and scale
to efficiency and viability, and the effect of community as
against entrepreneurial control. The conclusions are: first,
much manufacturing could be efficiently carried out at con-
siderably smaller scale (especially of firms), and second,
collective control offers specific advantages in certain com-
binations of industrial and market sectors.
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INTRODUCT ION
Much of the continuing debate on alternative public
policies related to economic growth and development concerns
their effects on the distribution of wealth, income, power,
and opportunity. In particular, the widely held feeling that
these items are too inequitably distributed at present has
generated increasing interest in specific social policies
which utilize programs of economic development to rebuild
decaying or lagging areas, to provide more jobs and job
opprtunities to unemployed people, and to offer poor groups
or communities the means by which they can gain a more equit-
able share in the general level of prosperity.
Two very different strategies exist; one utilizing
conventional economic structures but providing incentives
capable of shifting their focus more toward areas of public
concern, and the second developing new economic institutions
expressly for work in such areas. The former approach, for
example, typically seeks to entice businesses to invest in
the designated sector by improving the physical infrastruc-
ture or providing special tax benefits. The latter approach,
in contrast, might provide resources or legislation necessary
8
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to permit local communities either to form cooperative
development entities or to act as entrepeneurs in their own
right. In particular, the strategy which has become known
as community economic development is based on establishment
and initial funding (by grants typically) of institutions
(generally known as community development corporations or
CDC's) controlled by residents of depressed communities
(urban and rural) and which carry out a broad range of
activities designed to transform the social and economic
environment of- the area.(l) Key among their activities are
business enterprises, which become critical determinants of
long range success since they are intended to provide the
basic economic resources needed by the CDC or community.
Criticisms of several types have been levelled at the
idea of community economic development; these have been
discussed at length elsewhere.(2) The most important ones,
however, bear on the role of the CDC's in more narrowly
economic activities. In particular, such federal policies
and programs have often been criticized for supporting un-
economical enterprises - firms that are really too small to
succeed in the American economy, or if they manage to succeed,
too small to have a significant impact upon locally depressed
areas. Programs that have been criticized on this basis in-
clude those of the Small Business Administration (loans and
minority assistance efforts) and the Office of Economic
9
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Opportunity (support for cooperatives and CDC's). For example,
Theodore L. Cross, when he was special consultant to the
Director of OEO for economic development programs, told CDC's
that they would be hahdicapped by the "nickle-and-dime"
approach of small and medium-sized firms.(3)
In general, however, whether firms are conceived in
terms of classical entrepreneurial mechanisms or newly minted
participative devices for poor communities, it is assumed
that starting a business is a viable and appropriate means
by which the economically disenfranchised can gain their
birthright. The community corporations further assume that
the incomes thus gained can be used to solve related social
problems. It is not surprising that such assertions are
challenged. New ventures have an appallingly high rate of
failure even when there is no problem of access to the neces-
sary resources, and even when rooted in a highly supportive
environment. In 1969 alone, for example, although 274,000
new businesses were incorporated in the United States, a
nearly equal number went out of existence.(4) Roughly 2/3
of all new ventures fail to survive 5 years; 4/5 die by age
10.(5) Clearly, the odds against success are great. Despite
this, increasing numbers of people elect to make the attempt.
The number of businesses started has risen fairly steadily,
the momentum generated, at least in part, by the classical
American creed as exemplified in the stories of Horastio Alger.
0 However, this phenomenon, which until recently was most
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visible in the American middle class, has now been broad-
ened by such notions as minority enterprise, black capitalism,
and community-based economic development. The additional
difficulties facing black, poor, or community ventures com-
pound the usual problems considerably. To give one example
only, a new venture which explicitly sets out to hire a signif-
cant fraction of its workforce from the ranks of those with-
out the training, education, or attitudes regarded as gener-
ally necessary are forced absolutely to spend more time and
money, and to deal with far greater organizational complexities
at the very time when the risk of failure is greatest.(6)
It ought, therefore, to be agreed that it is difficult
to start a new venture, especially under these latter circum-
stances. However, a different question, to which this dis-
sertation is addressed, concerns the longer view. Assume
that problems of start-up can be resolved by some combina-
tion of extra help and physical resources. What can be said
about the possibility or likelihood of success and self-
sufficiency in the future? If the venture is inherently un-
sound or inefficient, no ammount of start-up help will solve
those problems. As a matter of public policy it may still
be appropriate to maintain the enterprise via some form of
continuing subsidy, in exchange for social benefits not
easily quantified. This situation, however, should be seen
clearly for what it is; it should not be viewed as a conven-
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tional business, and it should be treated, from the outset,
very differently.
With regard, however, to ventures aiming at some degree
of self-sufficiency, one of the fundamental questions is the
size or scale required to attain a reasonable degree of
economic efficiency, and thus, competitive power. Since
greater size, other things being equal, requires more capi-
tal investment as well as greater human resources, entrepre-
neurs often seek opportunities where modest size is adequate
initially, but with potential for subsequent growth. Manu-
facturing industries, in particular, are the subject of
extended debate on these issues since, on the one hand, they
tend to be the most capital intensive businesses, but on the
other, they provide an economic base of great power and
potential leverage. For that reason, and because the neces-
sary data are more available, they are the major focus of the
present work.
In the special case of ventures rooted in poorer com-
munities, these concerns are also exacerbated appreciably.
Capital is much scarcer, even with Federal programs aimed
at providing more of it, trained people are less available,
the time scale over which success (or failure) is to be
measured is often distinctly reduced, and the psychosocial
climate is not conducive to large scale risk-taking. If
present opportunities exist, there is a great temptation to
12
seize them as if they were likely to be the last available -
as, indeed, they may be. Seasoned entrepreneurs, not to men-
tion corporations in their institutional role as generators
of new ventures, are used to a series of trials, some, but
probably not most of which will succeed. No such luxury is
available to poor communities. The decision to start a
venture is thus more critical in these cases, and for that
very reason, tends to be highly conservative.
In that regard, the issue of size is double-edged. To
the extent that certain ventures are seen as requiring great
resources, they are likely to be rejected out of hand. Real
opportunities may thus be overlooked or passed-by. At the
same time, ventures which are conventionally regarded as
amenable to a small scale of operation, and which meet as
well the conservative criteria mentioned above, tend to be
those least likely to generate significant capital returns,
to provide a solid and extensible economic base for the com-
munity, and to capture any significant share of the wealth-
producing instruments for the community's benefit.
To the extent, then, that the need for larger firms is
exaggerated by the conventional wisdom, that perception itself
becomes a limiting factor in the generation of and public sup-
port for strategies of social/economic change based on smaller,
less centralized productive entities.
On the other hand, there are real and important advantages
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which accrue from increased size, and it would be equally
foolish to underestimate these. The critical questions, to
which this dissertation is addressed, concern the nature of
these advantages and disadvantages, and centrally, how their
importance and extent changes with size. In economic terms,
for example, do returns to scale continue to increase, re-
main constant above some identifiable point, or eventually
decrease?
As a part of this, it is also necessary to look at the
effects of size and scale in a larger and more encompassing
context since it is clear that social welfare does- not neces-
sarily increase, pari passu, with enterp'ise or firm scale.
Ultimately, this dissertation argues that the conventional
wisdom overstates the virtues of size, at least as regards
its effect on efficient operation and potential competitive
strength. It argues further that the present state of the
American economic system is such as to enhance the benefits
and opportunities for smaller enterprises, as contrasted to
larger ones, and that visible trends are likely to make this
even more true in the future. In short, there are not only
some definite advantages to smaller size, but certain equally
definite disadvantages to larger size.
These conclusions do not, in and of themselves, suggest
particular approaches for decentralized community industries,
but they provide a basis for further research toward that end.
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Plainly, these basic conclusions confirm that industries could
be decentralized with respect to control structures, and thus
more widely dispersed, both in ownership and in number of pro-
ductive units without loss of efficiency. However, this says
nothing about what is meant by community, or community-based,
and how these considerations would modify the general conclu-
sions on size and scale. This involves two related but separ-
able issues; the effect of collective or communal vs. private
entrepreneurial control, and the possibility that some categories
of manufacturing would be more consistent with the community fo-
cus than others. In other words, does either the form of enter-
prise control or its product/market orientation make a differ-
ence, and if so, what? The conclusion reached is that several
distinctions are important and fundamentally more consistent
with a community orientation. These include, in particular, col-
lective control and production oriented toward consumer goods for
local markets. To put it another way, import substitution of-
fers definite benefits, though this is not to be taken as a
drive for self-sufficiency. It is, rather, a shift of emphasis.
Chapter I investigates the economic data of the effects of
scale and the behavior of firms in the marketplace. It seeks to
distinguish, in particular, the effects of scale on plants or-
single plant firms from those related to multi-plant firms.
Chapter II extends the discussion to the actual operation of en-
terprises and seeks to de-
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fine the effects of scale on internal functional efficiency,
particularly with regard to planning, innovation and the use
of human resources.
Chapter III considers the relationship between firms,
the market, and consumers to evaluate again the effects of
scale and size on these matters (including size as a possible
source of market power) along with the relationship between
production costs and other elements determining final price.
Chapter IV then, builds on the conclusions on size and
scale to sketch out a line of further research and theory
concerning decentralized community industries which could
contribute to more truly productive communities. Chapter V,
finally, suijimarizes briefly the conclusions reached in the
previous sections and in the dissertation as a whole,
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CHAPTER I
ECONOMIC STUDIES OF SCALE
This chapter considers the economic evidence on size
and scale, primarily in manufacturing industry. It focuses
on economies and diseconomies related to production pro-
cesses, and on use of resources, and seeks to evaluate these
effects by observation of productive entities taken as
wholes. A particular distinction is drawn between plants,
single-plant firms such as orthodox economic theory gen-
erally considers, and multi-plant or conglomerate (multi-
industry) firms, which constitute by far the bulk of American
industrial effort. Evaluation of scale effects in elemental
or functional aspects of enterprises are discussed in Chapter
II.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
It is useful to begin by distinguishing between size and
scale, two concepts which so far have been used more or less
interchangeably. The distinction is simple; size refers to
absolute magnitude, whereas scale is a purely relative or
comparative concept. It is always appropriate, for example,
to speak of the size of a firm or a plant, whether by that
is meant numbers of workers, value of assets, volume of sales,
18
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etc. Strictly speaking, scale can not be used in the same way;
to speak of the scale of a plant or firm is to consider its
size relative to some other plant or firm, used as a standard
of comparison. Some of the important effects considered in
later chapters are properly considered functions of size
(e.g., access to resources, risk bearing ability, or market
power) whereas many others are more properly related to scale.
Economies of scale concern, therefore, the differences
in efficiency, cost, resource utilization, and the like among
units of different sizes producing the same product. With
regard to scale effects, the important questions concern
whether cost and efficiency changes in proportion to size of
the entity under consideration and how that relationship it-
self changes over the range of sizes involved. In ordinary
usage, size and scale are not so carefully distinguished, nor
is it generally important that they be so. That is equally
true of this dissertation, but if the distinction is kept in
mind, there will be less chance of misunderstanding.
The Idea of Economies of Scale
At root, the notion of economies of scale derives from
the fact that some of the factors required for production
are "lumpier" (i.e., less-divisible)'than others. In princi-
ple, capital can be subdivided as finely as desired, but the
same cannot be said for tools or people. In consequence,
19
those resources can only be used efficiently when the scale
of activity is large enough to employ them fully. Further-
more, even those which are relatively or completely divisible
(capital, raw materials) generally cost more per unit quan-
tity in small ammounts. Since these costs can be reduced
by operating on a larger scale, there is a scale economy in-
volved. Lastly, increased specialization of functions can
provide further returns to scale since subdividing tasks
more and more finely can permit less divisible factors to
be efficiently employed in those more specialized tasks.
There is only one absolute basis for economies of pro-
duction scale, and it follows from geometric considerations.
(There is, however, an absolute basis for non-production
economics of scale, in connection with reduction of risk.)
The volume or capacity of physical objects (containers,
buildings, vehicles) increases with the third power of
length or radius and thus faster than the surface area,
which only increases as the second power. Since the costs
associated with material needs and construction tend to be-
related to the surface area, larger units have greater capac-
ity or volume per unit cost. There is therefore an economy
of scale associated with larger structures. Of course, even
in these cases, as size increases other costs can eventually
rise to the point where they outrun the economies from this
source. Production processes and facilities are sometimes
20
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evaluated for returns to scale using this kind of engineering
approach.
Conceptually, all of these economies follow from spe-
cialization of one kind or another. The ability to use
relatively indivisible resources is the result of an organi-
zation specializing in production of a given good or service.
The lower unit costs of resources purchased in greater quan-
tity stem from the fact that some other entity is enabled to
specialize in the provision of those resources, and thus use
their factors of production more efficiently. And, of
course, specialization of labor is the basic device on
which rests the organization of present industrial civili
zation.(1) The point to be noted is that all of these
sources of economies are related. The potential speciali-
zation which permits goods to be produced at lower cost is
only itself possible because of the system that connects good
and services, producers and consumers, since all people and
firms are at different times are both suppliers and users of
these various economic goods. As Bjork has pointed out:
The large number of firms in the machine-
tool industry, each specialized in partic-
ular processes, is important in the achieve-
ment of true economies of scale. It may
seem paradoxical but it is true that a
large number of small firms buying and sell-
ing to each other may enjoy more economies of
scale than a large vertically integrated
company that produces to satisfy all its own
needs.(2)
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The market mechanism, which attempts to appropriately
link the separate production and consumption units, must
therefore be taken into consideration even in discussions
of economies of scale, since the apparent or theoretically
achievable economies will otherwise remain illusory. One
implication of this issue is that in the presence of un-
tapped markets - possible new users of goods and services -
the need for standardized consumption can be met by draw-
ing on that fraction of the total market available which
can usefully employ the product. However, in mature mar-
kets, as the U.S., the need to market standard products
tends to require that consumers who would otherwise be un-
interested in a given product be persuaded to desire it.(3)
S
These effects combine to produce a general result; the
unit cost of production of any good or service tends to
drop as the quantity produced by a given facility (the
scale of operation) increases. This is represented by the
so-called "L-shaped" curve below,
Unit
Cost
Quantity Produced
22"
In practice, these economies in production must be
balanced against the generally increasing costs that arise
because of transport to more distant consumers. Thus, even
though there is a market demand for the product, and even if
higher level of output (greater scale of production) could
be justified in terms of production economies, increased
costs of transport (which may also arise in connection with
necessary supply materials) will set an upper limit. These
effects are discussed in more detail in Chapter III.
There are four distinct levels of aggregation that can
be evaluated for returns to scale; the process, the plant,
the firm, and the industry. Roughly speaking, each of
these is subsumed by the next level. Processes are operated
in a plant; plants are operated by firms; firms combine to
form an industry. For present purposes, firms are also
differentiated into those operating only one production facil-
ity (single-plant firms), those operating more than one but
in the same industry (multi-plant firms) and those operating
plants in more than one industry (conglomerates).
A process includes only the physical elements required
to convert input materials into a product. It includes
machinery or chemical apparatus, sources of energy and power,
and material costs, but not building, land, labor or over-
head. The addition of those generates the next level of
aggregation, the plant. The firm, includes, in addition, ad-
23
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ministrative, financial, developmental, marketing, and planning
functions and their costs, and profit or margin as well.
Scale considerations at this level take on very different
significance because the firm is the smallest unit legiti-
mately viewed as an independent decision-making element in
the marketplace.(4)
The Idea of Diseconomies of Scale
There is no disagreement about the existence of economies
of scale. The same cannot be said about the effects of con-
tinually increased scale. Is there, in short, such a thing
as a diseconomy of scale, or to put it more accurately, are
there inavoidable diseconomies of scale, and if so, what are
they? If they exist, then the full curve, instead of being
L-shaped is, in fact, U-shaped as shown below.
Unit
Cost
Quantity Produced
The difficulties of understanding diseconomies stem largely
from the problem of coming to grips with the theoretical
24
factors which could justify a U-shaped curve. Nicholas
Kaldor put it as follows:
Orthodox theory postulates a U-shaped cost curve,
which asserts that each firm has an 'optimum
size' beyond which it becomes progressively less
efficient. But whereas the assumption of
failing costs can be adequately supported on
account of indvisibilities and economics of
scale, to explain the upward sloping part of
the curve, reliance must be placed on the
existence of diseconomies of large-scale
organization; a rather shadowy factor which may
be important in creating obstacles to fast
rates of growth, but not to size as such.(5)
In point of fact, these "rather shadowy factors," where
they have been considered in detail, are generally assumed
to be related to greater difficulties of administration and
control as scale increases. That is, there is said to be
little likelihood of observing diseconomies of plant scale,
because even assuming that such diseconomies exist above
some point, greater output than that would permit merely
requires replication of that efficient unit as often as
necessary.(6) Needless to say, this suggests in fact that
there are diseconomies even in plants. These effects will
be considered in detail in Chapter II. Empirically, the
issue thus reduces itself to diseconomies of firm scale
when, for example, several such optimum plants are managed
by a single enterprise.
Kenneth Boulding formulated one view of the basis of
diseconomies of overall scale in the following words:
25
There is a great deal of evidence that almost
all organizational structures tend to produce
false images in the decision-maker, and that
the larger and more authoritarian the organi-
zation, the better the chance that its top
decision-makers will be operating in purely
imaginary worlds. This perhaps is the most
fundamental reason for supposing that there are
ultimately diminishing returns to scale.(7)
Frank Knight described the problem in a somewhat different
way:
But any system of bringing large numbers of
people into intercommunication and coordinat-
ing their activities must involve enormous
costs in actual human and physical effort...
the larger (organizations) are, the more
easily broken into pieces, the larger in pro-
portion is the ammount of energy that must be
consumed in merely holding them together.(8)
The problem with such statements is, of course, that
they are difficult to quantify and test. Even granting the
existence of diseconomies from such sources, it is not clear
at what point associated costs become significant, nor in
what ways they would show up in practice. Their existence
in the general case (as opposed to the specific effects of
poor or inadequate management) should, it has been argued,
be evident through empirical examination over time of firms
of various sizes. It is thought, in other words, that dis-
economically large firms should be less efficient in the mar-
ketplace. In general, this is the basis for most of the
common techniques used to smeasure the effects of scale.
Measures of Scale
The techniques used to measure and observe scale effects
have in general provided quite inconsistent results. This
in itself is curious. In a concept of such importance,
subject to so much effort, something must be askew; other-
wise, there should be greater agreement. In fact, sources
of these difficulties are not hard to find, as examination
of the techniques makes clear.
The central thrust of economic studies of scale has
concerned firms, rather than plants, for one overriding
reason. In mainstream economic theory, the true test of
efficiency, or effectiveness, concerns behavior in the com-
petative market. But plants do not compete in markets; only
firms do. Most economic studies of scale therefore attempt
to observe the raults of market processes, in the assumption
that from such observations of different sized firms, the
effects of scale can be inferred. Such inferences, however,
require heroic faith in a complex set of social institutions,
which deserve some discussion.
Business enterprises are the key structural elements of
the economic system. As such, they exist to serve societies'
economic needs. Since economics is "that body of knowledge
which treats of the creation and appropriation of goods and
services for the satisfaction of human wants,"(9) then the
economic system in general, and businesses in particular,
27
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are to be judged in the final analysis by how well they
satisfy those human wants.
Thus, the notion of the efficiency of a firm, or for
that matter an industry, should refer ultimately to the
population whose wants can, in theory, be met by that firm
or that industry. By the same token, the maximum possible
efficiency, if it existed, would have been reached when the
distribution of those goods and services came as near as
available resources allowed, to meeting the total wants of
the population in question. These formulations of course
raise additional questions of meaning, but that is the
basic problem. The determination of the true state of
affairs with respect to a of these functional criteria is
at least overwhelmingly difficult, and very probably, im-
possible.
It is necessary, therefore, to recognize that the
measurement of economic efficiency in its truest sense is
quite beyond the realistic ability of available tools. In-
stead, we are forced to rely on distinctly less direct but
more feasible techniques, which are supposed to be proxies
for the measures sought. At the level of the firm, such
secondary measures involve either monetary profits or
changes in size (computed variously). The connection be-
tween these indicators and the kind of socially defined
efficiency mentioned above is made by assumption of certain
28
market mechanisms. The extent to which market actions cause
the environment of firms to reflect accurately the wants
and satisfactions of consumers thus becomes of critical im-
portance.
If, for instance, a factory producing buggy whips is
in operation, its efficiency as a plant or as a process
(the technology) could be measured by reference to its
purely internal dynamics. Given the available technology
and materials of construction, the most efficient scale
can be derived from engineering considerations. Few would
be misled by such statistics, since in the absence of a
sufficient number of customers willing to acquire that
production at the prices needed to cover the costs, the so-
called efficiency is irrelevant. We rely in principle on
the competitive operation of an open market to provide
that information.
Similarly, it is assumed that market mechanisms assure
that any business must pay, for the factors of production
which it requires, the amount which reflects the integrated
effect of supply and demand on each of those elements,
whether land, labor, capital or managerial talent. If, on
the other hand, there are forces operating which bias the
market in one direction or another, then it is not possible
to assume that costs and prices are consistent with optimum
allocation of goods and services in the light of the desired
satisfaction of human wants. Whether or not the idea of
"optimum allocation" is achievable, it is the assumption of
such a market that permits inference from measures of pro-
fitability or size to true economic efficiency.
With respect to profitability, John Eatwell, in a
recent survey of available data, concluded that
It is difficult to develop any rationale
for the utilization of the profit ratio as
a measure of efficiency, other than its
ready availability. The size distribution
of the profit ratio would seem to have little
relevance, in either a theoretical or a
practical framework, to the problem of long-
run costs associated with size of firms.(10)
And 11.0. Stekler, in his own study of profitability, noted
that ".....we have not yet devised a means of using the
profit ratio as a measure of economies of scale." The
effect of scale as such concerns the relative performance
of firms of different size, all of which have access to the
same resources at the same price.(11) Profit data are not
closely related to this issue.
Techniques observing changes in size over time assert
in essence that establishments competing in the same busi-
ness (even under conditions of oligopoly) will, over time,
drive out of esistence relatively less efficient firms.
Moreover, to the extent that size is a determinant of com-
petative efficiency, firms will tend to move toward the op-
timum. However, as Shepherd has noted, ".....there are
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many reasons beside social efficiency why plants - in small,
medium or large size classes - may survive, too many in fact
to permit normative interpretations without extreme caution."(12)
There is, in addition, a fundamental problem with the size
approaches. It has been described by Dean and Smith:
Assume...the true long-run cost curve is U-shaped...
Firms that are at a cost disadvantage because they
are too large will sooner or later shrink...As we
proceed past the point of optimum size, the number
of firms available for study will thus become in-
creasingly small and unrepresentative. We might
incorrectly conclude that there is no upper limit
to the size of a firm from an observation of the
effects of that limitl(13)
The other major approach is exemplified by the work of
Joe S. Bain.(14) It consists of detailed estimates of over-
all economies of scale which accrue either to plants or firms,
as determined by discussion with executives of major firms
in the industries analyzed. The pivotal issue, as Bain form-
ulated it, primarily concerns the economics of the multi-
plant firm since, as noted, one can always compensate for
expected diseconomies of too large plant scale by replication
of the unit, and since no such firm would construct a plant
which it regarded as too small to gain available scale econ-
omies.
Data generated by such approaches are valuable because
they represent the sense of those most directly concerned
with the benefits or defects of various sized units, and
because in principle the findings should be essentially free
of the limiting assumptions underlying market-based ap-
proaches. On the other hand, these "questionnaire" ap-
roaches suffer from the fact that those offering opinions
may be thinking only along lines to which their own educa-
tion and practice has accustomed them. In any case, Bain's
work in particular has become something of a benchmark in
the study of economies of scale. Before considering studies
of scale in detail, however, it is appropriate to display
briefly the anatomy of manufacturing industry in the United
States.
ANATOMY OF MANUFACTURING
In the aggregate, American manufacturing is highly con-
centrated. The Fortune 500 - Fortune magazine's list of the
500 largest American industrial (excluding financial, trade,
and utility firms) companies - in 1970 (a poor year) sold
$463.9 billion of goods (65.0 percent of all the manufactured
goods in the country) employed 14,607,581 people, (75.3
percent of all U.S. manufacturing employment) had total after-
tax profits of $21.7 billion (75.8 percent of all U.S. indus-
trial profits), and owned assets worth $423.1 billion (78.0
percent of the assets of all American manufacturing corpora-
* tions.(15) And this is so, despite the fact that they rep-
resent but one-sixth of one percent of all manufacturing
firms. Such firms are obviously enormous. General Motors
(#1 on the list) employed 695,796 people, owned assets of
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$14,174,360,000, and earned after-tax profits of $609,087,000
on total sales of $18,752, 354,000. Westvaco Corp. (#255)
had total sales of $420,344,000 and 15,660 employees. Even
#500 - Arvin Industries - employed 7,850 in 20 plants with
total assets of $108,811,000.(16) What is more, these large
firms are steadily increasing their share of employment and
production in manufacturing, along with the number of separate
plants they own and operate.
Table 1-1 distinguishes between employment and estab-
lishments (plants essentially) contained within firms which
have only one production unit, and those which control more
than one. It is clear that employment is concentrated in
multi-unit companies. Moreover, between 1954 and 1967,
multi-facilitied firms increased their share both of the
number of separate manufacturing establishments controlled,
and total employment. In the former case, the share in-
creased from 11.1 to 16.9 percent. As for the latter,
whereas only 61.0 percent of all manufacturing employment
was in units of multi-facilitied corporations in 19 54.9 it
had reached 71.9 percent by 1967. Issues of economies as-
sociated with firms owning multiple plants are therefore of
central importance, since it is just those which are at the
core of the American economy.
As to the fraction of firms owning more than one plant,
it is useful to distinguish between firms operating their
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CHANGE IN NO. OF MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS CONTROLLED BY
MULTI-UNIT AND SINGLE-UNIT COMPANIES
Table I-1
Total
Establishments (1000's) 287 298 307 306
Employees (1000's) 15,600 15,400 16,200 18,500
Single Unit Companies
Establishments (1000's) 225 256 261 254
Employees (1000's) 6,200 5,300 5,200 4,900
Multi-Unit Companies
Establishments (1,000's) 31.8 41.9 45.9 51.7
Percent of all Establish- 11.1% 14.1% 14.9% 16.9%
ments
Employees (1,000's) 9,500 10,100 11,000 13,300
Percent of all Employees 61.0% 65.6% 68.0% 71.9%
Source: 1967-Census of Manufacturers, Vol. I, Bureau of the Census, 1971
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several facilities in a single industry and those operating
in more than one industry. These latter, in essence, are
conglomerates, which until recently were the most glamorous
companies of all. Table 1-2 indicates the significance of
these distinctions to both numbers of employees and units.
It is also obvious that these distributions are highly
skewed. In fact, even within each category, that is also
true. For example, although the mean number of units owned
by conglomerate firms is 18.9, the largest such firms typ-
ically own many hundreds of separate facilities.
As to the distribution of numbers of establishments
and of employment within different size classes, these are
shown in Table 1-3 for 1968 and 1970, along with the pop-
ulation in each category. It is interesting to note that
the fraction of employment in units with over 500 employees
decreased slightly between those years, the change being
accomodated by a corresponding increase within moderate
sized units. Finally, as a brief indication of the geo-
graphic spread of larger manufacturing facilities, Table I-4
displays, as of 1968, the fraction of statewide manufacturing
employment in units employing over 250 person. This fraction
exceeds 40 percent for all but eight states: Alaska, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming and
Hawaii.
Several points are relevant. First, those states are
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NO. OF COMPANIES, SEPARATE MANUFACTURING UNITS,
AND EMPLOYEES BY CLASS OF OWNERSHIP (1963)
Table 1-2
Independent
Units
Multi-Unit
Single
Industry
Multi-Unit
Multi-Industry
Number of Companies 263,000 4,500 6,550
Number of Units 263,000 15,300 123,800
Mean Units/Co. 1.0 3.4 18.9
Number of Employees 5,570,000 1,369 000 11,602,000
Mean Emp./Unit 21.2 91.4 93.8
Mean Emp./Co. 21.2 310.0 1,770.0
cAz
Source: Enterprise Statistics, Bureau of the Census, 1963
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NUMBER OF UNITS AND EMPLOYEES IN MANUFACTURING UNITS
OF DIFFERENT SIZE CATEGORIES
Table 1-3
No. of Employees No.
of
Units
Total No. of
employees (1,000's)
Percent of all
employees
in class
1968 1970
71,600 68,900
48,200 4?,400
66,000 66,000
1968
133
257
825
1970
128
253
825
51,000 52,000 1,600 1,640
26,400 26,800 1,840 1,870
20,900 21,500 3,240 3,330
8,100 8,600 2,810 2,980
1968 1970
6.2% 6.1%
17.5 17.8
30.7 32.0
500-999
1,000-1,499
1,500-2,499
2,500-4,999
Over 5,000
TOTALS
3,750 3,800
1,050 1,100
680
480
710 9,020 8,730 45.6 44.1
460
220 200
298,500 297,800 19,720 19,760
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1-3
4-7
8-19
20-49
50-99
100-249
250-499
Source: 1968 County Business Patterns, Bureau of the Census, 1969
1970 County Business Patterns, Bureau of the Census, 1971
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FRACTION OF STATEWIDE MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN UNITS
OF GREATER THAN 250 EMPLOYEES
Table I-4
% of state manufacturing
employment in plants of
greater than 250 employees
Less than 30% Alaska, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico
North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming
30-40% Hawaii
40-50% Florida, Idaho, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Utah
50-60% . Texas, Vermont, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, D.C., Georgia, Massachusetts,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma
60-70% North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennesee, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Missouri, Wisconsin,
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi
greater than Delaware, Indiana, South Carolina
70%
Source: 1968 County Business Patterns, Bureau of the Census, 1969
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substantially the least industrialized ones. Apparently, and
not surprisingly, increasing industrial development corresponds
to some extent with larger sized plants. Second, what is
anomalous is the position of New York (and to some extent
Rhode Island), which may indicate that large plants tend to
be proportionately less numerous if development took place
over long times (since both states were among the first
settled), or in areas characterized by high population den-
sity.(17) Against this background, available data on scale
effects can be considered.
STUDIES OF FIRM SCALE
A considerable number of studies have been made by
direct evaluation of various profit measures (absolute, or
as a function of sales or assets) as related to size, which
is ordinarily ranked by reference to sales income. This is
of course appropriate, since it directly evaluates the market
response to the firms' product outputs. One of the earliest
such studies, by Blair, compared the return on assets exhibit-
ed over some years by the largest ten or so companies in each
of 30 different industries. Of these, seven show profits
roughly increasing with size, eight decreasing, and the remain-
ing 15 scattered and variable. A list of the industries in
these several categories is presented in Table 1-5. Thus,
in 23 out of the 30, profit rates either decrease monoton-
ically with size or are apparently unrelated to it. Nor,
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Direct
Candy and Chocolate
Textiles (Woven and Knit
Paperboard Boxes
Machine Tools
Business Machines
Motor Vehicles
Ships
Source:
Table 1-5
Inverse
Meat Products
Sugar
Malt Liquors
Distilled Liquors
Pulp, Paper and
Paperboard
Blast Furnaces
and Steel Mills
Textile Machinery
Aircraft
Varvine
Dairy Products
Bread, Cakes
and Pastries
Periodicals
Drugs and
medicines
Products of
Petroleum
Refineries
Rubber Products
Footwear, except
rubber
Glass Containers
Hydraulic Cement
Plumbing Fixtures,
Valves and
Fittings
Iron and Steel
Founderies
Smelting, Rolling
and Drawing of
non-ferrous
Metals, except
Aluminium
Ball and Roller
Bearings
Radio and T.V.
Motor Vehicle
Parts
Economic Concentration, Part 4, Hearings of Senate
Monopoly Subcommittee, 1965, p. 1755-1760.
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIZE OF LARGEST FIRMS AND RATE OF RETURN
S
7-M 1 0 "10 RPM IF rp,
~1p
for that matter are those that increase with size perfectly
so arranged. In 3 of 7 cases, the highest return is not to
the largest firm, and in every case, a representative of
the smaller half of firms analyzed in that industry is among
the top three in profitability. And finally, it may be
noted that the profit rates in question vary widely within
these industries; not untypically from a few percent to
about 20.(18)
More generally, Stekler has analyzed the profit perform-
ance of manufacturing firms, both by asset size and industry
grouping. Overall, as he says, "....for the profitable firm,
there is a declining relationship between profitability and
size."(19) Table 1-6 shows, for all profitable manufacturing
firms, the relative rate of returns on assets and sales, and
the ratio of sales to assets for different size classes of
firms. It is clear that, per asset dollar (which is related
to investment), smaller firms are more efficient users of
capital. Table I-7 breaks this down further into separate
industry classes. These results, though highly variable,
again suggest that smaller firms are not by any means penal-
ized by their size, at least as regards effective market com-
petition.
It is important to note that even though smaller firms
are more profitablre per dollar of assets than large firms,
the opposite is true of profitability per sales dollar. This
is so because the average asset value per dollar of sales
INDEX NTMBERS OF RATE OF RETURN ON ASSETS, SALES TO
ASSETS AND PROFITS TO SALES FOR ALL PROFITABLE
MANUFACTURING FIRMS, BY SIZE CLASS. 1949
Table 1-6
(Index for Largest Class Equals 100 for Each Distribution)
Asset Size Class
('000 Dollars)
(1) 0-50
(2) 50-100
(3) 100-250
(4) 250-500
(5) 500-1,000
(6) 1,000-5,000
(7) 5,000-10,000
(8) 10,000-50,000
(9) 50,000-100,000
(10) 100,000 or more
Rate of Return Sales-Assets Profits-Sales
on Assets Ratio RatioA
137
130
120
118
119
113
108
105
107
100
AThe profit-sales ratio can be
P P
asset and sales-asset ratios for - = -
S A
Source: H.0. Stekler, Profitability and
U. of Cal., 1963, p. 83.
261
226
209
194
181
151
133
123
118
100
52
58
57
61
66
75
81
86
91
100
obtained from the profit-
A
-, (i.e.) Col. 1 Col. 2).
S
Size of Firm, Berkeley,
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PERCENTAGE RATE OF RETURN ON ASSETS OF PROFITABLE FIRMS
(PRE-TAX PROFITS PLUS INTEREST PLUS
OFFICERS' COMPENSATION ADJUSTMENT DIVIDED BY ASSETS)
BY ASSET SIZE AND INDUSTRY GROUPING,
1955-1957 AVERAGE
Table 1-7
Industry Grouping
Asset Size
(t000 Dollars) t;
I
3
0
0
0Y
0
0
0-
eS
CU
0
E5-4
N
'-4
0
S
C,'
N
0-25
25-50
50-100
100-250
250-500
500-1,000
1,000-2,500
2,500-5,000
5,000-10,000
10,000-25,000
25,000-50,000
50,000-100,000
100,000-250,000
250,000 plus
L a a L
aData not available for
therefore no average rate of
class.
the entire period, 1954-1957;
return was calculated for this
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25.7
21.9
19.9
17.1
15.6
15.8
15.9
15.3
15.5
15.8
14.5
14.1
14.6
13.4
20.3
16.3
14.8
14.2
12.7
14.2
12.8
12.7
15.0
12.1
14.2
14.8
13.7
11.0
a
a
a
a
11.3
11.3
10.4
14.1
9.4
12.8
10.5
12.1
16.0
19.8
21.8
1601
12.6
11.3
10.5
10.3
11.3
11.6
12.3
9.6
9.7
21.6
13.1
17.6
16.0
11.4
12.2
11.1
10.7
8.6
11.5
7.3
8.4
10.5
6.7
Table I-7
(Continued)
Industry Grouping
Asset Size
('000 Dollars)
01 01Ncm0
0-25 26.6 18.7 26.2 23.9 23.9
25-50 20.6 17.4 16.1 19.3 21.0
50-100 18.1 19.2 13.3 18.6 20.3
100-250 13.7 15.4 16.6 17.6 18.1
250-500 13.4 15.2 14.5 17.1 18.0
500-1,000 13.4 14.5 16.9 17.1 15.3
1,000-2,500 13.1 16.2 14.8 19.1 16.5
2,500-5,000 11.4 16.3 14.5 15.2 17.7
5,000-10,000 11.0 18.2 16.3 17.0 17.2
10,000-25,000 11.9 21.2 15.0 18.8 18.1
25,000-50,000 1o.4 25.6 14.2 14.5 16.3r
50,000-100,000 11.0 15.9 14.0 14.7 13.6
100,000-250,000 6.7 -- 15.5 14.6 17.5
250,000 plus 14.8 -- 17.7 -- 18.8
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Table 1-7
(Continued)
Industry Grouping
Asset Size
('000 Dollars)
4 0 24. 82A 0
0 0 p0
p 4  C4
0-25 
-- a 21,4 18.3 48,3
25-50 
-- a 13,5 18.1 19.9
50-100 a 20.7 17.7 17.8 24.0
100-250 a 21.7 12.8 16.9 20.1
250-500 17.2 15.6 11.1 14.2 20.2
500-1,000 17.3 20.1 13.0 16.0 17.3
1,000-2,500 17.0 17.1 12.5 16.7 19.5
2,500-5,000 14.9 15.7 11.7 17.0 17.8
5,000-10,000 10.8 19.1 13.3 17.7 17.1
10,000-25,000 10.2 11.9 19.3 16.4 19.1
25,000-50,000 9.1 12.8 14.5 14.7 18.4
50,000-100,000 9.3 14.6 10.3 17.4 14.3
100,000-250,000 9.0 7.0 11.2 22.5 12.8
250,000 plus 6.6 14.3 -- 19.5 14.3
EData not available for the entire period, 1954-1957;
therefore no average rate of return was calculated for this class.
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Table I-7
(Continued)
Asset Size
('000 Dollars)
0-25
25-50
50-100
100-250
250-500
500-1,000
1,000-2,500
2,500-5,000
5,000-10,000
10,000-25,000
25,000-50,000
50,000-100,000
100,000-250,000
250,000 plus
d
+)
M0
28.2
25.5
21.1
18.3
17.0
17.6
17.5
16.5
16.8
16.4
15.6
19.0
13.1
11.3
Industry Grouping
0 0
0
0
0
If'
C','
28.8
24.3
23.3
21.6
17.5
17.8
18.4
17.2
16.5
17.2
16.2
14.9
14.5
13.9
0
0
0
0
S
C,,'
21.1
25.4
28.3
18.8
19.5
19.7
19.2
19.8
17.9
17.3
15.3
1803
14.1
11.5
$p4
M0
E-4
a
a
21.2
23.5
18.1
19.3
17.9
12.6
14.1
16.1
16.1
12.4-
13.9
22.3
0
"'4
"'4
0
"'4
0
Cl)
21.4
2701
23.8
22.5
17.2
18.1
16.4
16.6
18.5
18.9
12.1
12.3
14.9
19.8
0
0
0
*ie~
0
C,-'
35.5
27.8
21.1
16.5
16.7
14.6
15.7
16.0
13.8
15.1
12.3
13.2
b
aData not available for the entire period, 1954-1957; therefore
no av rage rate of return was calculated for this class.
ata for this class included with next smaller class.
Source: H.O. Stekier, Profitability and Size of Firm, Berkeley,
U. of cal., 193 pp 78-79.
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increases more rapidly with size than does profit. The more
commonly used figures show the relationship of profit to
sales, and are assumed to indicate the superior financial
performance of large firms. This is misleading. Indeed,
since other studies (e.g., Blair, reported above) generally
support the same findings on assets, it is clear that real
efficiency in the use of capital resources is more consistent
with small than large firms. Actually, availability of in-
vestment capital and stock prices both reflect return on
assets rather than sales. Even if one looks at the value
of output in goods attainable with given levels of assets,
it is clear that, for example, ten firms in the $5-$10
million asset class would produce, on the average, 12.7 per-
cent more than a single firm with equivalent total assets
($50-$100 million).
The conglomerates have particularly attempted to make
the case for the virtue of combining a strong central staff
apparatus and common capital resources with relatively small
decentralized units operating in widely different lines. At
the moment, profits are down and divestiture (or in Newspeak,
"fractional acquisition") seems more common; the virtues
claimed for large scale can therefore be questioned even on
the very crude measure of overall performance. There is in
fact data (see below) to indicate that small companies, when
acquired by larger ones, often decrease in profitability, al-
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though it is unfortunately difficult to observe this in
detail, because of consolidated presentation of financial/
operating figures.(20)
However, where such studies have been made, the indica-
tions are quite clear. The staff of the house antitrust
subcommittee drew the following conclusions with respect to
the performance before and after acquisition of 28 companies
by Litton Industries, ITT, Gulf and Western, and LTV - all
major and highly regarded conglomerate firms:
Of (these) 28 acquired companies, only seven
had a majority of its (profitability) ratios
in the years after acquisition higher than the
corresponding ratio in the year before quisi-
tion. In three companies, the ratios were
evenly divided...Eighteen companies had ratios
lower in the years after acquisition...it would
be reasonable to conclude that these ratios
reflect ineffective management.(21)
It would be equally reasonable, however, to conclude that
management was as efficient as it could plausibly be, but
that the concept of large organizations offering a sound
operating environment for smaller entities is basically
faulty. In fact, as has been pointed out, when a viable firm
in the marketplace is taken over and subsequently eliminated
as a competitive entitiy, that actually contributes to
market inefficiency.
An independent study of the influence on product diver-
sification on profitability of large industrial firms has been
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made by Eslick:
The results indicate a rather strong tendency
for diversified firms to be less profitable
than more specialized firms that are about
equal in size, whether or not they are in the
same broad primary group...This suggests that
product diversification may...cause managerial
diseconomies of scale that cannot be overcome
by efficiencies achieved through combining
similar activities required by the firms
various products...(22)
It is admittedly difficult, nevertheless, to draw hard con-
clusions from available studies which, in the final analysis,
often conflict with one another. Thus, two other studies
showed "that conglomerates grew faster than other industries
and that they were nearly as profitable (the difference not
being significant)".(23)
The most careful and detailed study of performance as
a function of merger activity and size is that of Ansoff and
collegues, whose major conclusion is that the key variable
is related to the "relative aggressiveness of the managements"
in terms of use of resources, drive'and ability, an issue
which is not necessarily related to size.(24) However,'their
data also indicate very strongly that smaller firms (less than
$30 million of sales before embarking on an acquisition program)
show much greater percentage change in sales growth, earnings
per share growth, earnings per common equity growth, earnings
per total capital growth and price per share growth, and
moreover, that moderate-sized companies do better than large
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ones on most of the same measures. Ansoff et al attribute
this to the fact that the smaller companies tend also to be the
initially slower-growth firms in the sample. They thus have
an easier time both in increasing their size and rate of growth.
Nevertheless, the data give no comfort to proponents of the
"big is better" thesis.
This point has not been lost even- on Wall Street. Oc-
casionally, the capital market and the major stock exchanges
tend to reduce the total valuation of a new combination of
merging or acquired firms to less than the pre-existing sum
of the values of the separate stocks. This is by no means the
typical response of the stock market, since the conglomerate
merger move which crested in the late 1960s was partly fueled
by the "instant profit" which upward revaluation of acquired
corporations produced. Even so, in a number of cases where
calculations have been made, stockholders of acquired compa-
nies have suffered as a result (e.g., in the cases of E.R.
Squibb and Sons when acquired by Matheson Chemical; Sharp
and Dohme by Merck, Bridgeport Brass by National Distillers
and American Marietta by Martin co.),(25)
Studies using changes in size of firm over time are
generally users of what has become known as the survivor
technique, first utilized in an important way by Stigler, who
described it as follows:
Classify the firms in an industry by size and
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calculate the share of industry output coming
from each class over time. If the share of a
given class fails, it is relatively inefficient,
and in general is more inefficient the more
rapidly the share fails.(26)
Stigler's basic results for 48 manufacturing industries are
displayed in Table 1-8.
It should be noted that the optimum size and range shown
is for companies - firms - rather than plants, and that size
is here described by total assets. As indicated above, the
extent of economies of multi-plant firm scale is modest, at
best. Stigler's results may therefore illustrate the strength
or staying power of firms in these industries, but are doubt-
ful indicators of true scale effects. However, it is inter-
esting to look at the figures for average establishment size
(in terms of value added), which indicate that even in those
industries said to be of largest optimum size, the establishment
(plants, essentially) are quite small.
A very rough basis for comparison in terms of employment
can be gained by assuming a value added of $20,000 per employee.
On that basis, $1,000,000 of value added requires some 50
employees. It will be seen that all but 14 of the 48 industries
listed fall below that line, and half of that 14, on the same
basis, would employ less than 100 people. The effective size,
then, is by no means necessarily large.
The same technique has also been applied by several
others since, and its reliability critically examined by
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BASIC DATA ON FORTY-EIGHT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Table 1-8
Optimum Optimum range Average
Company Size class limits Establish-
(in thousand (in thousand ment size
INDUSTRY dollars of dollars) (in thousand
total assets) dollars of
value added)
(1948-51) from to (1947)
Motor vehicles, incl. bodies and truck trailers
Petroleum refining
Blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills
Dairy products
Distilled, rectified and blended liquors
Pulp, paper and paperboard
Paints, varnishes, lacquers, etc.
Railroad equipment, incl. locomotives and streetcars
Tires and tubes
Grain mill products ex. cereals preparations
Drugs and medicines
Smelting, refining, rolling, drawing and alloying
of nonferrous metals
Office and store machines
$827,828
765,761
525,485
446,483
248,424
203,794
175,404
150,217
141,600
128,363
123,662
100,398
65,914
$100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
10,000
100,000
100,000
10,000
10,000
open
open
open
open
open
open
open
open
open
open
open
open
open
$3,715
3,429
8,310
110
2,000
1,645
394
3,407
11,406
210
552
1,658
1,411
S 0 9 9
Table 1-8
(Continued)
Bakery products $58,960 $50,000 $100,000 $192
Yarn and thread 44,375 10,000 open 687
Carpets and other floor coverings 37,337 10,000 100,000 1,119
Broadwoven fabrics (wool) 31,265 10,000 open 1,211
Watches, clocks, and clock work operated devices 31,025 10,000 50,000 705
Cement 29,554 10,000 100,000 1,600
Malt liquors and malt 28,922 10,000 open 1,750
Agricultural machinery and tractors 28,291 1,000 open 684
Structural clay products 24,001 10,000 open 253
Newspapers 23,428 10,000 100,000 168
Cn Knit goods 17,918 10,000 100,000 273
Confec.tionery 13,524 5,000 50,000 335
Commercial printing including lithographing 11,030 5,000 50,000 97
Furniture - household, office, public building, and
professional 11,378 5,000 50,000 209
Men's clothing 10,077 5,000 50,000 247
Dyeing and finishing textiles, excl. knit goods 9,625 5,000 50,000 545
Canning fruit, vegetables and seafood 6,536 1,000 open 249
Broadwoven fabrics (cotton) 5,847 50 open 2,595
0 LI 9
m m w w w w w W
Table 1-8
(Continued)
Footwear, exo. rubber $4,359
Paperbags, and paperboard containers and boxes 4,127
Cigars 3,753
Meat products 2,665
Nonferrous foundries 2,365
Fur goods 1,966
Partitions, shelving, lockers, etc.- 1,545
Narrow fabrics and other small wares 1,382
Wines 1,304
Women's clothing 1,304
Books 1,137
Periodicals 1,117
Leather - tanning, curing and finishing 764
Concrete, gypsum and plaster products 762
Window and door screens, shades and venetian blinds 667
Non-alcoholic beverages 546,
Millinery 468
Source: George J. Stigler, "The Economies of Scale", Journal
$1,000 $100,000
1,000 100,000
250 50,000
500 100,000
500 50,000
1,000 5,000
500 50,000
500 5,000
500 5,000
500 50,000
50 50,000
250 10,000
0 10,000
250 10,000
100 10,000
100 50,000
250 5,000
of Law and Economics; Vol.
$524
428
174
322
172
55
121
226
227
150
399
307
720
53
110
75
108
I, 1958.
Shepherd, whose conclusions are these:
...results fall short of early promise...
failures are many, proven successes few.
Most of the numerically reliable measurements
are for relatively trivial industries...
Although other methods of estimating inter-
plant, intra-firm returns to scale are still
primitive, the survivor technique is, almost
by definition, inappropriate. What is, is
not necessarily what ought to be.(27)
Although some would disagree with Shepherd's final words, it
remains true that attempts to replicate Stigler's work, or to
apply the technique to other data, have led to unsatisfactory
results. Clearly, whatever pressures the marketplace exerts
are not readily interpreted by observations of firm size.
As to the remaining basic approach, that used by Bain,
his summary results are displayed in Table 1-9. His overall
conclusions are as follows:
The extent to which economies of large scale are
realized if firms grow beyond the size of a
single optimal scale plant has been a subject
of controversy among economists...It thus may
come as no surprise that business executives
questioned on the matter...revealed similar
diversity of mind. Very distinct differences of
opinion about the existence and importance of
economies of multiplant firms were frequently
encountered in the same industry, and in a
pattern not satisfactorily explicable by the
hypothesis that the individual would generally
claim maximum economies for his own size of firm.
The estimates of economies of large-scale firms
based on questionnaire data should thus be
viewed as extremely tentative.(28)
Several features of Table 1-9 deserve comment. Although,
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THE EXTENT OF ESTIMATED ECONOMIES OF MULTIPLANT FIRMS
IN 20 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Table 1-9
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Industry
Estimated
percentage
of national
industry
capacity
in one
optimal
plant
Estimated
percentage
of natioanl
industry
capacity
in one
minimum
optimal
plant
Estimated
maximum
extent of
economies
of the
multiplant
firm
(as a per-
centage of
total unit
cost)
Estimated
approximate
number of
optimal
plants
in one
minimum
optimal firm.*
Number of
optimal plants
which would
be contained
in the
average of
the largest
4 actual firms
Group 1:
Canned fruits
and vegetables
Petroleum refining
Meat packing
(diversified)
Fountain pens
Copper
Typewriters
1/4 to 1/2
1 3/4
2 to 2 1/2
5 to 10
10
10 to 30
1/4 to 1/2
1 3/4
2 to 2 1/2
5 to 10
10
10 to 30
Number of plants as shown in this column are not always calculated from optimal-plant-size
and optimal-firm-size estimates in any simple mechanical way, since the association of differences
in plant-size estimates with differences in firm-size estimates has been recognized in deriving
these numbers.
(1) (6)
None
"f
"
1I
1
1
1
1
1
17.6
5.3
4.6
1.9
2.3
1.0"
W 1WW
Table 1-9
(Continued)
Group 2:
Flour
Distilled liquor
Metal Containers
Farm machines, ex
tractors
Tires and tubes
Rayon
Automobiles
Tractors
1/10
1 1/4
1/3
1
1 3/8
4
5
10
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
1/2
1 3/4
2
1 1/2
2 3/4
6
10
15
No estimate
"f
No estimate
"
'I
'S
It
"
" "
No estimate
"
Ii
'I
I,
'I
I,
Group 3:
~Iw. ~
shoes 1/7 to 1/2 1/2 to 2 1/2 Small,
or 2 to 3 3 to 5 21.8
Cement 4/5 to 1 2 to 10 Small,
or 2 to 3 3 to 10 8.2
Steel 1 to 2 1/2 2 to 20 2 to 5 1 to 8 6.4
Gypsum products 2 to 3 22 to 33 Small 11 8.5
soap 4 to 6 8 to 15 1/2 to 2 2 to 3 4.0
Cigarettes 5 to 6 15 to 20 Slight 3 to 4 4.1
Source: Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U. Press, 1962,p. 86.
24.3
12.5
16.7
7.2
9.3
3.9
3.0
1.3
as Bain pointed out, these figures should be taken as "ex-
tremely tentative", the estimated extent of economies of the
multi-plant firm, as a fraction of total unit cost, is in no
case more than five percent, and very generally much less
than that, if present at all. As later sections of this
dissertation point. out, such "savings" are dwarfed by varia-
tions in internal efficiency, and are further, diluted sub-
stantially by added costs beyond those associated with pro-
duction as such. Bain's important findings on size of
plant are taken up below.
The results and studies quoted here, at the least,
suggest that greater size and scale of firm, per se, do not
correlate well with efficiency, operationally defined. The
basic theoretical questions, however, remain open, and the
several approaches to this problem, combined with the dif-
ficulty of obtaining unequivocal results continue to be a
source of considerable disagreement among economists. The
preponderance of expert opinion probably leans toward the
L-shaped, as opposed to U-shaped curve. Thus, Robin Marris
recently wrote that "the empirical case against a law of di-
minishing returns to scale is now widely accepted except per-
haps in the most diehard 'Liberal' quarters..."(29)
Consider, however, the following two statements, the
first by Nicholas Kaldor:
The very fact that the simultaneous existence
of firms of vastly different sizes has become
such a common feature of industry shows that
diseconomies of large scale management cannot
be an important limiting factor on size.(30)
On the other hand, here is George Stigler:
...if one reflects upon the persistence of
small and medium-sized companies in the
industries dominated by big businesses,
it is apparent that there can be no great
advantage to size. If size were a great
advantage, the smaller companies would soon
lose the unequal race and disappear.(31)
Thus two eminent economists draw rather different conclusions
from observations of essentially the same phenomena.
All in all, three possible explanations can be adduced
to explain these diverging view; one, scale effects are but
minor elements in the total of factors responsible for eco-
nomic efficiency or competitive survival; two, returns to
scale are constant above some modest level, or three, there
are substantial and important scale effects which are, how-
ever, masked by compensating effects from other sources.
These distinctions, if they could be sorted out, would have
important implications for public policy, as well as for de-
cisions to establish new firms. However, it is certain that
the details will themselves vary with the particular industry
evaluated and its structual features. Possible conclusions
must be deferred until more data are presented. First, how-
ever, we turn to studies on the effect of scale on manufacturing
plants.
I
STUDIES OF PLANT SCALE
There are reasons to review data on size of plant, which
are not equivalent to concern about diseconomies of increasing
scale as such. For one thing, by definition, a minimal effi-
cient firm will have precisely one plant of minimal efficient
size. If there were economies to be gained from multi-plant
or diversified operation, a one-plant firm would not be as
efficient. However, as indicated above, this is doubtful, at
least for many or most industries. On that basis, a firm
operating one efficient plant can be fully competitive.
Moreover, even if there are no consistent diseconomies
of scale, and an L-shaped cost curve exists, it is important
to evaluate the minimum size at which available economies of
scale can be realized. Finally, one would like to know the
penalties which theoretically might be associated with opera-
tions at less-than-efficient scale. If, say, a plant of half
the minimum efficient size incurs additional costs of only
one percent, then profitable operation in the real world is
by no means excluded. For new business in general, these
data are critical. For all these reasons, it is important to
look at available data on plant scale.
John Jewkes has pointed out that in the U.S., the average
factory held 37.3 workers in 1914 and 42.8 in 1939.(32) Data
since World War II are not strictly comparable, but the number
of production workers per manufacturing establishment, even
so, was 49.5 in 1947, decreasing to 44.9 in 1967.(33) This
does not constitute a strong argument for a trend to larger
size factories. Jewkes himself drew the following conclu-
sion from these and comparable statistics from other indus-
trialized nations:
If there are pervasive and powerful forces making
for increased size of factories, then they cannot
have been operating long, because so far they have
produced no remarkable results. If, on the other
hand, there are forces acting in this direction
which are deep-seated and have long been in oper-
ation, they cannot be very powerful, because they
have not produced conspicuous effects.(34)
Even granting the above in general, it can be argued
that such average figures are misleading in two important
senses. First, since new (generally small) businesses are
being formed continuously, and at an increasing rate, even if
the size of plants owned by established and efficient com-
panies was increasing, the effect would be masked to some de-
gree. Second, businesses also fail at a significant rate,
especially when small, and average figures may thus include
a substantial fraction of manufacturing establishments which
are demonstrably inefficient (since they are unable even to
survive).
However, the more disaggregated data presented earlier
are useful here. Table 1-2 which breaks down manufacturing
industry by type of firm (single plant; multi-plant, single
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industry; and multi-plant, multi-industry or conglomerate)
shows that in 1963 the latter two categories, which included
only 4.0 percent of all manufacturing companies, owned 52.8
percent of all plants and accounted for 70.1 percent of total
manufacturing employment. Clearly, these organizations con-
stitute the core of the American industrial sector and it is
here, if anywhere, that large plants would exist if they made
economic sense. It is therefore striking to observe that the
average production unit accounted for only 91.4 employees in
the case of single industry firms, and 93.8 in conglomerates.
Moreover, since these figures include all employees and not
merely production workers, they may even overstate the actual
size of plant.(35)
Moreover, the fact that the mean number of employees/
unit is nearly identical for both single and multi-industry
firms is presumptive emidence both that efficient manufacturing
installations need not be large and that conglomerate growth
is not due to the increased size of facilities but to acquisi-
tion of other modest units. As for manufacturing plants in
general, the size distribution is heavily skewed, as indicated
by the fact that the overall mean number of employees per
separate unit is 46, whereas the median is only 5. That is
to say, half of all manufacturing units employ 5 or less
people.(36)
Although equivalent figures for particular industries
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vary widely, there is therefore a strong case to be made that
efficient manufacturing industry need not (indeed, probably
should not) be large. If these powerful and successful or-
ganizations saw benefits to be gained by larger plants, they
would certainly build them. In fact, careful studies of
productivity, as measured by value of shipment per manufac-
turing employee, indicate that the highest such productivity
tends to occur not in the largest size plant, but in those
of moderate size within any given industry. The result of
studies, according to Blair, are as follows:
When examined on an industry-by-industry- basis,
which means that all plants are operating on the
basis of a more or less common technology, the
highest productivity levels are generally found
in plants in the middle size range. According
to the 1967 Census of Manufacturers this was
true of three-quarters of the 420 (4 digit)
industries (including) 32 of the 44 food pro-
cessing industries.(37)
None of this should obscure the fact that real economies
of plant scale exist. The issue is merely at what levels
their incremental value approaches zero. Considerable work
has been done on the direct estimation of production scale
by engineers and technologists. A study of that sort by
Haldi and Whitcomb reached the following conclusions:
1. ...initial investment cost (and, therefore
the amortization portion of total cost) in most
types of plants and equipment (exhibits) econ-
omies of scale up to the largest plants ob-
served in industrial countries. In the more
capital extensive industries, savings in
capital cost are an important source of
scale economies.
2. In process plants, operating expenses
for labor, supervision, and maintenance
also show significant economies of scale.
3. Consumption of utility services shows
slight economies of scale, and consumption
of raw materials generally shows none.(38)
Great variability, however, existed in the specific esti-
mates, some of which indicated the presence of diseconomies.
Consequently, as the authors point out, these conclusions
must be seen as tentative. More importantly, yet, they are
limited to production costs only and are based on a sample
of industries which are known to require large production
plants (e.s., petroleum, chemicals).
Moreover, such techniques, which essentially evaluate
process or plant efficiency in terms of their technical
ability to convert various amounts of material and labor into
the end product with minimum waste of resources or at the
least possible cost, are of severely limited utility in the
present context. Although this is useful information for
design purposes, it is far from adequate for social judgements.
Horace Gray has pointed out that such "efficiency"
is a narrow, quantitative, mechanical engineering
concept, which measures only physical inputs
against physical outputs...This, however is
"engineering" not "social" economics; the results
are informative at the level of mechanics, but
meaningless in any true economic or social
sense.(39)
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More comprehensive information is available, as noted
earlier, from the work of Bain, who combined date from ex-
isting studies (where available) with direct estimates of
scale effects obtained from executives in the industries
studied. It is impossible to do justice to his findings in
a brief space, but some of the most important results can be
summarizied. Table 1-9 (discussed earlier) estimates of that
fraction of national industry capacity that is capable of
being provided by single plants of most efficient scale.
Table I-10 presents the same data as a fraction of smallest
and largest major submarkets (regional or product oriented)
where the industries appear to be operationally segmented in
that fashion.
And, indeed, although the figures vary widely, such
segmentation could lead in principle to a structure of in-
dustry which, by production efficiency criteria, would in-
volve at least some relatively centralized manufacturing
plants, especially in such industries as steel, automobiles,
diversified meats, cement, and fountain pens, serving regional
markets. However, as has been noted, such plants could be
operated efficiently as independent firms, since multi- plant
economies are probably small.
However, this suggestion raises another question. To
what extent would a producer be penalized by operating a plant
of less than optimum size (i.e., how flat is the cost curve)?
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PROPORTION OF NATIONAL INDUSTRY CAPACITY AND OF SPECIFIED
SUBMARKET CAPACITIES CONTAINED IN SINGLE PLANTS OF MOST EFFICIENT
SCALE, FOR 12 INDUSTRIES AFFECTED BY MARKET SEGMENTATION,
PER ESTIMATES CIRCA 1951
Table I-10
Percentage
of national
industry
capacity
contained in
Industry one plant
of minimum
efficient
scale
Percentage
of capacity
supplying
largest
submarket
contained
in one plant
of minimum
efficient
scale
Percentage
of capacity
supplying
smallest
ma jor
submarket
contained
in one plant
of minimum
efficient
scale
Flour milling
Shoes
Canned fruits
and vegetables
1/10 to 1/2
1/7 to 1/2
1/4 to 1/2
1/3 to 1
3/5 to 1
1/2
1/5
2 1/2 to 5
1 1/2 to 7
8 to 10
10 to 20
Cement
Farm machines,
except tractors
Petroleum refining
Steel
4/5 to 1
1 to 1 1/2
1 3/4
1 to 2 1/2
4 to 5
4 to 6
4 1/3
27 to 33
4 to 6
11 1/2
2 1/2 to 6 1/4
Metal containers
Meat packing:
fresh
diversified
Gypsum products
Automobiles
Fountain pens
1/3 to 2
1/50 to 1/5
2 to 2 1/2
2 to 3
5 to 10
5 to 10
2 to 12
1/10 to 1
8 to 10
8 to 12
10 to 20
10 to 15
8 1/2 to 50
1/4 to 2 1/4
24 to 30
20 to 30
30 to 60
25 to 33 1/3
Source: Joe S. Bain, op. cit., p. .
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1/3
20 to 50
Such estimates were also made by Bain; they are summarized in
Table I-11. It can be seen that for plants in those industries
where figures could be obtained, these diseconomies are some-
what higher than those indicated for too small firms, but are
still rather modest. The effect of these diseconomies on
total competitive posture is discussed in some detail in later
sections, but the general conclusion is that theoretical pro-
duction cost disadvantages of the order of ten percent do not
rule out competitive operation in the market.
Finally, Bain summarized (Table 1-12) the relationship
between actual firm size and his estimated optimal size for
20 industries. Save in the case of typewriters (and perhaps
tractors), the top four firms in these industries operate, on
the average, production facilities well in excess of those
associated with single optimal plants. Of the remaining 18,
14 have an output more than four times that of an optimal
plant. This implies either four times as many minimum effi-
cient scale plants, or plants larger than mere scale consider-
ations require.
Moreover, at least in the case of the relatively con-
centrated industries (roughly, the top half of the list), the
distribution of that average output among the four firms is
likely to be highly skewed.(40) Overall, one must conclude
that in such cases, the one or two largest firms produce an
amount equivalent to many more optimal plants than the average
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RELATIVE COSTS AT SMALLER THAN OPTIMAL SCALE
Table 1-11
Percentage of
capacity
supplying largest
recognized
submarket
which is
supplied
Industry by a single Judgement as to relative
optimal plant unit costs at smaller scales
Typewriters 10 to 30 Substantially higher at from
7.5 to 5 percent of national
market.
Automobiles 10 to 20 Moderately higher at 5 percent
of largest submarket; steeply
higher at 2 percent of largest
submarket; uneconomic at still
smaller scales.
Tractors 10 to 15 Slightly higher back to 5 per-
cent of national market; mod-
erately higher at between 1
and 2.5 percent.
Farm machinery, ex
tractors 4 to 6 Moderately higher at 2.5 per-
cent of largest submarket.
Steel 2.5 to 6.25 Up by 5 percent or more of
costs at scales at or below
1.25 to 3 percent of largest
submarket.
Meat packing: Only slightly higher at
fresh 0.1 to 1 smaller scales.
diversified 8 to 10 Only slightly higher back to
1 percent or less of largest
regional market.
Canned fruits and
vegetables 2.5 to 5 Up 2 to 5 percent of costs at
smaller scales.
G8
Table 1-11
(Continued)
Shoes 0.6 to 1.2 Up from 1 to 10 percent of
costs at scales substantially
smaller than 0.6 percent of
largest submarket.
Fountain pens 10 to 15 Higher but no definite estimate
Gypsum products 8 to 12 Higher but no definite estimate
Copper 10 Higher but no definite estimate
Metal containers 2 to 12 Higher but no definite estimate
Flour 0.3 to 1.5 Higher but no definite estimate
Source: Bain, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
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ACTUAL SIZES OF FIRMS AND MINIMfUM OPTIMAL SIZES OF PLANTS,
EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRY
CAPACITY OR OUTPUT, IN 20 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
Table 1-12
Average Mean estimate Ratio of
market share of percentage actual
of first 4 of national average
firms in industry firm size
Industry 1947 capacity to
in one estimated
optimal optimal
plant plant size
(approximate)
Copper 23.1 10 2.3
Cigarettes 22.6 5 1/2 4.1
Automobiles 22.5 7 1/2 3.0
Gypsum products 21.2 2 1/2 8.5
Typewriters 19.9 20 1.0
Soap 19.8 5 4.0
Rayon 19.6 5 3.9
Metal containers 19.5 1 1/6 16.7
Tires and tubes 19.2 2 1/16 9.3
Distilled liquor 18.7 1 1/2 12.5
Tractors 16.8 12 1/2 1.3
Fountain pens 14.4 7 1/2 1.9
Steel 11.2 1 3/4 6.4
Meat packing
(diversified) 10.3 2 1/4 4.6
Petroleum refining 9.3 1 3/4 5.3
70..
S
Table I-12
(Continued)
Farm machinery 9.0 1 1/4 7.2
Cement 7.4 9/10 8.2
Flour 7.3 3/10 24.3
Shoes 7.0 9/28 21.8
Canned fruits
and vegetables 6.6 3/8 17.6
Source: Bain, op. cit., p. 84.
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suggests. Given the very modest savings to be expected from
multi-plant operations (see above), there would seem to be
opportunity for a substantially greater number of independent
firms operating in these industries.
As Bain also indicates elsewhere, he was unable to ob-
tain even qualitative estimates of the shape of the cost
curve (or the penalties for smaller facilities) in a number
of important cases, and information for most others was
sketchy in the extreme. Thus, even those firms with the most
expert knowledge on this question were unable to answer the
question.(41) Further, in an important comment, Bain writes:
It is notable that the virtual advantages oflarge-scale plants with respect to processing
cost only, which virtual advantages are
frequently large, are greatly diluted by the
incursion by all sizes of plants of relatively
constant costs per unit for raw materials,
packaging, excise-tax stamps, and the like.
This dilution proceeds to the point of
substantially reducing (often almost to the
vanishing point) the net advantages to larger
plants. The observation applies in full force
to the soap, petroleum refining, cigarette, tire
and tube and liquor industries. (emphasis in
original),(42)
CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions may conveniently be summarized as follows:
1. Below a certain size (dependent on the industry and pro-
duct), manufacturing plants and firms are technically
less efficient.
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2. The threshold of significant scale effects is not known
with any precision, nor is the actual shape of curves
displaying scale effects.
3. The considerable uncertainty and variability of results,
along with the very doubtful'relevance of profit and
growth measures to efficiency, suggest that competitive
ability and scale are not necessarily related.
4. The penalty for operating well below apparent "optimum
scale" is not great.
5. The presence of relatively constant costs above and
beyond the variable costs related to size dilutes even
the clear advantages of technical scale.
6. There is no empirical case to be made for significant
economies of firm (as opposed to plant) scale.
7. Data on overall profitability of firm indicate the
possible existence of serious diseconomies of scale.
In brief, then, these data do not lend strong support to
those enamored of size or multi-plant firms, and still less
of true conglomerates. More insight is, however, available
from studies in a variety of fields concerned with the opera-
tion and internal structure of firms. Chapter II therefore,
turns to a consideration of data from other sources.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I
1. From at least Adam Smith to the present, this has gone
virtually unchallenged as a principle, both in command and
demand economies. The Wealth of Nations opens, in fact,
with three chapters devoted to this topic. The basic pro-
ductive value of division of labor was equally accepted by
Marx. At present, however, this principle has come under
attack from two directions. Some radical theorists are
challenging even Adam Smith's pin factory, claiming that
the increase of production proposed is not factual and
that the real function of highly specialized labor is to
provide a rationale for capitalist managers to legitimize
their claims to share in the returns (See Stephen A Marg-
lin, "What Do Bosses Do?: The Origins of Hierarchy in
Capitalist Production," Mimeograph, Harvard University,
1971). Second, increasing attention is being devoted to
the issues of work rotation (for example, in the Kibbutzim)
or the use of work teams (as in the new Volvo automobile
factory in Sweden) which depend on different assumptions
for their value. See P. Gyllenhammar, "Volvo's Solution
to the Blue Collar Blues," Business and Society Review/
Innovation, Autumn 1973, pp. 50-53, and below, pp.
2. Gordon C. Bjork, "Business and Economic Growth: A Long-
Run Perspective" in Ivar Berg et al., The Business of
America, N.Y., Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, p. 225.
3. This point has been made most strongly by John K. Gal-
braith in The Affluent Society, 2nd edition, Boston,
Houghton-Mifflin, 1969, Ch. 11. But see also the extensive
discussion on-this issue in Ch. III of the present work,
pp. 185ff., and for a radical perspective, Herbert Gintis,
"Consumer Behavior and the Concept of Sovereignty: Ex-
planations of Social Decay," American Economic Review,
May 1972, pp. 267-278*
4. As an analogue, it is useful to regard the firm as the
molecule in a complex mixture of compounds. The molecule
can be seen easily as a cluster of atoms or sub-atomic
particles but its characteristic properties are destroyed
in the process. At the same time, it should be noted that
a problem arises because, although the firm is the decision-
making entity, technical economies of scale are more rele-
vant to the plant.
5. Nicholas Kaldor, Essays on Value and Distribution, N.Y.,
The Free Press, 1960, p. 4. See also Edith Penrose, The
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Theory of the Growth of the Firm, London, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1959.
6. One should note that this "solution" to diseconomies of
plant scale is itself subject to the same problem of
"lumpiness" or indivisibility as conventional factors of
production. That is, the extra production needed may not
justify a full additional plant of optimum size. One is
reduced to accepting, in practice, either the reduced ef-
ficiency of a single plant of greater than optimum scale,
or unused capacity with its associated costs. The issue
reduces itself, technically, to the shape of the cost
curve; if the optimum point is more accurately described
as a broad, flat region, the trade-off may be minimal.
At the other extreme, if optimum scale of plant is small
compared to total firm production, the incremental add-
ition of another plant is evidently much more likely to
be economic. In any case, it is technicall true that
plant diseconomies can be overcome tis means.
7. Kenneth E. Boulding, Richard T. Ely Lecture, 78th Annual
Meeting of the American Economics Association, quoted in
Oliver E. Williamson, "Hierarchical Control and Optimum
Firm Size," Journal of Political Economy, April 1967,
p. 123.
8. Frank H. Knight, The Economic Organization, N.Y., Harper
Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1965, p. 22.
9. Harold S. Slan and Arnold J. Zucker, eds., A Dictionar
of Economics, 4th edition revised, N.Y., Barnes and
Noble, 1961.
10. John L. Eatwell, "Growth, Profitability and Size: The
Empirical Evidence," in Robin Marris and Adrian Wood,
eds., The Corporate Economy, Cambridge, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1971, p. 393.
11. H.O. Stekler, Profitability and Size of Firm, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1963, p. 6. Note that it
is possible to regard scale efficiencies as composed of
two different sorts; pecuniary and technical. Pecuniary
economies (e.g. cost of capital may be less for large
sized borrowers are here generally regarded as artifacts
of the economic system, and thus related not to the abil-
ity to supply goods and services more effectively, given
identical opportunity and factor costs, but to absolute
size and the benefits gained from it. See below, pp. 177ff.
It would, of course, be a different issue if pecuniary
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economies resulted from greater technical efficiencies
of scale. For present purposes, the point precisely is
that unless firms have access to meeded resources at a
competitive rate they are perforce likely to be less
cost-efficient even though their actual ability to pro-
duce is greater. At the very least, they face an uphill
battle.
12. William G. Shepherd, "What Does the Survivor Technique
Show About Economics of Scale?" The Southern Economic
Journal, July 1967, p. 122.
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CHAPTER II
SCALE AND OPERATING EFFICIENCY
In the previous chapter then, the economic literature on
scale effects has been surveyed with general results that do
not support the case for continuing returns to scale, either
with regard to plants or firms. However, such data are essen-
tially based on a view of the firm as a "black box." Resources
allocated by market or non-market mechanisms flow in; products
flow out, and some measure of the internal processes is given
by the dollar values of the inputs and outputs. However, ad-
ditional and more enlightening information is available from
closer inspection of firms' operational efficiency, given
their environmental characteristics.
It is useful first to consider the general issue of firms'
internal use of resources and, in particular, whether data sub-
stantiate the widely-held assumption of what might be called
high "transformation efficiency:" that is, the firm's ability
to make optimum use of its resources, given its purposes and
goals. Following that, several more specific aspects of the
general problem are discussed. These include the effects of
scale on innovative and inventive capacity, the planning pro-
cess, and manpower and organizational concerns (the firm as
human organization).
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THE INTERNAL EFFICIENCY OF FIRMS
One of the characteristics of classical economists' view
of business organization is a tendency to view firms as en-
tities operating at near-optimal efficiency within whatever
constraints size, industry and the environment impose. The
treatment of economies of scale and of other questions related
to efficiency have thus generally focused on the allocative
aspects; that is, the extent to which resources or factors of
production have been optimally distributed to firms and estab-
lishment within the economic system. Within that framework
firms are assumed to operate on or near the frontier of their
specific production functions. A not untypical statement is
the following:
...businessmen determine the cost of attaining
any (desired) output by choosing the combina-
tion of factors (labor, materials, or capital)
with which to produce that output...The pro-
duction function incorporates all the technical
data about production; it shows the greatest
amount of output that can be obtained by the
use of every possible combination of input
quantities.(1)
If this describes the actual situation, then questions of
allocation become critical. However, there is very good
reason to believe that industrial firms operate not near
their production frontiers, but well inside them and that,
correspondingly, measures assuming the ideal case are likely
to be misleading.
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There are two points to be made. The lesser is related
to utilization of capacity. It is clear that anything which
might be theoretically true with regard to efficiency of a
plant operating at design capacity, with all fixed assets are,
in effect, idle. Particularly in manufacturing, where invest-
ment per production worker is high, the cost of capital and
amortization charges can very drastically change the economics
of the business. This does not mean that, in general, plants
can expect to operate at full capacity. Because of the nature
of capital investment in new or improved facilities (done in
expectation of future needs and opportunities), there will
generally be some excess capacity. In fact, for all United
States manufacturing since 1960, capacity utilization has never
been higher than 90 percent (in 1966), and has typically been
a good deal lower (averaging 83.7 percent for the 11 years be-
tween 1960 and 1971). (2)
It is true, however, that when demand is increasing,
there is an optimal trade-off possible between advance invest-
ment in new facilities and subsequent loss of business from
too little capacity. That means, in effect, that it is possible
for a firm to be following.an optimal long-term strategy while
never reaching an optimal level of performance at an point in
time precisely because achievement of the former condition
necessarily involves the latter as a consequence. Under these
conditions, measures of short-term performance cannot be used
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as indicators of operating efficiency, nor therefore of scale
effects.(3)
But this is the minor point. While economists focus on
problems of allocation, businessmen have always spent much
more time on problems of internal efficiency, in the obvious
belief that it can be increased. Presumably, the growth of
sophisticated management tools, the increased importance of
schools of business administration, and the continuing rise
in business consulting services are further testimony to the
perceived opportunities for improving internal efficiency.
This point has been made very strongly by a highly respected
economist, Harvey Leibenstein, who in 1966 published an im-
portant paper on this issue. In the concluding section of
that paper, he wrote that:
...firms and economies do not operate on an
outer-bound production possibility surface
consistent with their resources. Rather they
actually work on a production surface that is
well within that outer bound. This means that
for a variety of reasons people and organiza-
tions normally work neither as hard nor as
effectively as they could.(4)
That is, the usual assumptions about efficient use of re-
sources within a firm are simply not true. What is more,
those inefficiencies are important. There is generally sig-
nificant opportunity for firms to increase their output for any
given array of resources or alternatively, to reduce their use
of resources for any given level of output.
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Leibenstein, in reaching the above conclusion, surveyed
a considerable body of material from a wide range of sources.
It may not be surprising to discover that the International
Labor Organization productivity missions to many partly or
poorly developed nations were able to produce enormous results.
In such economies one is not likely to be surprised at ineffi-
ciency, and the unit cost reductions to the firms involved,
typically in the 30-50 percent range, are therefore not unex-
pected. However, other studies (such as that by Johnston on
the benefits from consulting efforts in modern Great Britain)
have shown savings of roughly the same magnitude. On the
average, the rate of return on consulting fees was found to
be of the order of 200 percent. In comparable terms:
For the consulting job whose consequences were
quantitatively assessed, the average increase in
productivity was 53 percent, the lowest quartile
showed an increase of 30 percent and the highest
quartile 70 percent.(5)
Thus it is not merely in less developed economies that
such efficiency increases can be obtained. In further dis-
cussion of this point, Leibenstein tried to identify the
nature of what he labelled x-efficiency and although a thor-
ough discussion is outside the scope of this paper, the fol-
lowing quote is directly relevant:
These facts lead us to suggest an approach
to the theory of the firm that does not de-
pend on the assumption of cost-minimization
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by all firms. The level of unit cost de-
pends in some measure on the degree of x-
efficiency, which in turn depends on the
degree of competitive pressure, as well as
on other motivational factors. The re-
sponses to such pressures, whether in the
nature of effort, search, or the utiliza-
tion of new information, is a significant
part of the residual (unexplained increase)
in economic growth.(6)
It is at least arguable, and should perhaps be apparent,
that there can be no perfect utilization of available re-
sources. Theories of the firm assuming that apn single
specific parameter is responsible for observed behavior are
making an overly simplistic assumption. Corporations, despite
the legal fiction of personhood, do not act uniquely as en-
tities, but as a composite of human subsystems, each of which
is attempting to satisfy conflicting and complex needs, some
personal (e.g., keep one's job, do more satisfying work, earn
more money) and some organizational ( e.g., exceed profit
goals, develop new products, maintain the corporate share of
market). These cannot simultaneously be maximally satisfied,
nor can they always be combined into an optimal solution for
the entity as a whole. What is clear, however, is that the
larger the firm, and the more complex the subsystem interac-
tions, the more alternative solutions exist, and thus the
likelihood that efficiency, however, measured, can always be
improved.(7)
Support for these views of potential loss of efficiency
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can also be gained from simple observation of the extent to
which companies "discover" during lean times that they are
perfectly capable of operating at the same level with sub-
stantially fewer employees, or, in some cases, facilities.
The Wall Street Journal, in a recent article, emphasized the
surprisingly beneficial effects of the recent recession, in
quotes from a number of corporate executives. Thus, Thomas
M. Skove, treasurer of Acme-Cleveland Corp. said, "We've
found that when we have to, a smaller number of us can still
get out the work." As the Journal noted:
...many companies can increase output sub-
stantially without adding to the work force...
Often it is merely a matter of having type-
writers and drill presses running more
steadily.(8)
Andrew Hacker has acerbically pointed this out in a recent
book. The following passage conveys the spirit of his re-
marks:
That a large proportion of (corporate) em-
ployees are not necessary was illustrated when,
due to a long labor dispute, one large corpora-
tion took the unprecedented step of firing one-
third of its white-collar force. The whole-
sale departure of these clerks and executives
had no effect on the company's production and
sales. Nevertheless, the company was not one
to show that an empire could function half-
clothed, and it hired back the office workers
it did not need just as soon as the cash was
again available.(9)
The significance of all this is simply that computations
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and estimates of economies of scale, from whatever source,
can be misleading or downright inaccurate since they typically
assum that firms and plants operate efficiently within their
constraints. Since this is generally not the case, what is
being measured, if anything, is the relative productivity of
various entities all of which are capable of (and in time,
probably will) increase their efficiency by amounts and in
ways that are uniquely related to that entity. In addition,
such savings as might in fact be available because of the
p real economies of scale (ranging up to perhaps 20 or 25 per-
cent for a substantial change in size) are capable of being
overwhelmed by the continuing increases due to improvement
in "x-efficiency."(10) As to the effects of scale on x-
efficiency itself, discussion is defered until later in this
chapter.
It may be that this helps explain the great lack of con-
sistency in the many studies of economies of scale noted earlier.
It is still true that, depending on the specific industry or
business in question, firms with only a few employees and little
equipment will be unable to compete with a firm of reasonable
size. Nevertheless, this adds weight to the argument that the
scale needed to compete effectively in most markets is rela-
tively small, and that more may often be gained by a focus on
internal efficiency than by reliance on sheer size. But to a
considerable extent, what is called for is a capacity for
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innovation on behalf of both operating and economic efficiency.
There is a widespread feeling that creativity, especially in
manufacturing, is the special province of large and well-
financed firms. Relevant data, to which we now turn, suggest
a quite different conclusion.
SIZE AND INNOVATION
In the orderly world of theoretical economics, competi-
tion among firms in the marketplace is the normal order of
events. Prices are thereby held to a level determined by
supply and demand curves; individual firms can only survive
by developing better and more economically efficient means of
satisfying demand, either by improving on processes or pro-
ducts. This impetus to innovate is a cornerstone of economic
theory, since, among other things, it forces producers to
optimize the use of resources (leading to less waste and more
flexibility) and maximizes the progress of technology (thus
adding to the stock of social capital and increasing social
and economic options).
All of this follows directly from Adam Smith, and until
relatively recently, such concern as existed in this regard
was more related to the effect of imperfect competition and
monopolistic industry than to size per se. However, in 1942,
Joseph Schumpeter published his monumental work, Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy and started a debate which continues
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to this day. For in it, he wrote among much else, that:
...in capitalist reality, as distinguished
from its textbook picture, it is not (price)
competition which counts, but the competi-
tion from the new commodity, the new tech-
nology, the new source of supply, the new
type of organization (the largest scale unit
of control for instance) - competition which
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage
and which strikes not at the margins of the
profits and the output of existing forms, but
at their foundations and their very lives.(11)
As Schumpeter conceived of this process, he saw in it the
death of capitalism, not because it was inefficient or uncom-
petitive, but because large organizations had learned how to
innovate on demand, and because their very size was becoming
the prerequisite for successful innovation. Thus, the pri-
vate entrepreneur would no longer be able to fulfill his vital
role in the process of capitalistic development, in that new
firms based on new ideas would increasingly be unable to enter
the market.
This would mean, very simply, that small firms would be
relegated to insignificant or secondary roles in the economic
system, in considerable part because they would lack the ca-
pacity to challenge large enterprises based on new develop-
ments and products. John Kenneth Galbraith, in a celebrated
passage, expanded on this in the following words:
..a benign Providence...has made the modern
industry of a few large firms an almost per-
8~3
fect instrument for inducing technical change.
It is admirably equipped for financing techni-
cal development. Its organization provides
strong incentives for undertaking development
and for putting it into use.
There is no more pleasant fiction than
that technical change is the product of the
matchless ingenuity of the small man forced
by competition to employ his wits to better
his neighbor. Unhappily, it is a fiction.(12)
And he added, in a later book, that "by all but the patho-
logically romantic, it is now recognized that this is not the
age of the small man."(13)
Under the circumstances, and considering the importance
of the issue, it is not surprising that considerable effort
has been devoted to studying these questions. Does innova-
tion proceed more efficiently in large firms? Is it increas-
ingly difficult for small firms or individual inventors to
compete on that basis? The considerable mass of data avail-
able suggests that the answer to both questions is a clear no.
In what is probably the most intensive and comprehensive book
on this subject, John Jewkes and his colleagues, in specific
reference to Galbraith's argument, have written that "Since
(publication of American Capitalism) nearly all the system-
atic evidence has run counter to any such doctrine."(14)
Not all innovative activities are of the same type, of
course, and the effect of size and scale on their extent or
effectiveness might reasonably be expected to differ. Most
available data on results concern invention; the initial
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stages leading to the formulation of a useful and novel com-
bination of materials or ideas (roughly, the criterion used
to determine patentability). This is preceded, often, by
basic research; research conducted to explore frontiers of
knowledge, generally without orientation toward specific
"problems" to be solved. On the other side, inventions, once
made, often require considerable development before they can
be effectively used or produced. Innovations in development
obviously include a wide spectrum of activities, shading into
industrial or production engineering. Finally, many innova-
tive activities concern modification or improvement of exist-
ing processes; these may or may not be the result of organized
effort.
It is obvious that, of all these, development is the one
most likely to be responsive to large organized activities,
since much of what falls under this heading, though still
innovative, requires or permits more straight-forward applica-
tion of proven principles. Moreover, where development merges
into large scale manufacturing (as in automobiles) or where
it is oriented to end products of great scope and complexity
(as in space vehicles), the resources required are themselves
very extensive. However, two points need to be made in this
regard. First, even where large size is required, it can
often be generated ad hoc by firms in association for that
specific purpose. Second, within given types of firms, or
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industries, there is no evidence that above the necessary min-
imum size, development efficiency increases with scale of fir.
Indeed, as following sections indicate, much development which
benefits larger firms is done by smaller ones either deliber-
ately set up for the purpose, or purchased after reaching suc-
cess.
Finally, one might note that in certain industries, of
which pharmaceuticals is perhaps the most obvious example,
much of the expenditure on research and development in fact
is designed to enhance efforts at product differentiation,
regardless of the social or scientific value of the new dis-
tinctions. 
-New products of this sort have been demonstrated
to be economically valuable to the firms involved, both by
increasing the barriers to entry of new competition, and by
enabling more to be charged for what is in essence the same
thing. Such activities, though responsible for an unknown
b
but considerable fraction of corporate expense on research
cannot be used to demonstrate the value of the larger scale of
such firms, since the whole purpose is to retard competition
I
on price and artificially inflate the firm's size. (15)
The detailed data on these matters is summarized in
what follows, beginning with the relationship between size
and invention,
Of 71 important 20th century inventions studied by
Jewkes et al, more than half (38) were ranked as individual
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inventions, either in the sense of men "working on their own
behalf without (important) backing" or as employees of insti-
tutions such as universities which provided a setting for
autonomous effort. Those inventions largely originating in
the research laboratories of manufacturing companies number 24.
The remaining nine are difficult to categorize unequivocally.
These three groups are listed in Table II-1.
There is therefore no strong case to be made for the dis-.
appearance of the individual inventor, nor, as a glance at
Table II-1 will show, for his automatic restriction to inno-
vations of little consequence. However, it is also true that
a greater proportion of research work is in fact being done
in industrial laboratories, and that the relative number of
patents being issued to workers in those settings is greater
than previously. Although the details vary with the particular
industry, this trend reflects first, the need in a few fields
for expensive and complex equipment and second, the relative
security and other benefits available from work in such or-
ganizations.(16)
Nor is there any evident correlation between expenditure
on research and development (in which large size is more of an
advantage), and the resulting technical progress. This is as
true for nations as for firms. For example, in the U.S.,
"even disregarding expenditure on military R & D, nor correla-
tion can be established between R & D expenditure and the
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SOURCES OF RECENT IMPORTANT INVENTIONS
Table 11-1
Individual Corpra~te
Air Conditioning
Air Cushion Vehicles
Automatic Transmissions
Bakelite
Ball-Point Pen
Catalytic Cracking of
Petroleum
"Cellophane"
Chromium Plating
Cinerama
Cotton Picker
Cyclotron
Domestic Gas
Refrigeration
Electron Microscope
Gyro-Compass
Hardening of Liquid
Fats
Helicopter
Insulin
Jet Engine
Kodachrome
Magnetic Recording
Moulton Bicycle
Penicillin
Photo-Typesetting
"Polaroid" Land
Camera
Power Steering
Quick Freezing
Radio
Rhesus Haemolytic
Disease Treatment
Safety Razor
Self-Winding Wrist
Watch
Streptomycin
Synthetic Light Pol-
arizer
Titanium (processing)
Wankel Engine
Xerography
Zip Fastener
Acrylic Fbires
"Cellophane" Tape
Chlordane, Aldrin,
Dieldium
Continuous Hot-
Strip Rolling
Grease-Resisting
Fabrics
DDT
Diesel-Electric
Locomotive
Duco Lacquers
Float Glass
Fluorescent
Lighting
Freon Refrigerants
Methyl Methacrylate
Polymers
Modern Artificial
Lighting
Neoprene
Nylon
Oxygen Steel-
Making
Polyethylene
Semi-Synthetic
Penicillins
Silicones
Synthetic Deter-
gents
Television
Terylene
Tetraethyl Lead
Transistors
Continuous Casting
of Steel
Electronic Digital
Computer
Krilium
Long-Playing
Record
Radar
Rockets
Shell Moulding
Silicones
Stainless Steels
Tungsten Carbide
Wankel Engine
Source: John Jewkes, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman, The
Sources of Invention, 2nd edition, N.Y., W.W. Norton,
1969, p. 66-75.
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growth of G.N.P." And it may be noted that Japan, whose in-
dustrial growth in the last twenty years has been extraordinary,
ranks among the lowest countries in research expenditure as a
proportion of either income or population.(17)
Returning to the more direct issue of innovation versus
size of firm, there is widespread agreement that large firms
are not demonstrably more innovative than small. A study of
720 French firms engaged in R & D activities lead to the re-
sults indicated in Table II-2. These data suggest positive
diseconomies of scale. Schmookler has put the case as follows:
...existing comprehensive indexes of output
of new technical knowledge suggest that beyond
a certain not very large size, the bigger the
firm, the less efficient its knowledge-pro-
ducing activities are likely to be. Evidently,
as the size of the firm increases, there is a
decrease of per dollar of R & D in (a) the
number of patented inventions, (b) the per-
centage of patented inventions used commercially,
and (c) the number of significant inventions.
(emphasis added) (18)
Nelson, Peck and Kalachek, in a major study of technology and
economic growth, reached the conclusion that:
These considerations and evidence suggest
quite a different conclusion from the one
equating large firms and technological ad-
vances. No single size firm is an optimum
for conceiving and introducing all inventions
of an industry. Rather, the optimum is a
size distribution composed of small, medium,
and large firms varying from industry to in-
dustry, and from time to time.(19)
SAMPLE OF SOME 720 FRENCH COMPANIES WHO ENGAGED
IN R & D IN 1965
Table 11-2
% of R & D expenditure to total turn
% of R 8e D staff to total staff
% of research expenditure in total
R & D .expenditure
No. of Patents held as % of turnover
4. as ratio of 1.
over
mall
0.7
1.1
0.4
1.6
1.8
Medium
0.4
0.8
0.3
0.7:
1.3
Large
0.5
0.5
0.3
0.5
1.1
Source: Graham Bannock, The Juggernauts, Indianapolis, Bobbs-
Merrill, 1971, p. 177.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
And F.M. Scherer in prepared remarks for a Senate hearing
wrote that:
.. the best interpretation I can draw from my
research results is that giant firm size is
no prerequisite for the most vigorous inventive
and innovative activity.(20)
Jewkes et al, in their own study, drew the following conclu-
sions:
*..the large industrial research organization
cannot be considered, either actually or poten-
tially, the sole and sufficient source of in-
ventions...Three facts point in this direction:
1. The large research organizations of
industrial corporations have not
been responsible in the past fifty
years for the greater part of sig-
nificant inventions.
2. These organizations continue to rely
heavily upon other sources of original
thinking.
3. These organizations may themselves be
centres of resistance to change.(21)
And Arnold Cooper has in fact argued directly that R & D is
more efficient in small companies. He concluded after a study
of his own that:
...the average capabilities of technical people
are higher in small firms than in large ones...
(R & D people) are more often concerned over
how much a project costs than are their counter-
parts in large organizations...(and) the problems
of communication and coordination tend to be less
in the smaller organizations.(22)
Finally it is relevant to note that the bulk of increases
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in industrial productivity are more often related to rather
modest changes in internal operation and evolutionary tech-
nology on the shop floor than to "breakthroughs" or major
developments which by their nature are scarce and unpredict-
able. It is the continuing flow of modifications which have
the greatest impact, and they are likely to represent a con-
stant source of improvement. Thus Fritz Machlup, in 1962,
wrote that:
...it is by no means certain that the increase
in productivity over...time is chiefly due to
the great inventors and their inventions. It
may well be that the sum total of minor im-
provements, each too small to be called an
invention, has contributed to the increase in
productivity more than the great inventions
have.(23)
This was confirmed by Samuel Hollander, in a major study of
DuPont rayon plants. He concluded that:
..."minor" technical changes - based on tech-
nology judged relatively "simple" to develop
...and usually representing "evolutionary"
advances...accounted for over two-thirds of
the unit-cost reductions attributable to
technical change at most of the plants con-
sidered. (24)
Hollander also concluded that:
...it is possible to incorporate within a
given structure sufficiently productive
technology to permit an older plant to
produce almost as efficiently as a newly
built plant. Moreover (comparatively
speaking)...the sum total of the outlay
needed to accomplish the alterations at
the older plant is relatively small.(25)
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Accordingly, it seems likely that large sums of money would
not necessarily be required for truly productive enterprises.
These overall remarks on size in relation to innovation
are supported in detail by studies of particular industries
and companies. For example, the DuPont Co., whose corporate
image is highly research centered ("Better things for better
living through chemistry"), was also studied by Willard F.
Mueller. Of 25 important product and process innovations
between 1920 and 1950, only 10 were based on the work of
DuPont employees.(26) Information on steel, automobile,
bread, and drug industries has been assembled by Blair, whose
overall conclusion was that:
The information developed...provides no
support for the thesis that concentration
is essential for inventions, and only limit-
ed support for the idea that it is necessary
to produce development and improvement.(27)
In the steel industry, particularly, the largest producers
made no significant contribution to the three most important
new technologies (oxygen conversion, continuous casting, and
planetary rolling mills). Myers and Marquis, in their study
of the railroad, railroad supply, housing, computer and com-
puter supply industries concluded that "large and small firms
did not differ clearly in the proportion of products, com-
ponent, and process innovations."(28)
Similar views have been expressed by a number of exec-
utives of the very corporations often cited as examples of
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innovative organizations. T.K. Quinn, a former vice-president
of General Electric, gave credit to small companies for both
discovery and first production of virtually every home appli-
ance, including electric ranges and dishwashers, vacuum
cleaners, steam irons and electric shavers. He also added
that "The record of the giants is one of moving in, buying
out and absorbing the smaller concern."(29) Jan E. Jertson,
vice-president of Business Development Services, the venture-
capital subsidiary of G.E., has commented that it is easier
to fund small, new companies than to operate them as units of
G.E., because this gets the advantage of small company momen-
tum and entrepreneurship and "we wouldn't have to impose our
practices upon them."(30)
Frederic de Hoffman, former president of the General
Atomics Division of General Dynamics Corp., wrote that:
...American business certainly does not
recognize (that change is the most vital
part of technical progress). It conducts
an eternal search for finding perfect
stereotyped solutions to given problems
and is very unhappy when new facts arise
that demand a change in its little world.(31)
And considerable evidence can be marshalled to demonstrate
that even widely accepted new technology, such as computers,
have not made serious inroads into large organizations except
in simple replacement operations. In particular, for purposes
of top management planning and decision-making, the very place
where the most significant contribution is to be expected,
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and where the problems are greatest, there has been little
indeed. A study of more than 12 large companies, selected to
evaluate the expected use of sophisticated information pro-
cessing technology, indicated that in no case was top manage-
ment utilizing such techniques. Even in middle management,
use was only moderate and was primarily in restricted areas,
such as preparation of presentations.(32)
Overall, it can be fairly said that there is little or no
evidence to indicate that large companies are more efficient
in knowledge production and use than small ones, and there
is more than a little information indicating precisely the
opposite. A study by the staff of President Johnson's Cabi-
net Committee on Price Stability reached the following summary
conclusion:
The weight of evidence hardly supports the
simple prescription that large firms and
S concentrated markets are necessary to
achieve an adequate rate of inventive out-
put, and to foster a more rapid adoption
of new technology.(33)
One aspect of the capacity of firms to utilize their
available resources in innovative and efficient ways concerns
planning. This is of particular importance in the light of
the primary social functions performed by business entities;
namely, the provision of needed or desired goods and services
for society. In the face of rapid change, and the great
variety of individual interests and wants, the difficulty of
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effective planning is manifest. It is therefore appropriate
to consider whether large firms can plan more effectively.
More broadly, what is the effect of scale on the planning
process?
THE IMPERATIVES OF PLANNING
In one way or another, much of the issue in any serious
discussion of the role of business enterprise in meeting the
needs of American society concerns planning. Production does
not occur at the same time as consumption for any given item;
whatever is obtained today (at least in the realm of economic
goods) must have been created at some earlier time in the
hope or expectation that it would be needed (desired) later.
In one way or another, therefore, an estimate of the future
is inevitably involved in all economic decisions. It is the
special function of planning to attempt to minimize the un-
certainty in those expectations. As Aaron Wildavsky put it:
Planning may be seen as the ability to control
the future consequences of present actions.
The more consequences one controls, the more
one has succeeded in planning. Planning is a
form of causality. Its purpose is to make the
future different from what it would have been
without this intervention.(3 4 )
* The question is whether the size of firms has an impact on
planning and, if so, what it is.
To start, it is clear that the greater the time lag be-
* tween the decision to produce a product, and its availability
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to the (hopedfor) customers, the greater the uncertainty. More-
over, the uncertainty also increases with the rate of change
of the environment influencing the structure of demand. Fin-M
ally, assuming that the purpose of production is in fact to
meet social and individual needs, the more distorted the in-
formation flowing to the enterprise about those needs, the
greater the likelihood that products produced will differ from
the actual needs.(35)
Galbraith has perhaps put the case for the planning
benefits of large organizations most strongly:
The size of General Motors is in the service
not of monopoly or the economics of scale
but of planning. And for this planning -
control of supply, control of demand, pro-
visions of capital, minimization of risk -
there is no clear upper limit to the de.
sirable size. It could be that the bigger
the better.(36)
His argument rests, fundamentally, on the complexities of
modern technology and the consequent need for closely coor-
dinated effort among the many highly specialized disciplines
that increasingly characterize the American industrial system.
Roughly speaking, this follows because 1, more time is needed
for development of complex devices; 2, more capital is re-
quired for their manufacture; and 3, more (and more costly)
specialists are needed to make the necessary decisions. Un-
less firms engaged in these activities have some ability to
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control their environment, such an array of resources cannot
be committed for the necessary time, because the risk would
otherwise be prohibitive. In effect, this solution to the
planning problem calls for a deliberate reduction of the rate
of change of the environment.
Thus, to Galbraith, the choice is not between more or
less efficient production, but between provision of these
goods (by entities not entirely subject to market pressure,
hence able to plan effectively) and the absence of such
goods. As he writes elsewhere in the same work:
Size is the general servant of technology,
not the special servant of profits. The
small firm cannot be restored by breaking
the power of the larger ones. It would
require, rather, the rejection of the tech-
nology which in earliest consciousness, we
are taught to applaud...The modern large
corporation and the modern apparatus of
socialist planning are variant accomodations
to this need. It is open to every freeborn
man to dislike this accomodation. But he
must direct his attack to the cause. He
must not ask that jet aircraft, nuclear
power plants or even the modern automobile
in its modern volume be produced by firms
that are subject to unfixed prices and
unmanaged demand. He must ask instead that
they not be produced.(37)
No doubt, some would opt for that alternative. However,
the main question is whether, in fact, that is the only choice.
There is, however, a dilemma here. On the one hand, Galbraith
argues that large scale is required in the service of planning
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and control of the future. On the other hand, as he indicates
elsewhere, since the necessary information and experience are
distributed down through the organization, then decisions and
decision-making authority are not in fact held by the organi-
zation at large, still less its visible leadership, but by
rather smaller units which are more or less autonomous.
Galbraith recognizes this, citing it partly as an ex-
planation of the necessary convergence between enterprises in
highly industrialized economies, whether socialist or capi-
talist:
This autonomy is necessary both for small
decisions and what appear to be large ques-
tions of policy...The effect of...denial of
autonomy and the ability of the technostruc-
ture to accomodate itself to changing tasks
has been visibly deficient operations.(38)
But this need becomes increasingly impossible with greater
scale of the enterprise as a whole. It can only stretch it-
self so far, and as that tension increases, one or the other
of these requirements must give way. Indeed, this conflict
may well constitute the source of the most fundamental dis-
economy of scale.
Particularly under conditions of rapid change, whether
with respect to technology or market factors (both of which
exist now), this conflict becomes more severe. The point has
not been missed by businesses. Overall, it has generally been
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agreed that small firms offer advantages of flexibility and
responsiveness, and the ability to develop closer relation-
ships to customers. Thus, as E.A.G. Robinson wrote some time
ago:
...the small firm is strongest in.all those
industries in which fashion rules, and in
which changes of design are constant....
(and) also in those industries where the
conditions of production are so varying that
important decisions must be made at frequent
intervals.(39)
That this is still - even increasingly - true is demon-
strated by the continuing attempts of large organizations to
invent mechanisms whereby they can offer those same advantages.
One need only look at the trend - nearly a stampede - towards
project management and profits centers. Increasingly, modern
theorists in organization and business urge decentralization
of decision-making and new forms of organizational control.
Warren G. Bennis, for example, has written that:
The social structure in organizations of the
future will have some unique characteristics.
The key word will be "temporary;" there will
be adaptive, rapidly changing temporary
systems. These will be organized around
problems-to-be-solved. (40)
This point has been underscored by a recent study of the
effectiveness of business organizations faced with different
environmental demands, particularly contrasting a stable en-
vironment to one in dynamic flux. The conclusions strongly
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suggest that under conditions of rapid external change, the
organization must be more highly differentiated (both with
respect to structure and people), and information about the
environment must be available to more people: "The more
unpredictable and uncertain the parts of the environment, the
lower in the organizational hierarchy this (required knowledge)
tends to be."(41) Thus, increasingly, organizations must
stretch themselves to provide that local autonomy, while main-
taining the necessary overall coordination - an uneasy and
p difficult task.
There are, then, a number of different reasons to suppose
that the need for more autonomous, decentralized decision-
making units will continue to be felt by large enterprises.
The history of the modern American corporation over the last
50 years or so has been in part the development of adminis-
trative structures responsive to increased market and product
complexity. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., in his pioneering study
of the growth of the largest modern industrial firms has
clearly shown the structural response - multidivisional organ-
ization - to changing demands of market and technology. He
summed up the lesson as follows:
...growth without structural adjustment can
lead only to economic inefficiency. Unless
new structures are developed to meet new ad-
ministrative needs which result from an ex-
pansion of a firm's activities...the tech-
nological, financial, and personnel economies
of growth and size cannot be realized.(42)
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The present argument simply is that the new structures needed
in response to today's requirements are different from those
of the past. Indeed, economic inefficiency is increasingly
what is to be seen.
But the general issue is that of coordination; whether
separate activities, factors of production and consumption,
and productive units are to be coordinated through the market
or by administrative action within a firm as its growth in-
ternalizes what were once external elements. This is not the
place for a full discussion of such effects which have, in any
case, been widely discussed elsewhere. Briefly, however,
those activities brought within the purview of a firm must be
justified by the firm in terms of its own purposes and goals,
Whether that shift of control results in a net increase in
efficiency is another story. Observations of the behavior of
the newly-expanded firm in the market might answer that ques-
tion, were this process not subject to precisely the defects
noted in the previous chapters discussion on measures of size
and profitability. The question cannot therefore be answered
by that means in this case any more than it could earlier, and
one is forced to seek more fundamental arguments.
Suppose it be argued, then, that as Galbraith asserts,
if large industrial firms can reduce the fluctuations in the
marketplace, and so limit the changes which would call for
these stressful organizational adjustments, the problem of
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matching disappears. Even granting that assumption (for which
there is no support whatever), what does that imply? Galbraith
himself has phrased it well: "The problem of the technostruc-
ture... is whether it can be accomodated to social goals or
whether society will have to be accomodated instead to its
needs."(43)
However, if one starts with the (proper) idea that the
function of the economic system is to serve social ends, then
it is impossible in principle to subscribe to the notion that
control of the market or of the supply of certain goods and
services should rest elsewhere than with the members of society
for whose needs these goods are being produced. Only they are
in a position to assure that fact, and only then if their
choice is more than among a restricted set of alternatives,
none of which may be their desire, but one of which must be
made to serve, willy-nilly. Galbraith himself is uncomfortable
with this need for market control to which society will have
to accomodate itself. Clearly, if firms could be responsive
to local conditions, they would not need to control them.
That, by definition, is a reflection of their lack of ability
to be adequately responsive. But ultimately, this question
hinges on the other aspect of this thesis; namely, that with-
out that scale and control, important goods will simply not be
able to be produced.
Fortunately, his argument is not supported by the evi-
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dence. It has already been noted that innovation is not the
special province of the large firm. A brief look at the man-
ufacture of automobiles may serve to demonstrate that even
for production, present scale is unnecessary. To start, Bain
has concluded that 7 1/2 % of national industry capacity
could be produced by one optimal size automobile plant. As
to economies of the multiplant firm, Bain concluded that
these were largely advantages of sales promotion rather than
production and distribution. Thus, it is likely that, even
with the present integrated production facilities, some 14 in-
dependent firms could compete effectively in the U.S. market.
Moreover, the disadvantages of much smaller scale are
not overwhelming:
...the trend of the estimates is that cost
would be "moderately" higher at 150,000 units
per year, substantially higher at 60,000
units...But it has been impossible to obtain
quantitative estimates...the firms of the
automotive industry seem generally uninterested
in publicizing their plant and firm scale
curves.(44)
It may be noted in passing that 150,000 units is only 2.3
percent of the 1970 sales, and 1970 was a distinctly off year
as regards the record of the recent past.(45) Moreover, it
has been estimated that the extra cost of American automobiles
as a result of the annual model changes since 1949 amounted in
the latter 1950's to about $5 billion per year. Since the
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annual sales of passenger cars was about 6.7 million units at
that time, the additional cost of such changes was about $750
per car, or some 40 percent of total wholesale value! Some
of this covers desirable and useful changes in power and ac-
cessories. "But have they been worth $5 billion a year? A
reasonable man might have doubts."(46)
It is then, very difficult to argue that the present
structure of the American automobile industry reflects the
imperatives of technology or planning - at least in any so-
cially desirable sense. One can, further, look at automobile
production from other points of view. A detailed study of
the British automobile industry indicated that the economics
of the firm have roughly the following form:
Something like a 40 percent reduction of
costs can be expected as production in-
creases from 1,000 to 50,000 units per annum.
Doubling volume to 100,000 units should
lower costs by 15 percent - doubling to
200,000 (achieves) another 10 percent in
savings (and) to 400,000 an additional five
percent.(47)
But as will be noted elsewhere, a five percent savings in
production cost is not of crucial importance given the struc-
ture of the industry. And, of course, companies like Volvo
and BMW seem to have no problem surviving (and profiting) on
outputs of the order of 200,000 units per year.(48)
Finally, there is no reason why automobile production need
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be integrated at all, Just as in the machine tool industry,
referred to earlier, true economies of scale could be achieved
better by an array of firms producing major elements, (e.g.,
engines, bodies, accessories) of the automobile. The engine,
which of all parts is most subject to technical scale economies,
reaches its minimum unit cost (with present technology) at
outputs of the order of 400,000 per year. European firms, in
general, have chosen that route rather than vertical integra-
tion, in part precisely because it reduces risk and increases
flexibility.(49)
One might ask, at this point, why, if these facts are
accurate, American Motors nearly went bankrupt (or at least
out of the private automobile business) or why British auto
firms have been merging and consolidating so vigorously over
the last some years. The answer, not surprisingly, is that
the lack of increasing economies of scale, or the presence
even of substantial diseconomies of scale, predicts poorly
the outcome of an economic battle among the various firms in
the industry. As is discussed later, size itself is associated
with power, and leads directly to it. Under the circumstances,
it is reasonable to expect that large and powerful firms will
become larger.(50)
All in all, it is difficult to understand why Professor
Galbraith is so confident that the present large size is re-
quired for a viable automobile industry. In some other in-
*
dustries, similar data have been generated. For example, in the
steel industry, as Fortune said recently:
Those famous old economies of scale which
demanded gigantic equipment and blocked the
entry of small would-be competitors - are
greatly diminishing in importance. Small
companies, emboldened by steels' "new
economies" are streaming into the industry,
setting up regional, even local plants,
splintering the business into smaller
pieces - and making money.(51)
These "new economies" include rapidly changing technology which,
as Blair had early predicted, offers considerable saving at
smaller scale.
To sum up then, planning is perverted if it merely be-
comes a rationale for large corporations, and if it becomes used
to control the goods and services made available to members of
society. It is clear that some kinds of production call for
very large entities - space flight being a case in point. How-
ever, that is an exception, rather than the rule. Consumer
needs, if they are to be supplied efficiently, call increasingly
for organizations more flexibly arranged and in more direct
contact with those customers. The essence of planning, under
conditions of increasing uncertainty, is to seek better ways by
which those who have the needs can influence or control the
productive apparatus more effectively, not less.
Under conditions of rapid environmental change, this is
only possible if the "distance" between those supplied and the
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locus of decision-making on the part of those producing is
reduced. Richard S. Bolan commented on the relevance of var-
ious views of planning as follows:
- values are continually changing, goals are
shifting, priorities are varying...A planning
system which ignores this will quickly be out
out of touch and consequently have only a lim-
ited capacity to contribute to the policy-
making process.(52)
But it can easily be shown in information theory that the feed-
back - information linking the environment and the organization
attempting to service that environment - necessarily becomes less
accurate or less complete as the rate of change of the data in-
creases, or as the number of steps in the information transfer
process increase. There are also human interaction problems
associated with size, and noted below.
The rapidly changing present environment presents the
former situation; large organizations involve the latter, the more
so as they grow. What John Friedmann has called the "guidance
system" thus becomes less and less adequate.
- where the guidance system is itself inade-
quate, its "output" may be full of "errors"
or in the language of communications theory,
"noise." An effective guidance system must
bear some meaningful relation to the demands
made upon society and the "turbulence" brought
about by its own actions.(53)
Galbraith has suggested, in effect, that the solution to this
problem lies in attempts to prevent that "turbulence" in the
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future; to control the changes, in kind and extent, that
the society will undergo.
It is not likely, for one thing, that such a strategy
can work. Much of the present sense of social turmoil may
well stem from the tension which arises from the attempts,
however well-meaning, to provide just such control. Emery
and Trist, in an important paper on changing environments,
commented on the implications of "turbulent fields" as
follows:
The turbulence results from the complexity and
multiple character of the causal inter-connec-
tions. Individual organizations, however large,
cannot adapt successfully simply through their
direct interactions.(54)
What is needed, instead, they suggested, is a value shift
which integrates the organization and the environment it
serves. But under the present structure of large corpora-
tions, separate values are internalized because of their
utility to the organization.
Over time, an organization fabricates an
idealized self-image...The elements of fan-
tasy in the view of the organization involve,
usually, some distortion of reality, and,
therefore, prejudice the evaluation af in-
coming information.(55)
This problem is to be solved not by the hope of better plan-
ning on a large scale (although that will always remain a
worthy objective), but by the better integration of productive
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enterprises with the elements of society needing that pro-
duction.
Under conditions of rapid change in an affluent and com-
plex society, the only means available for meeting differen-
tiated and fluid needs is an array of producing units small
enough to produce for their demands, and able to do so in a
relatively short time; and yet large enough to take advantage
of all important technical economies of scale and specializa-
tion. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the necessity
of very large units to control their environment so as to pro-
duce products which in fact no one may want!
Thus far, there can be a strong presumptive case made
against ever increasing returns to scale. However, one of the
most critical questions remains to be faced. Is there some-
thing inherent in the nature of large and complex organiza-
tions which mitigates against effective use of resources or
which places basic restrictions on their internal efficiency?
The information theoretic argument has already been noted,
but the fact that organizations are networks of people has
important consequences of its own. Considerable evidence
exists, and an impressive body of argument, to indicate that
that is in fact the case. The source however is not merely
economic, but social. Businesses are human organizations,
even though specialized, and size itself has important ef-
fects on the nature of human interactions and efficiency. It
is important, then, to look at such issues in more detail
and in particular to consider the psychological and struc-
tural response to scale.
FIRMS AS HUMAN ORGANIZATIONS
There are many data and much experience indicating that
a substantial (and growing) fraction of the workforce is dis-
satisfied or worse with their jobs. These problems are not
limited to blue-collar workers. It is becoming clear that
white-collar workers, including executive personnel, though
relatively more satisfied than laborers, are increasingly ex-
periencing similar problems. Moreover, this general "dis-
satisfaction" is not merely a vague wish for something better,
but it is often associated with deterioration of mental, and
sometimes physical, health. Nor is this a new discovery; it
is in actuality so disturbing to contemplate seriously that
it needs to be periodically "rediscovered", most recently in
a major study done for the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education
and Welfare.(56)
In the present context, the issue concerns the effect of
scale and organizational structure on such problems, and its
opposite, the potential enhancement of health and psycholog-
ical well-being by participation in certain types of organi-
zation as against others. What follows below is an attempt
at an overview of these matters, rather than a detailed in-
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vestigation. Even that, however, indicates the potential
value of smaller firms, differently organized. Further, an
attempt is made to assess the effect of organizational scale
on the behavior of the firm itself. The data here similarly
support a conclusion that relatively smaller firms have sig-
nificant advantages vis-a-vis their larger sister organiza-
tions.
It is appropriate to set the stage by indicating the
scope of the problem overall. One of the most complete and
careful studies was that done by Kornhauser in the early
1960's. He carried out detailed surveys of the mental health
(as indicated by measures of such items as self-esteem, anxiety,
life-satisfaction, quality of social relationships, and dis-
trust) and attitudes toward work of a large and diverse group
of corporate employees in the Detroit area. Kornhauser's
sample included blue and white-collar workers in both factory
and non-factory settings. Some of the relevant results are
displayed in Tables 11-3 and 11-4. Table 11-3 shows the pro-
portion of young workers (aged 19 to 29), all of whom had had
at least three years of steady work, evaluated as having "high"
mental health in four different settings. Further elaboration
is provided by Table II-4 which indicates the percentage of
workers with high mental health as a function of skill level
and type of job. Finally, with regard to those holding re-
petitive jobs, he noted that workers in small plants included
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"HIGH MENTAL HEALTH" (HMH) AS FUNCTION OF
WORK ENVIRONMENT
Table 11-3
Setting Percent of Young Workers
(aged 19-29) with IH
Larger Plants
Smaller Plants
Non-Factory
(Public Utilities)
White Collar
34
51
69
76
Source: Charles Hampden-Turner, "The Factory as an Oppresive
and Non-Emancipatory Environment", in Humnius, Garson,
and Case, eds., Worker's Control, N.Y. Vantage, 1973,
p. 3.
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"H IGH M ENTAL HEALTH" (HMMH) AS
OF SKILL AND JOB MECHANIZATION
Table II-4
Level of Skill
and Mechanization
Percent of Young Workers
(aged 19-29) with HMH
Skilled and High semi-skilled
Ordinary semi-skilled
Semi-skilled, repetitive task
Semi-skilled, repetitive, task,
machine paced
58
35
10
7,
Source: Arthur Kornhauser, Mental
Worker: A Detroit Study,
Health of the
N.Y., Wiley,
Industrial
1965, p. 57.
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29 percent with high mental health, as compared to 18 percent
in large plants.(57)
The results are remarkably unequivocal, especially in
terms of their self-consistency and that with other findings
indicated below, although it should be kept in mind that they
refer to a particular socio-economic system. Blue-collar
workers in small factories are 50 percent likelier to exhibit
high mental health than similar workers in large factories,
though workers in a non-factory setting (in this case, public
utilities) are likely to be mentally healthier yet. Moreover,
the results displayed in Table II-4 show a systematic and
strong decay in mental health as exercise of skill and self-
control over work decreases.
These latter findings are not rigorously related to size
of factory or organization, but they are relevant nonetheless.
The structural and coordinative requirements of large organi-
zations, along with the increased problems of control, tend to
foster repetitive, highly fragmented work, reaching the ex-
treme on large assembly lines. Moreover, it is plausible to
generalize Kornhauser's findings beyond the specific workers
in his sample, and to suggest that the larger the organization,
the less the self-direction and autonomy of most employees,
whether blue or white-collar. Data in support of these prop-
ositions is given in later sections of this chapter.
Although direct comparisons are difficult because of the
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several measures and techniques used by the many investigators
of work satisfaction and worker health in various settings, it
is worth noting that four studies of satisfaction have been
carried out in Israeli kibbutzim (industry and farm) since
about 1968. Leviatan has described the results as follows:
Between 60-70 percent say that they are very
satisfied with their job, about 9-11 percent
say that they are dissatisfied...the rest are
satisfied to a little degree only. There were
no differences found between farm and industrial
workers. (58)
Further, this distribution was more positive than comparative
studies done on both American workers and those of other coun-
tries.
However, one is likely to ask whether such findings are
directly relevant in light of the possible compromise between
job satisfaction and enterprise efficiency. In fact, al-
though data are sparse, one comparative study of this question
has been carried out by Melman in regard to six comparable
pairs of Israeli enterprises, half managerially controlled,
the other half cooperatively administered (Kibbutz enterprises).
Although the study is merely a beginning, Melman concluded
that:
...equal or greater efficiency of operation
(was) found in the cooperative, as against
the managerially controlled enterprises...
This is not anticipated from conventional
knowledge in economics and industrial man-
agement.(59)
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For present purposes, one should note that the enterprises
studied were also relatively small, all involving less than
250 persons. Thus, although Melman did not explicitly deal
with the effect of size, it is possible to suggest that such
high values of both efficiency and satisfaction may not be
achievable in much larger units.
Other empirical studies have also demonstrated some
relationship between size and the attitude and behavior of
members. In particular, four kinds of studies are worth men-
tioning. Revans concluded that, for a given industry, large
size both of organization and work groups, was positively
correlated with rates of absence, strikes and accidents;
studies by Marriott found a negative correlation between or-
ganizational size and measures of job performance; Hewitt and
Parfitt concluded that "working morale" was negatively related
to size; and Thomas found small organizations more likely to
show high quality of work and general organizational effective-
ness than large.(60)
These data are consistent with many other studies car-
ried out elsewhere. Several comments can be made on the basis
of such studies. First, there is a clear difference indi-
cated between large and small plants, which suggest that
small plants are "healthier". Second, it has been shown that
"low mental health" as used here, is correlated with such de-
terrents to efficient operation as absenteeism, rate of griev-
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ances, and even sabotage. Third, these results are not the
result of a self-selection process which places those with
initially low mental health into factory settings. kornhauser's
own conclusion was as follows:
... mental health (as here defined) is poorer
among factory workers as we move from more
skilled, responsible, varied types of work
to jobs lower in this respect...(This) does
not appear to be caused in any large degree
by differences of prejob background or per-
sonality of the men...The relationship of
mental health to occupation, in other words,
seems to be genuine; mental health is in-
timately associated with the nature of the
work...(61)
And indeed, most of the recent focus on possible "solutions"
to these problems has dealt with job enlargement, job enrich-
ment, participation in decision-making, rotation of tasks and
shifts from assembly line to group assembly techniques. All
of these are based on the recognition that the nature of the
work environment, in terms of its task content, its technology,
and its social organization, strongly influence worker satis-
faction. Although such approaches have not been uniformly
and completely successful, there are increasing data and num-
bers of experiences which demonstrate that they do have an im-
pact.(62)
The relatively low level of "x-efficiency" of which
Leibenstein took note, is certainly related to such findings.
As he put it:
The simple fact is that neither individuals
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nor firms work as hard, nor do they search
for information as effectively, as they
could. The importance of motivation and its
association with degree of effort and search
arises because the relation between inputs
and outputs is not a determinate one.(6 3)
A. significant and growing improvement in such efficiency can
be obtained by internal changes which offer the individuals
involved the real opportunity to contribute so as to achieve
some personal goals as well as organizational ones. It is
important, however, to consider the source of these motiva-
tional opportunities, particularly those which bear on ques-
tions of size and scale.
There seem to be three sources important for present pur-
poses; overspecialization of function, inability to relate
narrow tasks to overall purpose and opportunities, and com-
plexity of internal coordination and interaction. As to the
first, Adam Smith himself recognized the potential problem
that could arise from overspecialization, as in the modern
assembly line, although of course he had never seen such a
thing. Nevertheless, he wrote the following remarkable pas-
sage in a discussion of the educational implications of the
highly specialized industrial enterprise:
The man whose whole life is spent in per-
forming a few simple operations, of which
the effects too are, perhaps, always the
same, or very nearly the same, has no oc-
casion to exert his understanding, or to
exercise his invention...He naturally loses,
therefore, the habit of such exertion, and
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generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as
-is possible for a human being to become.(64)
A recent example of this problem showed up at the new
and highly automated General Motors production line at Lords-
town, Ohio, where assembly line workers have rebelled against
the dehumanizing work conditions. This is by no means a uni-
que instance. Business Week, in an article on this topic, re-
ferred to "the increasingly serious problem of worker dis-
content on automated assembly lines everywhere."(65) It is
likely that such problems will increase until work organiza-
tions are modified in significant ways. Blauner, following
his own research, put the general case as follows:
...a nerson is more likely to be (alienated)
...(l) when he is powerless and lacks con-
trol; (2) when his role is so specialized
that he becomes a "cog" in an organization;
and (3) when he is isolated from a community
or network of personal relations which would
inhibit impersonal treatment. The result..
is that...his (own) activity becomes only a
a means rather than a fulfilling end.(66)
The second source, inability to relate narrow tasks to
overall purposes and opportunities, is clearly related to the
first. Not only does mental health and satisfaction suffer
from narrow specialization, but the very ability to contribute
is decreased by those inherent blinders. Schmookler has con-
cluded, for example, that:
There seems little doubt that many of today's
firms have subdivided labor so much that oper-
ating employees no longer understand the rela-
tion of their work to the enterprise well e-
nough to make significant improvements even when
they have the native ability to do so.( 67)
Nor are these problems limited to blue-collar workers.
One of the executive vice-presidents of the Union Carbide
Corporation, a giant by any standard, remarked in private con-
versation that he and his colleagues "had no idea how to man-
age a large corporation." He said they simply did not know
enough of the coporate workings, nor did they know what to do
even if a clear problem was identified.(68)
It has already been noted that much of technological
progress within the firm is the result of a series of small
innovations. This point can be made more generally. The
primary source of all innovations is from recognition of a
need, rather than from technical opportunity as such (as in
"climbing a mountain simply because it is there.") In one
study, only 21 percent of the successful innovations stemmed
from technical sources, 30 percent were a response to percep-
tion of a need/opportunity in manufacturing, and 45 percent to
market factors.(69) And such recognition, whether within the
firm or with respect to the outside market, comes only under
conditions in which workers (executives and labor alike) are
more generally knowledgeable about the organization, its oper-
ation, and its relationship to its environment. This point
has been made by Kenneth Arrow, for example, in a brief study
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of a -candinavian steel mill in which productivity steadily
rose over a ten-year period in the absence of any new invest-
ment whatever.(70)
As to the third source of motivational problems, the de-
tailed and ongoing studies by Robert L. Kahn and colleagues
have demonstrated first, that psychological stress and organi-
zational size are correlated; second, that stressfulness "stems
in considerable part from increased requirements for coordina-
tion," and as a general conclusion, that:
The inplications for builders and leaders of
organizations can be summed up in these terms:
minimize the requirements for coordination be-
tween positions and groups; in other words,
treat every coordinative requirements as a
cost, which it is.(71)
Such findings becomes part of a somewhat broader issue:
the organizational and structural (as against individual) ef-
fects of size and scale. An earlier quote from Jewkes et al
referred to a "resistance to change" on the part of large or-
ganizations. This concept, that organizations, in general,
and larger organizations more strongly, are not easily shift-
ed in their paths, has been discussed extensively by most mod-
ern theorists and researchers. The general findings dis-
cussed earlier support such a view, as does the evident reluc-
tance of large organizations to utilize findings of potential
value - even great and demonstrated value - when it is brought
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to their attention. It is not merely the case that their
ability to innovate may suffer, but that the application of
innovations finds serious resistance within the very heart
of such institutions.(72)
One view of the general problem has been developed by
Schon:
Technological innovation attacks the corporate
society at all levels. The corporate society
is built to function on the model of the pro-
ductive process - that is to say, in a manner
that is rational, orderly, uniform, and pre-
dictable. But invention and innovation are
nonrational processes that resist control.
They are precisely what cannot be managed...(73)
But these problems are demonstrably more severe in large or-
ganizations than in small, other things being equal. The
flexibility, stimulation and rewards which are needed to en-
courage or utilize innovations come much more easily to
smaller groups.
The most obvious proof that large organizations are not
well adapted to innovative activities is the extent to which
such companies have been attempting to set up structures aim-
ing to offer the advantages of small size within the broad
constraints of the firm. The trend toward decentralized pro-
fit centers, venture development units, project management
systems and the like is clear and widespread. It is not near-
ly so clear, however, that these techniques are truly effec-
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tive. So long as that supplsedly autonomous unit is subject
to criteria meeting the requirements of the parent, it cannot
in fact replicate either the reality or the experience of
that same group working truly independently (in the control
!sense - obviously they are subject to important market forces).
This is not to say that such approaches are not useful; in-
deed they are. But they cannot achieve their major goal. In
fact, such techniques have been only partially successful.
To quote Bannock once again:
The divisional venture system, like decen-
tralized control and all the other attempts
to simulate the small competitive corpora-
tion within the large, are only palliatives
and could only succeed fully at the expense
of breaking up the corporation.(74)
It is fair to point out, however, that some small firms,
which are specialized suppliers of component parts., are the
very opposite of independent. They are highly dependent on
one or a few much larger firms who constitute essentially the
whole market for their product. The larger firms, by this
means, obtain the benefits of smaller facilities operated ex-
clusively in their interest, while being free to cut them a-
drift or purchase less if their own purposes would thereby be
better served. Monopolistic practices of this sort are per-
haps less obvious than the more notorious evils of monopoly,
but they are no less destructive. In any case, the preva-
lence of this practice (for example, in the automobile in-
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dustry) makes clear the economic production value of smaller
units, along with diseconomies due to too-close association
with large firms and concentrated industries. Relationships
in which the parties differ enormously in power are generally
equally skewed with respect to the benefits derived, a fact
which is as obvious in economic life as political.
That firms often place control and power benefits a-
bove those more narrowly associated with efficiency is also
indicated by the results from a major study of corporate
decision-making, with respect to the classic problem of
making vs. buying (i.e., is it cheaper to purchase a com-
ponent externally or set up to produce it internally). Data
showed that the actual decisions reached in most of the cases
evaluated were not consistent with the purely economic re-
sults. One of the authors of that study testified that "bus-
inessmen typically make more items than they are wise to make
and, therefore, dissipate a sizable amount of resources."
That is, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, many
p components which are produced by a firm for further modifi-
cation can be produced more cheaply by other more specialized
and typically smaller firms. Such decisions may be perfectly
* rational from the viewpoint of the larger entity, which has
an interest in extension of its control and in growth, but
such an attitude cannot be justified on competitive economic
ground.(75)
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Returning to the issue of scale as such, one notes at
once that virtually all of the new forms of organization and
the processes that underlie them, are more adaptable to small
than large entities. This includes, for example, profit cen-
ters, matrix organizations, self-managed units, task groups,
and contingent reward systems. It is not unreasonable to
conclude that (1), new developments in task organization are
universally based on forming more flexible, personal, and
open relationships among members and (2), this is consistent
with and related to new structures which attempt to convert
large entities into collections of smaller groups in which
face-to-face relationships can be built and maintained. As
noted earlier, it is the temporary system which is seem as
responsive to the new needs, since in the large organizations
characterizing much American (and certainly industrial) life,
there is no option but that small subsystems be temporary, if
only because there is a continuing necessity to assure even
better interconnection among the parts. However, much of this
problem would be obviated by smaller organizations, since
these problems of role, function, and connection are enormous-
ly reduced, in exponential ratio to the number or people and
units. As to the efficiency of the various alternatives to
conventional bureaucracy, much has been written. The general
conclusion is that, although there is much yet to learn, every
sign suggests that alternative forms of work organizations can
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Ibe as or more economically productive while greatly enhancing
the value of that experience to those involved.(76)
At this point, it is possible to return to the question
of x-efficiency, and its variation with scale of firm. It
seems clear that the major sources of x-efficiency are first;
costs and problems of communication and information flow; and
second, human problems stemming from complex sources but
clearly including overspecialization, inadequate understanding
of the total entity, and suboptimizing tendencies which fol-
low from greater identification with smaller units. In any
case, both of these factors increase in importance with size,
and probably quite rapidly. It therefore seems likely that
x-efficiency itself will decrease with size and scale, or, to
put it otherwise, that the gap between potential and actual
performance is likely to increase (at least from this source)
with size.
Against this, perhaps, must be weighed the possible in-
creases in efficiency or effectiveness from two other sources;
first, increased information access and processing capacity,
and second, ability to utilize specialized human resources
not economically available to smaller organizations. Clearly,
* these effects are real, in and of themselves. However, that
is not to say that the benefits are necessarily realized. In
the case of information, it can be argued that its use - dis-
semination, interpretation, and timely availability - is sub-
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ject to the same internal costs and defects, and the same
self-image problem described earlier. Indeed, data indicate
that diffusion of information is slower as organizational
size increases. As to specialized resources, data on conglom-
erates indicate that this presumed effect does not exercise
sufficient beneficial influence to offset problems from other
sources, although more research could profitably be used to
this connection. In any case, it is also clear that smaller
firms can acquire the same expertise by buying it as necessary
from specialized business service firms, which are increasing
in number, scope, and range of services.
CONCLUSIONS
These findings can be summarized as follows:
1. Firms operate substantially inside their production fron-
tiers. Significant gains in productive efficiency can
therefore always be made.
2. Both the number of innovations per resource unit used
and the extent and rate of their application are greater
in small or medium-sized than in large firms.
3. Planning is likely to be more responsive to social needs
if carried out by modest-sized firms. Moreover, efficient
production of major products (e.g., the automobile) does
not require enterprise of the scale which now exists in
the U.S.
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4. Available data indicate that as size increases, worker
satisfaction and mental health decrease, and less con-
structive behavior (strikes, etc.) increases.
5. In general, increased organiztional efficiency and the
capacity of organizations to utilize human resources
are more consistent with small than large entities.
Overall, then, studies of firms' operations in general
and with regard to specific critical functions do not conform
to the hypothesis of increasing returns to scale. On the
contrary, much of the data suggests serious diseconomies of
large scale. Final conclusions, however, must be deferred
until the relationship between firms and their environment
is explored in more depth. Chapter III turns to this topic,
particularly as to the links connecting productive entities
to consumers of the goods produced, and the impact of size
and scale on those connections.
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This Is essentially the point made earlier, in
Chapter I, which has to do with the structure of industry.
The present thesis is essentially that smaller and more
specialized firms (both as to product and market) are not
only in themselves more efficient, but that they combine
to create a more effecient system. Obviously, it is
"rational" for producers to extend their control over
resources and markets, both to enhance their own profits
and power, and to minimize risk. Monopolies, cartels,
mergers and restrictive agreements are among the results
of this kind of rationality. However, none of these
things are clearly identical with or even consistent with
the highest level of attainable efficiency either in tech-
nical or social terms.
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Garson, and Case, Worker's Control. See also Charles
Hampden-Turner, Radical Man, Cambridge, Schenkman, 1971.
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CHAPTER III
FIRMS, MARKETS, AND MARKET POWER
Thus far, little has been said about the firm as it
interacts with the market environment in general and its
customers in particular. Yet this is critical to efficiency
since the latent value of a product is only realized when ity
is made manifest by a consumer's use. This is all the more
important in the present context since final sections will
begin to explore the possible advantages of different rela-
tionships between the producer and consumer (e.g., via com-
munity controlled firms). This chapter therefore explores
the changing nature of the American marketplace, the importance
I
of non-production costs (distribution, promotion, sales), and
the effect of size on market power.
THE CHANGING MARKET PLACE
At the beginning of 1971, Fortune Magazine launched an
important series of articles, called "The U.S. Economy in an
14G
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Age of Uncertainty." In it, among much else, was the following
passage:
There is, in fact, more uncertainty about the
possible course of the economy over the next
tent years than there was at the beginning of
either of the two preceding decades - uncer-
tainty both over the size of the economy and
its composition.(l)
Although Fortune's prime focus was on the social, political,
and technological trends as they will influence the GNP and
its components, there is a more pronounced basis for that
uncertainty. It involves a shift in expenditure (business
and individual) from goods and services conceived as commod-
ities, generally useful products marketed to large groups, to
specialties, more nearly tailored to specific individual
wishes and desires. The uncertainty, in short, is due to the
breakdown of the mass production, mass consumption economy and
its replacement by a more diversified and rapidly changing
structure of demand.
The fullest flowering of the Industrial Revolution was
implicit in Henry Ford's dictum; "You can have a Ford in any
color you want as long as it's black." By the early 1960s
in contrast,- the number of combinations of routine options
available exceeded the total production of the entire Ford
model year. It is unlikely that automobiles will be produced
largely in small local companies, but it is not by accident
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that the industry - one of the classics arging for the bene-
fits of large scale - has developed strategies to meet in-
creasingly unique and even capricious personal desires.
For one thing, of course, it is in the company's interest to
produce what seem to be new and different versions of the
same old product, but a price is inevitably paid every time
an additional option is introduced, or distinctions made a-
mong otherwise identical units. Mass production and the mod-
ern assembly line offer their greatest technical advantage
when the products so manufactured are-precisely identical.(2)
The cost of any such changes are passed on to-the pur-
chaser, whether directly as in a given additional charge for
an option, or indirectly, as in choice of color. That is, no
direct cost is added on for that latter option, but it be-
comes an additional item of internal expense reflected in the
overall price to all consumers.(3) The fact of the matter is,
whether one is in favor of extensive choice or not, its pres-
ence generally reduces the extent to which large plants are
more technically efficient. Moreover, these optional features
are also a part of the general industrial scene. Sheets and
pillowcases (still known as white goods in deference to their
original uniformity) are produced in a vast array of colors
and patterns; appliances not only are available in colors,
but with their own increasing numbers of "features."
A remarkably broad array of changes in purchasing
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patterns demonstrate the same trend. Antique shops, auction
sales, and art galleries have grown very rapidly since W.W.II.
In fact, antiques, as we now use the term, were nearly un-
known before 1940. Older things were bought as art or be-
cause of their historical/cultural value; other objects were
simply second-hand. And it is not merely that art sales have
generally increased; those types of art attracting broadest
consumer interest and growing fastest are graphics, prints
and multiples because true originals in the classic sense are
too expensive for any but the wealthy, and too scarce to sat-
isfy any but a few of the large group wishing to acquire them.
The striking event is not that more "wealthy" people buy art,
but that the consumer base has broadened to include other
classes.
Some figures help make this apparent. Alvin Toffler, in
a study of these phenomena, reached the following conclusions:
Americans spent or donated, all together, a
rock-bottom minimum of $3 billion for culture
(music, art, books, etc.) last year (1960), a
figure that excludes public funds and business
gifts - this sum is 70 percent more than the
comparable estimate for (1950). This rate of
growth was nearly four times greater than the
rate of population growth during the decade.(4)
He also added, quoting from a study by Arnold Mitchell of
Stanford Research Institute, that "the trends toward culture
will create a total arts market of about $7 billion by 1970."
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Perhaps most startling of all is an advertisement which ap-
peared in the Wall Street Journal offering a "guaranteed in-
vestment with an antiques franchise" and which required "no
need for knowledge of antiques."(5)
If one looks at more traditional consumer goods, like
cleansers and cosmetics, the number of such products avail-
able on market shelves has increased enormously. Moreover,
these once-established markets have been segmented into
dozens of differentiated sub-categories, quite aside from
brand names, the numbers of which have also grown markedly.
Distinctions are now routinely made as to applications, style,
color, flavor, texture, method of applying er using, and size -
all quite aside from price. In drug and grocery outlets only,
there are some 6,000 products a year - more than twice the
figure of 10 years ago, and it is expected that during the
1970s, a further 120,000 new products will be introduced in
supermarkets alone.(6) The turnover of products in the super-
market is phenomenal. In 1966, some 7,000 new products be-
came available. Put another way, 55 percent of all items
sold there in 1970 did not exist in 1960, and 42 percent of
all items then available have disappeared.(?)
This trend is driven primarily by a revolutionary change
in attitude and awareness on the part of most Americans. In
particular, as we enter the era of what Marshall McLuhan has
called the "global village," more people are turning to the
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use of purchasing decisions to create highly personal life-
styles and to provide at least the outer illusion of individ-
ual distinction in the face of an enormously enlarged peer
group. As Victor Ferkiss has written:
In culture, as in politics or economics, what
we find is not conformity, standardization and
centralized control, as the proponents of the
mass-society hypothesis allege, but diversity
to the point of incipient cultural breakdown.(8)
Or, as a report from the Stanford Research Institute put it:
It more seems evident that the better off and
better-educated groups are consciously- turning
away from mass conformity...The trend away from
conformity toward individuality and self-ex-
pression should gain impetus...as levels of af-
fluence rise.(9)
And a story in the New York Times, titled "Selling to the
Individual," concluded that:
- the consumer's individuality - and catering
to it - will be one of the dominant themes in
the retail sales-promotion area in years to
com. (10)
One underlying shift which has occurred in the American
economic system is that in disposable income and its distri-
bution. Without sufficient and discretionary purchasing power,
none of these options would be possible. In fact, even over
the last 15 years or so, the level and distribution of real
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money income has undergone a nearly revolutionary change.
For example, total real disposable (after direct and indirect
taxes) income expressed in 1970 dollars rose by 72 percent be-
tween 1955 ($399 billion) and 1970 ($685 billion). Disposable
income per capita increased by 44 percent over the same period,
from $2,410 in 1955 to $3,460 in 1070.(11) Although this
seems modest, when the change in distribution of family in-
come ever the same period is noted, as shown in Table III-1,
the real effect becomes apparent. In short, close to 50 per-
p cent of all American families had in 1970 a money income over
$10,000 per year, whereas in 1958, that was true of only 25
percent, and the percentage of families with real annual in--
comes over $15,000 has more than tripled in those- 12 years.
That change in the distribution of income has greatly in-
creased the purchasing flexibility of most American families.
There is every reason to suppose that this trend will continue,
at least for the foreseeable future. It is therefore clear
that the forces leading'both individuals and organizations to-
ward increased use of purchasing options as expressions of in-
dividual interest are -supported by an increasing financial
capability to exercise those options.(12)
Business, of course, has often been seen as the cause of
this 6itutation. It is argued that business creates more de-
mand, via advertising, promotion, and various marketing tech-
niques, in the process turning people into consumptive machines,
pp! T
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CHANGE IN DISTRIBUTION OF
FAMILY INCOME OVER TIME
Table 111-1
Under $5,000
5,000-10,000
10,000-15,000
Over $15,000
Family Money Income,
Before Taxes
Percent Distribution of Family
Income, Before Taxes,
In Constant (1970) Dollars
Source: "Consumer Income", Current Population Reports, Bureau
of the Census, May 20, 1971.
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32.0
44.8
16.2
6.8
29.7
41.4
19.5
9.5
1965
24.1
36.9
24.3
14.6
1970
19.3
31.7
26.8
2203
independent of need or real value of the object "consumed."
Without denying some truth in that argument, it must be said,
as previous remarks have attempted to demonstrate, that the
situation is not quite so simple. Despite the pressure from
business, people consume in ways that do not uniformly con-
form to business interests.
One must distinguish an omnivorous appetite to consume
from peoples' very real and important psychological need to
express their own individuality, in part through shaping their
material environment; that is, by acquiring material goods
which can be incorporated into one's life space. To quote
Simmel:
Every property is an extension of personality;-
property is that which obeys our will, that in
which our egos express, and externally realize
themselves.(13)
Thus, the reason why marketing works at all is because it
draws on fundamental psychosocial needs, and not merely be-
cause of the Machiavellian genius of business enterprise. In
any case, the ultimate proof of this proposition is the fact
that business-enterprises themselves are caught in a difficult
situation, which poses enormous challenges to their capacity
to survive in present form.
From the companies' point of view, the critical issue
is that in broad areas, the total market has not risen nearly
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as fast as its segmentation, and both manufacturers and mer-
chandisers are caught in a situation neither to their liking
nor their benefit. Since the market targets for new pro-
ducts are decreasing in size, being smaller and more special-.
ized sectors in a broad category, the likelihood of making a
profit on any one product is shrinking. At present, it is
estimated that over 80 percent of all new products actually
introduced to the market will fail, not to mention the far
greater number yet which are killed before that point. In
total, some $15 billion are spent annually in this process.(14)
The effect overall is clear; available markets for many given-
items are shrinking and firms with smaller production capa-
bility can compete more effectively.
It should also be noted that industrial products - as
opposed to consumer - are feeling the same pinch. Business
Week, in a major report on the new product problem, quoted
Magnus E. Robinson, general manager of the Polymers Division
of Shell Chemical Co., as follows:
- more than ever before, the challenge is to
know the individual needs of the industry you
market to...You risk virtually having to make
a new product for every different application
by every type of industrial customer.(15)
All of these effects place greater importance on close rela--
tionships between producer and consumer, or' innovative func-
tions like research and development, than on the organization's
ability to produce vast quantities of identical products at
the least possible price. The relevant effects of scale thus
become very different from those conventionally observed.
New strategies are being developed in an attempt to
cope with these new demands. For example, in an article on
marketing and its relation to new product development, Nor-
man Barnett made a strong argument for a shift in focus,
from looking at markets as generalized groups of customers
defined by demographic and economic parameters, to "consumers'
perception of products" as offering particular values to them.(16)
This is not easily done, given the present structure of
American industry. Business Week, in a major article on con-
sumer behavior, had this to say:
For companies that serve the consumer's needs,
the challenges are stupendous. There is the
obvious problem of simply trying to cope with
the consumer's bewildering diversity of tastes.
For large manufacturers, this involves no less
than learning to custom-build on a mass basis
and to switch over to what urbanologist Jane
Jacobs calls "differentiated production."(17)
This very focus on "custom-building on a mass basis" raises
the most serious questions about the size of economic units
most suited to doing it. Since business grew large by learn-
ing how- to- develop, -produce and market products for true mass
consumption, the breakdown' of that market suggests that present
requirements could be better served by other - smaller - units.
That follows for two reasons. First, the structure, or-
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ganization, specialization of function, technology, and ex-
perience derived from producing the largest quantities of i-
dentical products for wide distribution to undifferentiated
consumers is increasingly inappropriate as both products and
consumers become more individually treated. Such a change
is not at all easy, and firms setting up specifically to meet
the latter sort of demand would be expected to offer superior
performance in any but the very long run (where other firms
could conceivably learn appropriate behavior). Second, the
p scale of effort for differentiated production would itself
ideally be smaller, as would such ancillary functions as
sales, marketing, product planning, and distribution. This
0 is due to the fact that as markets become-more segmented, they
come continually closer to the ideal field of action for-small-
er firms, which are much better suited to close relationships
with customers, assessment of specialized demand, and produc-
tion of more highly tailored products.
This, of course, says nothing of -the competitive effect
which these proliferating products generate in some -fields.
A substantial number of companies - especially large ones -
are dropping product lines in which they were once predomi-
nant and more lften than not leaving the field to much small-
er and more specialized organizations. Consider home appli--
ances, for example, the total market for which was about $16
billion in 1971. During the last year, General Electric Co.
157
f
(presently the 4th largest U.S. industrial corporation) crop-
ped entirely vacuum cleaners, electric blenders, fans and
heaters, and Westinghouse Electric Corporation (14th largest
industrial) eliminated television sets, electric knives and
tooth brushes, tape recorders, hot plates, blenders and ul-
timately all small appliances, even toasters.(18) Although
some of these product lines were probably sold to other firms,
most of these changes simply represent a drop in the number
of competitors in such markets. The market share previously
held by Westinghouse and General Electric is then largely
picked up by more specialized firms (e.g., Sunbeam) which,
though sizable in absolute terms, are much smaller than the
giants.
It is also clear that these very large -manufacturers
are aware-that they are simply unable to compete in products
which increasingly do not offer the scope for their greater
size (and hence, presumed production efficiency) to overcome
the advantages of smaller, more flexible organization. These
companies, said the Wall Street Journal:
- figure they can do better in their primary
markets if they quit trying to do too many
other thing. They're getting away from the
concept that they have to offer every conceiv-
able product their customers might need...(19)
And, of course, this is related to their greater opportunity
to malce profits in more controlled markets. To quote John S.
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Chamberlain, general manager of GE's housewares division:
After a thorough review, we have concluded
that there are opportunities within the scope
of our division product responsibility which
provide a greater return than exists with
these (dropped) products.(20)
It would appear that where serious competition exists, in-
cluding competition on price, the largest companies can be
at a distinct disadvantage.
So far, this work has focussed very largely on the effects
of scale on production processes, including both its economic
and operational aspects. Discussion of market issues, however,
calls attention to the fact that final price of a good to the
purchaser is based not merely on the cost of production per se,
but also on the costs associated with physical distribution,
(including wholesale and retail units) advertising and sales*
promotion, not to mention profit. To do justice to these sub-
jects would require much more space than can be devoted~to
them here. However, some indication at least of the relative
importance of production costs, vis-a-vis other costs, is re-
quired before significant conclusions can be drawn as to the
relevance of these overall findings to smaller enterprises.
PRODUCTION IN PERSPECTIVE
If efficiency is taken (as noted in Chapter 1) with re-
ference to the satisfaction of human and social needs, then
the costs of production must be balanced against costs from
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other sources. These include not only costs of physical trans.
port of goods, but such other items as marketing and sales,
research and development, general overhead, and profit for man-
ufacturers, wholesale, and retail firms. Industrial location
theory, to take that first, is based precisely on minimizing
the total cost of production and transport. In the simplest
case, unit costs of production, which up to some point de-
crease with scale, are compared to unit costs of distribution,
which tend to increase (other things being equal) with the
size of the area served. Thus, it does not automatically fol-
low that increased returns to scale necessarily justify cen-
tralized production facilities. However, if the costs of pro-
duction are very large as compared to the costs -of distribu-
tion, it is likely that large centralized plants are justifi-
able (at least, on those purely economic grounds).
Of course, whatever the specific case, the presence of
I
other costs dilutes the effects of scale. For example, if
production costs make up only half the total cost of a good,
operation of a smaller plant at a ten percent disadvantage
due to too small scale would add only five percent- to the
customer's cost, assuming no change in other costs. In the
particular case of physical distribution and transport, these
could even decrease if a smaller are is being served, because
such costs tend to rise with distance (but not linearly).
Thus, the final increment in price may be smaller yet. In
160
actuality, cost variations are much more complex, but these
basic principles hold.(21)
There are also economies of scale associated with aspects
of the firm other than those directly related to production
(e.g., distribution, wholesaling, and retailing). Some of
these are similar or identical to those enjoyed by produc-
tion units; for example, the ability to afford specialized
management or technical resources. Others are more peculiar
to those industries, such as those deriving from the ability
to hold large stores of inventory. And equally, whatever
power attaches to size, (discussed later in this chapter),
is accessible to large service firms. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to differentiate such real economies, which can be
gained by the individual plant or establishment, from the
false claims made for their advantages when agglomerated into
larger firms. In any case, this does not diminish the neces-
sity of a tradeoff between production costs and the various
distributed costs associated with the delivery of goods to
consumers.
The costs directly associated with physical production of
a product, then, and it is only these costs to which the ec-
onomies of manufacturing scale apply, constitute only a part
of the whole. It is difficult to assess these costs exactly,
since they vary with product, with firm, and with time, and
are often associated differently with conventional accounting
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categories. With these caveats in mind,. however, Table 111-2
is an attempt to derive an average breakdown of cost in several
lines of business in the absence of transport costs for finish-
ed goods. In this table, overhead includes all costs but trans-
port, aside from those directly related to production of the
good (for manufacturers) or purchase of it (for merchandisers),
which are included in "Cost of Sales". The mean value of cost
of sales per dollar of retail sales price for the product
classes listed is 0.384; that is, only a bit more than one--
third of the final price derives from costs associated with
.physical production.(22) That is, even if there were no costs
associated with distribution of goods to customers, there
would be a very considerable dilution of the effects of pro-
duction scale because of the additional functional and organi-
zational costs associated with present industrial structure.
Clearly, when transport costs are considered, the fraction of
final consumer cost which represents production as such is
smaller yet. A very rough estimate may be derived by noting
that the -cost of physical transfer of goods is about seven
percent of the- total market value of consumer goods sold.(23)
-The markup between production cost at the plant, and final
price -to consumers, Is therefore probably about three times.
The figures in Table 111-2 also tend to be conservative,
since it is in the interest of every firm to apportion as
much capital as possible onto a current account, in order to
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FRACTION OF COST ASSOCIATED WITH ELEMENTS OF
BUSINESS PER DOLLAR OF REPAIL SALES PRICE
Table 111-2
Products
Manufacturer
Coat of Sales 1Overhead
Wholesaler/
Distributor Overhead
__du s- D- -r o Ovrha Ovehea
Malt Liquors
General Apparel
Canned/Frozen
Foods
Drugs
Automobile Parts&
Accessories
General Hardware
Household Appli-
ances
Gasoline/Oil
.33
.52
.27
.47
.32
.33
.43
Source: Calculated from "Cost
1971.
.33
.12
.19
.30
.16
.23
.18
.22
h
of Doing -BusTnss in 185 Lines,"
.14
.12
.08
.13
.20
.15
.13
.11
Retailer
Overhead
.20
.36
.21
.30
.16
.30
.36
.24
N.Y., Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.,
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reduce income tax liability. Horeover, other sources of sim-
ilar data based on direct analysis of specific companies -doing
business in these various industries, typically show higher ad-
ministrative and overhead costs-than those reflected in the
table, which are based on a statistical sample of income tax
returns. It is clear, in any case, that the economies associ-
ated with production at different scales has a distinctly
smaller effect on the consumer price than appears at first
blush.
For these reassons, calculations of scale economies made
with respect only to one element of production or distribution
of the total process of producing and delivering goods to the
consumer can give rise to misleading conclusions. The presence
of large additional costs not taken into- account dilutes the
effect of economies of production scale. Moreover, it is pos-
sible that though the individual elements of the system appear
to be efficient, the whole system is not. A large manufacturer
may well be operating at a size that minimizes production costs
by gaining all available economies of scale. The distributor
or wholesaler who handles the products from such firms may
also be efficient, given -the structure of the production sec-
tor. -However, the total process, measured without regard to
firm boundaries, may not be efficient, since there may be op-
portunities for a different trade-off between size of plant
and costs of distribution. Obviously, a facility producing
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vast quantities of a product, serving a large market (in the
sense of geographic area covered) will also be requiring, on
the average, higher costs of physical distribution than sev-
eral smaller plants distributed through the market territory.
In such a case, what is the true measure of efficiency?
Clearly, that overall structure of the industry which mini-
mizes total cost to the final consumer.(24)
In fact, the situation of many products can be shown to
be much more estreme yet, by concidering the private or house
brands which many retail outlets offer in direct competition
with nationally known products. These are essentially of
two types; those made explicitly for a particular chain or
retail establishment (e.g., tools and paint for Sears Roebuck,
home remedies and toiletries for CVS stores, canned and fro-
zen foods for A & P, etc.) and those provided through an in-
p tervening firm for distribution to smaller outlets whose vol-
ume does not justify a private house label. In either case,
these products are typically equivalent to the national brands
with which they compete, and are often supplied by large man-
ufacturers who offer the identical product under their own
label, but at a higher price.
Leading corporations - Heinz, Armstrong
Rubber, Westinghouse, and many others
(such as Whirlpool, G.E. and SCM Corp.) -
are allocating more and more of their out-
put to products that are sold under cut-
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rate private labels. Often manufacturers
use the same materials in these brands as
in products sold under their own label.(25)
Comparison of the prices of these two forms of distribution
of identical products offers an enlightening insight into the
cost structure.
Consumer Value Stored, for example, a chain of discount
cosmetic and toiletry outlets in the Northeast, launched a
program of private label products in 1970. As Ron Young, who
was the vice president in charge of the program, wrote in the
initial public announcement:
Our private label products will always be
"as good as" or "better than" comparable
national brands. The best and best-selling
national brand products will be used as min-
imum standards. They'll be laboratory test-
ed, analyzed and often improved on.(26)
Several dozen products are now available. Table 111-3 shows
a few comparisons.
Several things are worth noting. The CVS prices for
national brands are much lower already than manufacturer's
suggested list prices, since CVS is fundamentally a discount
chain. For example, the suggested retail price for 100 Bufferin
tablets is- $1.67 and for 100 1-A-Day vitamins, $2.98. Second,
the CVS products are all attractively packaged and in no ob-
vious way inferior in appearance or presentation to the na-.
tional brands (therefore, no great savings are being made by
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9PRICES, SELECTED PRIVATE VS. NATIONAL BRAND PRODUCTS
Table 111-3
Product
Description
Vitamin Pills
Cotton Swabs
B Complex and
Iron Tablets
Aspirin
Buffered
Aspirin
Extra strength
pain reliever
Super stainless
double-edged
razor blades
National Brand CVS Brand
-- I ~ I - - I - . ~ ..Name Price I quantity PricePrice O t - II
1-A-Day
Q-Tip,
Geritol
Bayer
Bufferin
Excedrin
Gillette
2.13
.e55
4.86
.77
1.00
1029
Source: Author's survey, June 27, 1972.
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cheaper packaging). Third, it is likely, from CVS' own des-
cription of its program, that these products, by and large,
are being manufactured on order by relatively small firms
(such as manufacturing chemists). If this is not the case, and
they are in fact being produced by the same type of large firm
as the national products, one can still clearly conclude that,
at least for products of this class, whatever economies of
scale exist in production are being dwarfed by greater costs
associated with advertising, promotion, and physical distri-
bution.(27)
The reader may, at this point, enter a caveat. It is
possible, first, that the products are in fact inferior to
standard brands, either in quality or consistency. Quite
aside from CVS claim, which might be taken as an advertising
gesture, it would seem that the risk of losing credibility
as a reliable source of such products would far outweigh the
temporary benefits of increased sales. The second concern,
which is more serious, is that the investment in research and
development, and in testing-of new products necessitates great-
er prices on the part of the firms making those expenditures,
whereas- others who merely copy, can do it at less cost. How-
ever, one can hardly resist noting that large companies have
typically been on the wrong side of that argument, since they
routinely buy out smaller firms or private developments to
gain for themselves the same advantages, with less risk.(28)
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In any event, there are several responses to this argu-
ment. One is that some of these products (e.g., aspirin, cot-
ton swabs) can hardly be said to involve great innovations
or elaborate R & D. Moreover, such products have been avail-
able for many years and whatever special costs have been in-
curred have presumably long ago been written off. Patents,
after all, are valid for only 17 years, not forever, precise-
ly to assure that the benefits which the innovation offers
are not permanently monopolized. For another thing, to the
extent that the brand name manufacturers are themselves sup-
plying the product, they are presumably not doing -so at a
loss. It is merely a matter of keeping two sets of books,
one of which reflects, at a higher price, the cost of main-
taining the brand image, and the other of which reflects simply
the production costs. Finally, the very size of the discrep-
ancy makes any such simple arguments unlikely.
In the long run, it is important to study the sources of
manufacture of private label products, and their changing price
and availability over time. Such data are not presently avail.
able except in an occasional instance. However, it is clear
that a very great difference in time-related behavior would be
observed between identical products provided by name-brand
manufacturers as against independent firms not consumer mar-
keting any products of their own. In the former case, firms
will presumably sell to private labellers if one, they have
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unused production capacity (since marginal cost for these ad-
ditional units will be far below average) or two, returns to
the firm (in terms of its own objective function) are greater
from such sales than from sales of its own brand. In the lat-
ter case (firms manufacturing solely for private label use),
the thrust of this argument suggests that such firms are like-
ly to be relatively local (vis-a-vis their markets) and rela-
tively small, since they would be highly dependent on retailers
for maintenance of market share and product promotion. The
second case would, however, presumably be more efficient (by
the preceeding reasoning on scale) at least above some modest
size. All of this should be observable by detailed observa-
tion. On that basis, more rigorous arguments could be made.
Returning, then, to Table 111-3, the disparities -be-
tween the prices shown are consistent with the large margins
in such product lines. However, the same general effect can
be seen in packaged foods and supermarket items, although the
difference is smaller. In this case, however (food products),
more detailed data are available: "In so far as comparative
quality tests have been made and reported, distributors" (pri-
vate label) and manufacturers' brands are essentially equal in
quality". Moreover, "although private label products are not
necessarily profitable, it is claimed and generally assumed
that (they) are more profitable to distributors' than are manu-
facturers' brands". And that is so despite the fact that, as
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one survey concluded, "The average retail prices for distrib-
utors' brand items were lower (than manufacturers' brands) in
almost all cases." A detailed analysis over time of 10 pop-
ular products showed such a savings of 21.5 percent on the
average. (29)
In some cases, it can be argued that private brand pro-
ducts are really offered as "loss leaders" and might them-
selves lose money. This argument cannot be made, however,
if a line of such products is available. Moreover, as the
data noted below about food products indicate, these local
brands are felt to be more, not less profitable. Nor is it
the case that private brands are a small and unimportant as-
pect of the manufacturing and distribution system. In- fact,
they are immensely important in the national market. It has
been estimated, by the National Retail Merchants Association,
that private labels may represent as much as 60 percent of
total department store sales, or some $42 billion annually.(30)
Any discussion of private labels and brand names, how-
ever, raises the general issue of advertising or promotion in
general. Although it is certainly true that the present price
structure for large-scale use of media -reflects a pecuniary
economy of' scale (e.g., television rates per exposure unit
drop as volume purchased rises), this does not satisfactorily
deal with the issue. The question is whether large-scale ad-
vertising is itself wasteful of resources (and promotes mar-
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ket power), and what impact its use has on the competitive al-
ternative proposed here.
THE EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING
To mention advertising is to expose a most perplexing
topic. As Telser put it:
Hardly any business practice causes economists
greater uneasiness than advertising. Among
the many reasons for this feeling is the opin-
ion held by some economists that competition
and advertising are incompatible.(31)
In search of clarification or rebuttal of that proposition,
much theoretical and empirical work has been done. Despite
it all, results have been exceedingly modest in the sense
that disagreement on the basic issue is at least as sharp as
it was before that research was carried out. Indeed, a re-
cent survey showed that even businessmen tend to feel more
strongly than before that advertising is both wasteful and
misleading.(32)
For present purposes, it is not necessary to take a
strong position on the overall question. Very likely, part
of the continuing dispute merely reflects the evident fact
that the many kinds and uses of advertising are distinctly
different in function and purpose. Correspondingly, the re-
lation between advertising and competition under those very
different circumstances can be both direct and inverse. Thus,
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Taylor and Weiserb summed matters up as follows:
By now, there is fairly general agreement that...
advertising is important as a barrier-to-entry
and that advertising does succeed in shfiting
demand for individual products...
Further, in their own studies they concluded that advertising
tends "to increase consumption at the expense of saving."(33)
All three of these conclusions support the value of ad-
vertising to firms, but the first two also support the state-
ment that advertising is (or can be) wasteful. Barriers to
entry of new competition can offer firms the potential to
sell products at prices above what efficient markets would
allow, and the shift of demand for individual products leads
to the possibility of competition through advertising,- the
goods in question remaining materially unchanged in the pro-
cess but becoming overpriced vis-a-vis the situation in the
absence of such advertising. Moreover, these two effects
offset each other since entry of new firms, which would pre-
sumably follow in the latter case, tends to be restrained by
the former effect. The issue is, therefore, not whether there
is a wasteful component to advertising - clearly there is -
but whether it is specifically associated with certain forms
of market structure of industrial organization, or alterna-
tively is roughly evenly distributed among all uses of ad-
vertising.(34)
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The present position adheres to the former alternative.
Briefly, the reason is that the two effects noted, which can
lead to economically inefficient production, are structural
in their very nature. That is, barriers to entry refer to
particular market or product sectors and tend to generate mar-
ket oligopoly and concentration. Similarly, most firms in a
given market sector will be forced to advertise their pro-
duct more or less in step with other competitors in order not
to lose market share. It is to be expected, then, that these
disfunctional aspects of advertising will be concentrated in
certain sectors. This tends to be confirmed by the fact that
expenditures for advertising, as a fraction of -sales -revenues
for given products, vary enormously among product categories
and it is plausible that industries characterized by substan-
tial advertising are pre-eminently those in which the above-
noted effects of advertising exist.
A few specifics will make this clear. In 1968-1969,
the mean expenditure on advertising as a percent of sales,
for all manufacturing companies, was 1.38 percent. Five
product classes (roughly at a 3-digit SIC level of aggrega-
tion) exceeded 5.00 percent on the same measure; malt li-
quors (5.46), tobacco (5.70), bottled soft drinks (5.36), drugs
(9.25), and soaps, cleansers and toilet goods (10.06). All of
these are non-durable consumer goods, with well established
markets and strong brand identification. They are, as well,
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inexpensive products subject to frquent and repetitive pur-
chasing patterns. On the other hand, those product cate-
gories falling below 0.05 percent were sugar (.43), logging
and basic lumber (.25), newspapers (.30), cement (.25), con-
crete, gypsum, and plaster (.39), primary ferrous metal pro--
ducts (.23), Primary nonferrous metal products (.49), fabri-
cated structural metal products (.46), aircraft and guided
missiles (.21) and ships and boats (.44).(35)
With the exceptions of newspapers, which are in them-
selves a medium of advertising and thus qualitatively dif-
ferent from other consumer goods, and possibly sugar, much
of which is sold in bulk to other producers, these products
are producer goods, costly unit purchases, and minimally if
at all branded, though still well established in their mar-
kets. Clearly, there are important structural differences
between those product lines involving high advertising con-
tent and those not so characterized. These figures also nec-
essarily understate the direct advertising content of indiv-
idual products, since they refer to aggregates of firms in
an industry, and it is clear from the foregoing that adver-
tising is primarily oriented to particular products within
the set of firms in a given industry.
For example, in 1971, Noxell Corp. (proprietary drugs
and medicated toiletries) spent about 28.4 percent of its
sales revenues on advertising. Similarly for Alberto-Culver
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Co. (toiletries) 19.0; S.C. Johnson & Co., (cleaning products)
16.4; Lever Brothers (soaps and detergents) 12.4; William
Wrigley, Jr. Co. (chewing gum and candy) 12.8; Seven-Up Co.
(bottled soft drinks) 14.8; and Mennen Co. (toiletries) 32.5
percent. And all of these figures exclude other important
promotional costs such as for packaging.(36)
Clearly, then, large advertising and promotional costs
are associated with specific types of industries and are not
uniformly distributed. Moreover, these costs can be a very
substantial fraction of final price paid by the consumer and
therefore, if those costs can be reduced, significant savings
can be passed on to consumers. This is, evidently, the basis
by which many products can be sold under- local or private
brands at substantial savings. This argument is pursued be-
low in some detail, particularly as to the criteria which
can be established a priori to determine which product cat-
egories are subject to competitive attack on this basis. Fur-
ther support-for these ideas can be gained from studies in-
dicating that more extensive advertising is associated both
with increased profit, and with reduced risk of loss (both
clearly related to market power).(37)-
Some of the above issues are more related to absolute
size than to relative scale. For example, it is market size
that counts, or in a more sophisticated formulation, market
density, in calculations dealing with location of plant, or
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with amount of output and its relationship to the distribu-
tional functions which follow physical production. Human
resources within organizations, in particular, are subject to
increasing diseconomies as size of unit or number of persons
increases. Indeed, as noted, firms struggle mightily to ad-
ministratively decompose themselves into smaller groups so as
to avoid these very problems. Size is not, however, merely
a source of problems. It also offers very substantial ad-
vantages, at least in the present industrial system. Some
attention should therefore be given these since they provide
a source of increasing apparent market effectiveness even in
the absence of real scale economies.
SIZE AND MARKET POWER
One of the pioneering empirical studies of effects due
to scale was due to Blair, whose conclusions were not only
that economies of scale are less important than ordinarily
assumed, but also that technological trends are shifting the
competitive balance more yet in favor of smaller, more de-
dentralized units, at least in all but the continuous process
industries. And he added:
... these new techniques, by shifting the
point of diminishing returns toward small-
er size, will tend to resolve the incon-
siatency which has long existed in eco-
nomic theory between the struggle for great-
er efficiency on the one hand and the main-
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tenance of competitive efficiency on the
other.
(However), their adoption may be held
back by the nontechnological, institutional
barriers of monopoly control and lack of fi-
nancial aid for small business.(38)
In effect, Blair was saying, these possibilities for the im-
proved competitive posture of small firms vis-a-vis larger
ones, may be restrained or prevented from coming to fruition
by the fact that the structure of American industry puts more
power in the hands of the large or concentrated firms than is
economically justifiable. The point is important, and has
been extensively discussed.
It is necessary, in short, to distinguish between true
social efficiency and simple power. Efficiency has been de-
fined earlier as a measure of the extent to which social and
individual needs are met for a given set of available re-
sources, But large and well-established firms also have power,
the ability to control the environment toward their own ends.
To a -considerable degree, organizations with power can be
less efficient; at least, they can change the nature of the
contest so that others, even if more truly efficient, are
less able to compete. Thus, many of the gross measures of the
relative efficiency of firms of different scale (such as over-
D I all profit, sales'growth, or survival), may be indicative of
the power of size, rather than the economic effect of scale.
Robert Averitt, in a pioneering study, proposed that the
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American industrial economy was in fact best conceived as
composed of two quite distinct sectors of firms; a core and
a periphery. His definition of the core firm is one "whose
long-run average cost curves potentially rise as capacity in-
creases, but may not actually do so."(39) He thus accepts
explicitly that diseconomies of scale exist (largely for ad-
ministrative reasons), argding that new management and organ-
izational techniques can overcome them, at least to the ex-
tent of permitting increasing technical economies of scale
to overcome the residual diseconomies of administration. But
as indicated by the earlier sections of this paper, it is by
no means certain that these newer management techniques serve
as Averitt supposes, nor does it appear that -the technical
economies of scale require anything like the size and scope
of most center businesses.
In fact, Averitt's list of advantages of the core firm
are nearly all related to size per se, rather than to efficien-
cy or economy. They include, for example, power to outspend
and outlive others, to spread risks, to diversify geographi-
cally and with products, better credit terms, and legal, po-
litical, and financial advantages.(40) Since all of these
characteristic features offer competitive strength, what is
important is that smaller, periphery firms, are at a definite
disadvantage.
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In fact, it is well established that large firms have
a degree of power, simply as a result of size, which ordinar-
ily is translated into more or surer profits on operations
over time, into barriers to the entry of new competition, or
into access to funds or control over market share greater
than is to be accounted for by conventional models of a fully
competitive economy. One cannot say a priori that large firms
will show correspondingly large profits; indeed, as has been
noted, the facts are often otherwise. However, the existence
of market power, to use a generally accepted expression, does
show up in other ways. Edwards put the overall case as fol-
lows:
A big firm has advantages over a smaller firm
just because it is big. Money is power. A
big firm can outbid, outspend, and outlose a
small firm...Some of these advantages...con-
stitute real economics. Others are bargaining
advantages which do not appear to have any par-
ticular advantage to the economy as a whole,
and some of them are advantages of being able
to live for a time on accumulated fat. Such
advantages of bigness are derived from the
total size of the enterprise, whether that
size is attained in one market or many.(41)
Several people have in fact estimated the extent of mar-
ket power in American industrial life. Most such studies are
based on concentration ratios within given economic sectors,
combined with other correlated indicators as asymmetry (sig-
nificant difference in size among leading firms in a concen-
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trated industry). A recent extensive review of the data by
Shepherd led to the following summary conclusion:
As far as (statistical) estimates are reliable,
they suggest that markets with substantial
market power accounted in 1963 for at least
$171 billion, or approximately 41 percent, of
national income arising in market activity.(4 2)
In further discussion, Shepherd felt that the probable minimum
value of substantial market power was between 35 and 45 per-
cent of the total market activity. And, quite likely, there
is some degree of market power for any large firm in other in-
dustries. It is a small competitive edge, perhaps, but it is
an edge nevertheless,
The fact of market power is accepted by many or most of
those who have studied the matter. It does not, of course,-
always coincide with-size, nor is'it present to the same ex-
tent in all companies of a given size or in comparable pos-
itions in their own markets. That is because there- are two
distinct aspects to such phenomena; those related specifically
to absolute size, and those related to concentration (size in
a given market area).(43) The latter has been the subject of
great effort since the Second World War, and conclusions are
mixed. A balanced appraisal would seem to be the following:
In the greater part of the American economy,
market concentration is sufficiently low so
that competition places substantial restraints
on the discretionary pricing power of sellers
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..Nonetheless, concentration is sufficiently
high in a number of important producer goods,
(e.g., steel) to confer substantial discretion-
ary power in making price and other market de-
cisions. (However), postwar market concentra-
tion trends in consumer goods industries have
been less salutary than in producer goods...
This increasing concentration suggest that
there has been a growth in the discretionary
purchasing power of sellers in the industries.(44)
And, in fact, there is evidence that in such concentrated
industries, profits are higher than they would otherwise be.
The same study quoted above adds elsewhere the following com-
ment:
A growing number of studies confirms that there
is a significant positive relationship between
the level of industry concentration and reported
industry profits. The studies show that profit-
rates tend to be 50 percent (or more) higher
in highly concentrated industries than in mod-
erately concentrated ones.(45)
These data, however, may appear to conflict with findings re-
ported earlier that profitability tends to be inversely pro-
portional to size, above a certain modest level. That is not
necessarily the case. Higher profit rates, even assuming
that measurement is made in terms of assets, can be consistent
for industry as a whole with the reported variations with
size within those industries. For that matter, the same
could -be true with regard to all industry. It would imply
simply that profit rates -for firms of the same size would in-
crease as their industries became more concentrated. The dis-
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tinction is important. High concentration does not necessarily
equal large size, and many very large firms are in relatively
unconcentrated industries.
One might, however, expect that a significant advantage
of large firms lies in their greater ability to take risks
without likelihood of financial failure. Indeed, this is sup-
ported by the evidence. As Stekler notes:
...the variability of the profit rates of
firms in a particular class diminishes with
size. This is true for the profitable manu-
facturing firms as well as for all manufac-
turing corporations.(46)
Similar data exist elsewhere, leading to the conclusion that
sheer size has at least one definite virtue; that of enabling
firms to explore more alternative investments in relative
safety. The issue for smaller firms is thus to develop risk-
pooling mechanisms (e.g., by cooperative financing, etc.)
which permit some of the same potential. But, of course, it
could also be argued that the relative freedom to spend which
large corporations enjoy might lead to less than optimum se-
lectivity among alternatives.
Consider also that, as noted earlier, a (large) fraction
of new ventures fail. It is difficult to see how this can
ever be avoided, nor perhaps, should it be. However, if, say,
five must be launched for one to succeed, new or small firms
are penalized by their general inability to plan for a series
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of risks. If it were the case that firms invest their re-
sources in ventures commensurate with their size, one could
argue that size is not necessarily beneficial. More typically,
however, the growth of enterprises results from a large num-
ber of relatively small investment risks - small, that is, in
relation to the resources available. As a result, they are
more likely to grow and prosper, since the probability of suc-
cess increases with the number of such risks taken, other
things being equal.(47)
p This is not to say that some large firms do not go bank-
rupt and/or suffer losses. Gross inefficiency over long per-
iods of time can still cause problems, although this is not
a frequent occurrence. Losses among the giants are exceed-
ingly rare. In 1957 (a mild recession), only one of the top
200 industrials lost money; in 1964, seven of the -top 500
lost money; and even in 1970 (a very bad year), only 34 of
the top 500 failed to show a profit.(48) U.S. Steel, a not-
ably inefficient company by any standard, has not shown a loss
for over 25 years. - The Ford Motor Company lost amounts ap-
proaching $1,000,000 a day for two years, after World War 11,
when they were considerably smaller! In the late 50's, the
Edsel appeared; it cost Ford several hundred million dollars.
Neither of these events was deadly to the firm.(49)
The clear lesson is this. Size - meaning sheer avail-
ability of capital - is an overwhelming advantage in our pres-
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ent economy. Whatever controls are applied, capital offers
the flexibility, time and comfort - solidity - on which man-
agement can build as needed. The ability to take economic
risks with attitudes which help rather than hinder stems di-
rectly from resources of some magnitude. Small and/or new
companies suffer most particularly in this regard; even if
they have the same (or better) ideas, the attendent risks
are perceived as greater, and therefore more likely to fail.
The ease of entry into new markets, or new products, is sim-
ply less for smaller firms. It could then be argued that
large size is socially useful, since it encourages risk-
taking, but this is a matter of institutional arrangement.
Pooling of risk could be accomplished by other (for example,
cooperative) means, not nerely by ownership alone. And, in
any case, not all risks ought to be encouraged; at least,
some are more socially desirable than others. Such a dis-
tinction is used to justify a wide range of activities, from
investment in municipalities (tax-exempt bonds) to mineral
and oil exploration (depletion allowances).
That choice- of examples, however, raises the very im-
portant issue of consumer choice or sovereignity and whether,
in the process of taking risks, or launching new products,
consumer needs are actually being met or even seriously taken
into consideration. To deal with these questions in detail
is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but a few comments
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can put the matter into an appropriate perspective. First,
it is obvious that consumer interests are powerful and cannot
be disregarded. The annals of marketing are built on the
skeletons of such product failures as Ford's Edsel or DuPont's
Corfam, not to mention thousands of less visible examples.
However, it is equally obvious that consumer needs and choices
are not made on the basis of fixed preference maps, but are
themselves shaped by the very process which also attempts to
satisfy them.(50) The findings in advertising offer some evi-
dence of this, and it is well-known to every advertising, mar-
keting, or product development specialist.
The fact is that one can select only from what is avail-
able, so long as that basic decision is in the hands of pro-
ducers. To quote from Kurt Rothschild:
The fact is...that the consumer can in-
fluence only the output of goods already
offered on the market. The initiative to
introduce or withdraw a commodity rests
entirely with the producer.(51)
Similarly, here is Robin Marris:
The bureaucratic environment of the large
corporation...is likely to divert emphasis
from the character of the goods and ser-
rices produced to the skill with which
these activities are organized...The con-
cept of consumer need disappears, and the
only question of interest...is whether a
sufficient number of -consumers, irrespec-
tive of "real need" can be persuaded to
buy (a proposed new product).(52)
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And lastly, it is worth quoting George J. Stigler, on the
question of whether big businesses do, in fact, compete to
the ultimate benefit of the consumer:
The answer is that they do compete - but
not enough, and not in all the socially
desirable ways...The plain fact is that
big businesses do not engage in continuous
price competition.(53)
In fact, it is likely that these effects, taken together,
tend to produce behavior in the part of firms which reduces
risk-taking behavior, at least outside certain well-explored
avenues (e.g., new breakfast cereals). Firms in general often
settle for merely adequate results, and are not disposed to
risk their overall position. With market power, they are able
to sustain this mediocre performance.
The brief conclusion, then, is that big business, gen-
erally speaking, does not reflect in the degree desired at-
tention to the real needs of consumers, nor does it offer
through the market mechanism, a meaningful basis for "con-
sumer sovereignty." These things are not true in some in-
dust-ies, to be sure, nor to the same degree in others; but
overall, large enterprise as such is not generally efficient
by the test of social function. And it seems clear, for ex-
ample, in the case of the home appliance industry mentioned
elsewhere in this paper, that relatively smaller and more
specialized companies can out-perform the giants.
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Further evidence of market power is provided by the
practice of "administered pricing," in which prices are not
set by the direct effect of supply and demand in the market-
place, but in advance in order to achieve set goals for pro-
fits. This has been studied most carefully, perhaps, in the
case of the large automobile companies.(54) Thus, for ex-
ample, Robert L. Heilbroner described one such case as fol-
lows:
General Motors..."targets" its prices to
attain a 15 to 20 percent return after
taxes, calculating its costs on the assump-
tion that it will use only 60 to 70 percent
of its total plant capacity.(55)
Under the circumstances, the fact earlier reported by Bain
that the automobile manufacturers shy away from claiming
knowledge of the economic effects of scale becomes understand-
able. That is, they would rather not publicize their remark-
able ability to produce profits at the expense of customers.
Similarly, it has been pointed out that U.S. Steel sets
its prices so as -to assure a profit even if it operates only
two days out of five, and it has been successful in maintain-
ing a profitable position despite its universal (deserved) rep,
utation as-an inefficient firm.(56) The present increased
level of competition in the industry has had an impact on the
pricing system, although not so much that one can place great
credibility in the importance of technical scale economies.
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In a Fortune article, Chairman Stewart S. Cort of Bethlehem
Steel noted that his company in 1971 had to produce at 70 per-
cent of capacity to make a profit, whereas in 1966, only 50
percent was needed.(57) Since technical scale calculations
assume 100 percent utilization to achieve the supposed savings,
it becomes increasingly clear that such issues are only per-
P ipherally related to the ultimate measure - efficiency to the
society.
Of course, prices cannot be set by anyone with complete
freedom. The administered-price thesis merely suggests that
"a large body of industrial prices do not behave in the fashion
that classical theory would lead one to expect" and, more par-
ticularly, -that the actual behavior of these prices-is typi-
cally such as to fall less in recessions and rise less in re-
covery than a simple response to market factors would pre-
p dict.(58) At the same time, it is clear that all firms at-
tempt to plan for their income and profit in future periods.
Where firms have a degree of market power, therefore, such
planning can utilize it to minimize future uncertainty. Al-
though there have recently been challenges to the administered-
price thesis, the data do suggest a degree of market power on
the part of certain firms and industries.
In sum, the existing American market is increasingly
troublesome for large corporations structured on the tradi-
tional basis of standardized production design. Moreover,
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production costs account on average for somewhat over a third
of total cost to the customer aside from transportation (for
consumer goods), from which it follows that the cost of too-
small scale, if any, is reduced proportionately in its impact
on final cost. When transport is considered, the figure drops
to about one third. A particular expense of importance is
that associated with large-scale advertising which in certain
types of industries is economically wasteful. However, from
this and other means, large firms derive power with which to
control their environment. To some considerable degree, or-
ganizations with power need not be efficient; at the least,
they can change the nature of the contest so that others, even
if more truly efficient, are less able to compete.
This chapter concludes, then, direct evaluation of the
effects of scale on economic, operational, and market effi--
ciency. Chapter IV, which follows, attempts to sketch out'
p
one line of argument concerning the implication of these con-
clusions for decentralized community industries. That is,
this work was carried out as a step necessary to better ap-
praise such a strategy. It is appropriate, therefore, to
see toward what avenues of further exploration, attention
could now be profitably directed.
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Chapter IV
TOWARD THE PRODUCTIVE COMMUNITY
On the basis of the foregoing chapters, it is evident
that large scale firms are neither as efficient as the con-
ventional wisdom asserts nor as immune to competitive attack
as their critics often suggest. It is therefore clear that at
least on those grounds, smaller enterprises are not ruled out
of contention in the marketplace. It is equally clear that the
potential for decentralized community industries, or develop-
ment strategies based on them, is enhanced by these conclusions.
If, as has been shown, smaller firms - and in particular, sin-
gle-plant firms - make economic sense, then a more decenttal--
ized industrial structure is not necessarily wasteful of re-
sources or otherwise inefficient. This is, of course, true
whether or not these now-smaller firms are controlled by pri-
vate entrepreneurs or by some collective representing a com-
munity. However, because the present work focuses on the lat-
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ter case, it is necessary to explore the possible differences
that would follow from that distinction. To put the matter
more concretely, are there, for example, particular reasons to
suggest that community firms, even if the same scale as en-
trepreneurial ones, would be more desirable (and under what
circumstances), and are there specific classes of products or
industrial sectors more appropriate to one type of firm than
another? This chapter develops a framework for considering
such questions.
Before exploring these issues, however, some preliminary
remarks are necessary. First, conventional (that is, useful
but already widely accepted) approaches to economic develop-
ment and industrial location consider certain basic parameters
which are as important in the present context as anywhere else.
Labor intensity, capital requirements, access to and size of
markets, competitive environment, and the need for specialized
technology and resources are obviously relevant considerations,
although the significance of any one of these depends on the
context.(l) Since the focus of the present work primarily
concerns other issues, less widely addressed, these conven-
tional matters are mentioned only to the extent that they are
particularly relevant.
Second, it should be made clear that the present discus-
sion is not limited to what are customarily classified as
"small" businesses. One conventional definition, for example,
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sets the upper size limit of small firms at a point:
...which, considering the nature of the business,
permits personalized management in the hands of
one or a few executives, as opposed to institu-
tionalized management characteristic of larger en-
terprises.(2)
This definition, although it describes a type of organiza-
tion which will often or generally exist in early stages of
development, is entirely too limiting for several reasons.
For one thing, such firms may or may not be efficient pro-
ducers; this distinction is in that sense quite arbitrary.
Second, it assumes an entrepreneurial or narrow control model
for firms which is in distinct contrast to the collective al-
p ternatives, which may never be actually organized that way,
even if-it were possible given the size. Third, firms of that
size and organized that way would not offer in any case an
effective training/development opportunity for other workers,
nor the potential to take maximum advantage of underutilized
resources available throughout the organization, or of the
extra benefits- from shared or collaborative arrangements. If
these do not occur, the organization will inherently be less
efficient in its use of resources.
Fourth, it must be recognized that the very idea of scale
is complex, and that it can refer to several very different
measures. In particular, there is a considerable difference
between scale as interpreted by employment, by capital invest-
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ment, and by market or market area served, not to mention such
other possibilities as energy required or physical space cover-
ed. In this dissertation, scale has generally referred to em-
ployment size unless other indices were specified. However,
two plants of identical employment, and therefore of identi-.
cal "scale" in that sense could easily differ by a factor of
twenty in any of the other measures noted above. To apply the
general conclusions to a particular case, therefore, would re-
quire detailed investigation of the particular industry or pro-
duct orientation. For that reason, the present chapter partic-
ularly, attempts a different task, namely to develop and ex-
plore a set of theoretically important categories, on the basis
of which more detailed questions could be considered.
Finally, the notion of community itself needs- some atten-
tion. To this point, it has been used as if its meaning were
self-evident, being implicitly contrasted to the country as a
whole on the one hand, or to individuals and small groups on
the other. At this point, however, with discussion turning to
the more specific impact of a "community" focus on issues of
size and scale of enterprise, a somewhat more detailed under-
standing is necessary. By community, then, two essential ele-
ments are implied for present purposes, although this is not
meant to be a definition of the term, as that is a problem of
considerable complexity to which social scientists continue
to devote much attention.(3) First, a community is a specific
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geographic unit, and moreover, one which is relatively small
in proportion to some larger political unit in which it is
embedded. Thus a nation, or a state, is not a community.
The context, however, will necessarily provide the standard,
differing at different times, for judging the significance of
"relatively small." What is central here is not the idea of
a community as conceptually fixed in size, but as signifying
that attention is directed to a more local or parochial unit
than would otherwise be the case. In that sense, areas large
on an absolute basis may still be relevant cases.
Second, the concept of community directs attention toward
a social unit - that is, a society which, though relatively
small, is nonetheless a coherent whole with the capacity to
engage all of a persons' roles and attachments. Within a
community are families, interest groups, firms or other eco-
nomic entities, and political subdivisions, governments, or
parties. Thus, the concept of community is broader and more
all-encompassing than "economy" or "polity," and to speak of
a community is to imply concern with the broadest possible
level of integration of social life and relationships. Re-
lated to this, plainly, is the notion that in such expressions
as "community based" or "community controlled" or even "com-.
munity industry," is inherent a view of the particular sub-
ject under discussion in relation to the total social unit
rather than to some narrower aspects alone. Thus, community
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industry refers to something whose interests inevitably ex-
tend beyond monetary profits, even if those are included in
its focus. In short, its essential import is that the industry
in question is to be considered in terms of its social func-
tions, broadly construed.(4)
It should also be evident that the issue of size has
special significance from an economic point of view. For one
thing, as noted earlier, size in the sense of market area, or
density, is a possible measure of scale; one which, in fact,
is particularly relevant to the question of enterprise effi-
ciency. Clearly, the size of any community, whether measured
in numbers of people, geographic area, density of population,
or income, total or disposable, would make a great difference
in terms of efficiency (however assessed), appropriateness, or
level of decentralization. Moreover, the appropriate or op-
timum size will necessarily differ when different industrial
sectors or product orientations are considered. There can be,
in short, no such thing as the "right" community size for all
purposes. In the present context, then, rather than try to
appraise these boundaries in detail, the essential idea of
community industry is considered in order to see what might
differentiate "community industries" from "decentralized in-
dustries" of about the same size.(5)
What difference, in short, does it make for decentralized
industries also to be community based? Two key issues arise,
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in the broadest sense; they are conveniently put as questions.
First, is there reason to believe that the form of control of
a firm - particularly private entrepreneurial vs. community
collective control - would make a difference to the efficiency
or compeitive ability of the firm? Second, should the in-
dustrial sector, product line, or customer orientation of the
firm be different if it is community-based, in terms of its
potential viability and utility? These issues are taken up
in what follows.
COLLECTIVE VS. ENTREPRENEURIAL CONTROL
At first glance, it would appear that a given product
could be equally efficiently produced in the same size of
plant for the same nominal market independent of its owner-
ship or control structure. However, closer examination shows
this to be a false conclusion, particularly in certain sub-
stantial and definable sectors of industry. To put it more
directly, efficiency in social - even in economic - terms is
not independent of-the nature of ownership and control.
In particular, it is necessary to differentiate between en-
terprises controlled and owned "individually" as conventional
entrepreneurial firms, and those based on some form of col-
lective ownership or control. In the collective case, two
distinct types exist, though as indicated below these are not
necessarily incompatible. One can consider either control by
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workers - those whose primary work is within the enterprise;
or by the community - a larger and much more encompassing
social unit with, perhaps, many such enterprises. Both forms
of collective control are, however, quite different from
"individual" control, and the implications for action are
correspondingly different. The terminology is not entirely
satisfactory, since it could be argued, for example, that a
conventional publically-held corporation is collectively owned.
The word "collective" in the present connection, specifically
refers to a social unit having a collective identity, rather
than a cluster of otherwise unrelated individuals. In this
sense, most shareholder-owned firms are still individually
owned since those holding stock perceive a commonality of
interest only with regard to the success of the firm and since
they act as individuals in any case.(6)
p Economic institutions in any society are of course ulti-.
mately justified by the prevailing ideology in terms of their
substantive contribution to the well-being of that society
p and its members. Such institutions are no more to be viewed
as ends in and of themselves than are the products or services
they generate. In the United States, or for that matter, in
capitalist economies anywhere, it is asserted that these broad-
er social purposes are optimally achieved through the separate
decisions of individually controlled firms and consumption units
0 interacting through market mechanisms. The defects and limita-
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tions of this view are by now well known and have been written
about extensively. What is less clear however is the impact
of other, quite different alternatives on the social fabric.
In the present context, those things are important because
the very idea of collective enterprise is inherently incompat-
ible with those principles. It is not merely a matter of
firms which are owned by such organizations as communities or
community groups, but which continue to operate and organize
themselves in the same ways as if they were owned by private
entrepreneurs. If that were the case, there would be little
difference. In fact, the result of simply changing the identity
of the controlling group, without other changes, would not only
fail to produce the desired benefits, but would continue to
create the same kinds of dysfunctional distinctions among their
several paricipants and constituencies as are seen in more con-
ventional enterprises. Consumers would merely consume; workers
would only seek pay.
The issue thus goes beyond narrow change. The essential
meaning of community enterprises derives from the notion that
economic institutions should not - indeed, if social welfare
is sought, cannot - act only through market linkages based
on price-making mechanisms. On the contrary, community enter-
prises will necessarily develop relationships with customers,
workers, and owners which specifically take into account other
than purely financial considerations.
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This distinction is central. Economic relationships,
mediated through markets, are suppo sedly at arms length. The
very foundation of the market is its impersonality. To quote
Milton Friedman:
There is no personal rivalry in the competitive
marketplace. There is no personal higgling. The
wheat farmer in a free market does not feel him-
self in personal rivalry with, or threatened by
his neighbor, who is, in fact, his competitor.(7)
For fully-fledged community enterprises, however, this no
longer holds. Those whose labor enters the community firms
will not be merely selling their time to the highest bidder;
customers, especially as they fall inside community boundaries,
will not merely be used as opportunities for economic gain;
managers will not be rewarded for orienting actions to promote
the welfare of the firm, seen in isolation. Such relation-
ships, instead of focussing on their purely instrumental char-
acter, will have to pay more attention to individual, personal,
and social aspects. Economic acts, in short, will tend to be-
come aspects of social relationships.
Although the problems of doing this are great, and must be
minimized, more attention cannot be paid them in this disserta-
tion. The arguments supporting such a set of principles are,
however, briefly summarized. First, to reduce widespread ex-
isting alienation, and related social and individual patholo-
gies, requires attention to people as whole individuals, and
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to reconstruction of social units on a human scale - communities -
capable of promoting and enhancing human growth and development.
Second, the present capitalist arrangement of economic life in-.
herently results in inequities in the distribution of material
and psychic rewards alike, and in continued pressure for greater
aggregate material output at the cost of continued degradation
of both human and physical environments. To ameliorate these
problems calls for fundamental change in economic organization,
one alternative for which is the community-based decentralized
industry evaluated here.(8)
It is useful, however, to return to the distinction be-
tween enterprises which are strictly worker controlled, and
those which are more broadly community controlled. The workers
are, of course, a part of the community, but it is apparent
that the latter would involve more people in decisions affect-
ing the venture than would the former. However, these two
principles are not philosophically in conflict. The basic
criterion, which applies to both, is simple and straightfor-
ward; those affected by the activities of an organization or
group should have the controlling influence in those decisions,
the more so as effects become more primary and central to those
involved. Robert Dahl has called this "the Principle of Af-
fected Interests".(9) In one way or another, then, truly com-
munity-based industry will involve substantial self-management
of the separate units, although the detailed distribution of
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powers will derive from some form of political process which
mediates overall. In this sense, a key measure of community
control will be the extent to which all workers are involved
in the decision-making processes of the firm. Similarly,
worker's control, though it may start as a movement purely
internal to an enterprise, cannot stop there. As Andre Gorz
has put it:
The demand for self-management ... cannot be
obtained within the factory walls, the lab-
oratories and the research bureaus. Men who
cannot be ordered around in their work cannot
be ordered around in their life as citizens,
nor can they submit to the rigid decisions
of central administrators.(10)
As to the specific benefits of such systems, Vanek, in a
major study of the economic and social values to be gained
from the worker-controlled economy, has concluded that it
appears in a very favorable light, both in
comparison to an absolute standard of ef-
ficiency and in comparison with other eco-
nomic systems...It has a definite advantage
in generating full employment, long-range
price stability, and growth.(11)
Vanek also concludes that such a system has important ad-
vantages in social terms, such as those which require atten-
tion to what are otherwise externalities, plus education and
a more genuine opportunity for people to be motivated by in-
ternal drives related to their individual interests and ca-
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pacities. Since workerb control offers, by definition, the most
direct opportunity for significant participation, the remarks
made earlier on its value apply -here in full force.
That is, there really does not seem any reason to doubt
that participation of this sort would have a constructive im-
pact on the motivation and commitment (and resulting psychic
rewards) of "members of the firm," as well as on overall pro-
ductivity measured against the organization's goals. Paul
Blumberg, for example, as written in regard to the former
issue that:
An impressive panopoly of research findings...
demonstrates consistently that satisfaction in
work is significantly enhanced by increasing
workers' decision-making powers on the job.(12)
And in regard to the latter issue (productivity), a similar
conclusion has been drawn by the members of the HEWY Task Force
on work:
Several well-documented experiments show that
productivity increases and social problems de-
crease when workers participate in the work
decisions affecting their lives, and when their
responsibility for their work is buttressed by
participation in profits.(13)
These outcomes are found without regard to size or scale,
but it is obvious that such effects will be more powerful,
and easier to achieve in the -bargain, as the units of control
and size of employment decrease. This is, in part, essentially
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a simple restatement of the conclusions reached in the pre-
vious chapter concerning the effect of size and scale on be-
havior and motivation of workers. Indeed, one of the essen-
tial features of the successful experiments referred to in
the above two quotes is some way to create smaller social
units with a work function. Smaller scale is thus of direct
P value in this connection. Moreover, both the potential and
motivation for innovative activity will be enhanced by smaller
size, particularly insofar as the individual worker can both
understand the relationship of his tasks to the whole product,
and perceive the impact of his actions on the whole.
These are, so to speak, some of the internal values which
follow from a more collective orientation in the workplace.
There are, however, potentially as important external effects;
those concerning the relationship between the firm and its
customers. Moreover, it will be seen that choice of product
or service also can be influential in social and economic ef-
ficiency, and that certain sectors or orientations of output
are more consistent with and supportive of community industry.
To these considerations, we now turn.
PRODUCT CHOICE AND COMMUNITY COITROL
As Chapter III indicated, the marketplace is changing so
as to shift demand increasingly towards goods and services
meeting individualized needs and desires. Within this context,
however, two classes of goods can be distinguished in princi-
ple. In the first class are included those products, which
may be called tailored, characterized by their inherent ca-
pacity to be significantly modified to meet specific needs or
interest. Such products, for example, include clothing, food,
and furniture. Clothing can vary as to style, size, color,
and fabric; furniture as to material and design; food pro-
cessing as to flavor and cut, even without a consequent price
difference.
The second class of products are those not inherently
capable of supporting differences of significance (call them
commodities), but which nonetheless are often artificially
distinguished for purposes of sales, marketing, and promo-
tion. This category includes such products as ethical drugs
(e.g., aspirin), glass products (e.g., windows), many foods
(e.g., table salt), and cleaning materials (e.g., soap, steel
wool, detergents). The artificial differentiation in such
cases is typically based on elaborate packaging, misleading
advertising, imputed qualities, and brand names. Clearly,
to apply this distinction rigorously is difficult if not im-
possible. For present purposes, however, it is merely neces-
sary to recognize that these two categories suggest distinctly
different conclusions as to appropriateness of various scales
of production, and their consequent efficiency in meeting cue-
tomer needs.(14)
The class "tailored products" clearly is that for which
true mass production is inapplicable, since such products
ought to be produced in conformity to wishes of individual
consumers. In conventional practice, these requirements are
relaxed in order to permit some economies of scale to be
realized, as well as to offer firms producing such goods the
possibility to centralize operations, creat substantial and
well-defined markets, increase sales and assets, and produce
greater profits for the owners. This is generally done by a
firm's vertical integration of the operations required to
form relatively basic materials into those tailored pro-
ducts, coupled with very direct marketing to final consumers.
Such an industrial structure, however, is not determined either
technologically or by scale considerations, but is merely one
of a-wide range of options for producing such goods. Its
virtues are many for the firm, and , as shown below, minimal
for the consumer. Thus, Dean and Smith have pointed out that:
.. we now recognize that important kinds of
flexibility exist at many points in the process
that determines the size of a firm...Great ad-
vantages of specialization do not always re-
quire firms large enough to use the entire output
of a specialist...In general, firms can obtain
any resource under a variety of arrangements,
of which ownership is only one.(15)
As an example, consider clothing, say shirts. In the
ideal case, each shirt produced would uniquely suit the cus-
tomer for whom it is intended. Its color, fabric, shape,
style, and quality would reflect that personal focus. Even
in that case, however, consumers in the aggregate will re-
quire large quantities of the commodities - such as basic
fabrics, undyed and uncut - from which the shirts are to be
produced. Such commodities can be efficiently produced by
large-scale mass production methods. And although the scale
required for that efficient production need not be as great
as the present industrial structure suggests, it is clear
that a substantial enterprise is needed.
At each successive step required to convert those com-
modities to tailored product, the market becomes smaller and
the opportunities for mass production correspondingly less.
Thus, the required quantities of a given fabric dyed a spe-
cific color will obviously be much less than the total; when
the dyed fabrics are cut into different patterns, each combin-
ation of pattern and color will be still smaller in quantity,
and in the end, only one shirt with a given set of features
will be produced. At each such step, alternatives exist for
separate firms to. purchase intermediate goods for modification
to a stage closer to final consumption. Truly efficient pro-
duction of such products will be maximized, other things being
equal, when finished products correspond precisely to consumer
preferences (of course, at the least price). Several conclu-
sions follow from that.(16)
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First, that criterion urges timely and detailed inter-
action between customer and supplier. There is therefore an
immediate benefit from close relationships where such products
are involved, contrary to what competitive market models re-
quire. Although these are attainable in some degree by pri-
vate firms, there is a clear advantage accruing to collective
enterprises at least some of whose members (even potential
members) are also potential users of the goods. Second, it
follows that attempts to sell such goods in remote markets
will produce less efficient results than similar production
oriented toward more local consumption since the desired inter-
action with consumers is less available. However, since there
may be real and significant increases in efficiency to be
gained by production at larger sizes which could yield econo-
mies of scale, or to put it another way, since consumers will
often prefer somewhat less specific tailoring at lower cost,
there is a trade-off calulation to be considered. In contrast,
production of commodities can be characterized differently.
To start, though there exists, as in tailored products,
a similar series of wmre-or-less discrete operations to trans-
form raw materials into final consumer products, there is by
definition no real possibility of modifying those products to
meet differentiated needs except at a very gross level of ag-
gregation (e.g., warmer clothes in colder climates). Accord-
ingly, the potential to utilize mass production techniques and
the economic pressure to gain all possible economies of scale
I
exist in the fullest sense. The "decay" of appropriate scale
characteristic of tailored goods (smaller units of output as
final consumer is approached), does not appear in the case of
commodities. Such industries are therefore expected to tend
toward structures with relatively fewer plants of larger
size, subject only to the constraints introduced by the pro-
cess of physical distribution.
If it were true that such commodity products were avail-
able in the market in the undifferentiated form which their
nature inherently suggests, competition even of an oligopolis-
tic sort would tend to reduce consumers' costs to a level con-
sonant with the costs of production and distribution; there
would be strong incentives for producers to minimize their
own costs and to construct just such factories and organiza-
tions as would accomplish that. Instead, however, attention
has inevitably focused on the strategy of attempting to con-
vert true commodities to apparent tailored goods, so as to
avoid direct price competition in the marketplace. (Recall the
discussion on size in chapter III.) The distinctions thus
introduced - elaborate packages, exhortative advertising and
promotion asserting the presence of unmeasurable values, and
irrelevant physical modifications (e.g., colored toothpaste) 
-
do not in fact render these competing products more different
in any substantive sense, but to the extent that consumers
treat them as if they were, narrow brand loyalty is the re-
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sult.
From the point of view of firms producing such goods,
this process is profoundly beneficial. Not only does it
minimize the requirement for price competition with its at-
tendent low margins, risk, and hard work, but by generating
a new type of expenditure offers the possibility of greater
growth in sales, and a consequent increase in status and in-
fluence. From the consumer's point of view, and, still more,
with regard to productive use of society's resources, this
process is sheer waste.(17)
In this case, then, very substantial cost savings are
available in principle from production of commodities of
this sort in the absence of means of differentiation noted
above. The counter-argument, that such expenditures- are
useful in that they are necessary to assure a larger and more
economical scale of production such that final costs are lower
does not accord with the facts on scale efficiency presented
earlier. In particular, these are the very goods most widely
sold as private brands by local retailers, at great savings
(up to 50 percent) and discussed in chapter 111. It is, of
course, true that efficient production scale for commodities
in general will be greater than that for tailored goods, but
it is also true that the market for such goods in any 'given
group of potential customers will by definition be greater
since these are less differentiable in character.
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Many such commodities also can be characterized in an
important additional way. These particular commodities are
extremely well known in the sense that they have become rou-
tine elements in most people's lives. In a highly developed
economic society such as the U.S., the central fact is that
they have virtually saturated the total present market avail-
able, and thus no longer represent opportunities for growth in
the same sense as new products or tailored goods. Mature
commodity products effectively define the material level of
a society; these are the components of the "market-basket"
which every consumption unit must fill if it is to regard it-
self as even a minimum participant in society's prosperity.
This is the essential meaning of the "revolution of rising
expectations." As economic growth continues, more and more
goods become mature in this sense; that is, nominal neces-
sities for an adequate level of material existence. Some of
the accompanying increase in disposable income, noted earlier,
therefore tends to be consumed by increased expenditure on
goods of this sort.(18)
However, this means that for any particular such good,
there inevitably comes a time at which its market has become
essentially saturated. More accurately, further growth will
increase only with population or some related unit of con-
sumption (e.g., families). Thus, even though opportunity con-
tinues to exist for new products, and for conversion of luxuries
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to necessities, an increasing number of goods - the most
basic and important ones at that - whose provision becomes
seen as central to the continuance of the social and economic
system, no longer offer strong economic incentives to firms
that supply them. Although some aspects of this process are
familiar to economists and business theorists, the implica-
tions of these effects overall is striking. In particular,
in the United States, the most highly developed material
economy in the world, this process is sufficiently far ad-
vanced to have had a significant effect on the industrial
structure of those sectors oriented to mature commodity goods
production.(19) In such sectors, opportunities for entrep-
reneurial firms diverge sharply from those available to col-
lective enterprises.
Entrepreneurial firms of the usual sort have limited op-
tions under these circumstances. Differentiation on sub-
stantive grounds is ruled out by definition, leaving aside the
possibility of using quality to serve that purpose. However,
since not major firm active in consumer markets wishes to be
seen as a producer of goods of inferior quality, this very
real possibility is excluded on its fact. Differentiation, if
it is to exist at all, must be sought through artificial means
typically involving brand names and extensive promotional ef-
forts. Since by definition there is no possibility for a firm
to increase its market except at the expense of a competitive
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firm (the total market being saturated), these promotional
efforts aim to maintain share of market position. But all
firms are caught in the same situation; they must run to stay
in the same place. As many game theorists have pointed out
(the prisoner's dilemma), no single firm can afford to reduce
its expenditure on differentiation unless others will follow
the same pattern. Since this cannot be assured, the tendency
is for such expenditures to increase. This in turn results
both in still higher prices (relative to costs) for.the con-
sumer, and increased barriers to entry-for new firms. Thus,
as Bain has written:
...product differentiation is of at least the
same general order of importance as an impedi-
ment to entry as are economies of large-scale
production and distribution...Second, great
entry barriers are more frequently attributed
to product differentiation than to scale eco-
nomies in production and distribution.(20)
There is no strong incentive for other private firms to
enter such a market, characterized as they are by substantial
and capital-intensive barriers to entry, well-entrenched com-
petitors, considerable risk, and a saturated market which re-
quires acquiring customers only at another firm's expense.
When new competitors do arise in such industries, they are
drawn by the potentially high returns which accrue to the few
well-established figures in the field. Such new entrants will
of course generally be those whose own promotion and differen-
§2)
tiation strategy is thought to be powerful - as, for example,
in the case of L'Eggs, the recent successful entrant in the
women's hosiery field, and whose strategy was in clever pack-
aging and a name that would "stick".
In any case, it is clearly more attractive for firms to
enter growing market areas, where opportunities are less
risky, and all participants can increase their sales together.
It is in these cases, particularly, that large-scale advertis-
ing has its greatest potential benefits; not to switch cus-
tomers from one brand to another with an identical product,
but to generate larger aggregate demand for new g which
have untapped markets (see the section on advertising in chap-
ter III). In short, separate suppliers have an obvious in-
centive to concert their promotional activities, even by sep-
arate (non-collective) decisions.
0 There appears, however, another possible strategy for
producers of commodity products characterized by large costs
of synthetic differentiation; namely, to offer the same pro-
duct at a lower price, permitted by cutting the expense as-
sociated with advertising and promotion. For a number of rea-
sons, this is less plausible than it seems at first blush.
First, most consumer goods companies in this category compete
with brand names in a wide range of goods; elimination of ad-
vertising support for any one product is therefore difficult
without unintended and negative effects on other products.
Much promotion is itself institutional (oriented to the firm
or a multi-product brand name). In fact, the very purpose
which brand-name based promotion serves is that of forging
links between the producers of a good and its consumers and
through that mechanism, bypassing both wholesalers and re-
tailers whose connection to the market is closer in principle.
The history of American industrial development has been char-
acterized by a shift in the sources of product credibility
from retail outlets to wholesale merchant to manufacturers
themselves. A reduction of advertising expenditures overall
thus runs substantial risk of undercutting this market power
on the part of such firms.(21)
Second, there is a real possibility that reduction of ag-
gregate promotion for a product which has reached virtual mar-
ket saturation (because one large firm reduces its share of
advertising) will result in recuction of aggregate demand for
that product, since many other products are competing for the
same limited dollars. Third, such a strategy would be bene-
ficial to the firm only if coupled with a substantial price
reduction for the product involved (otherwise, since some cus-
tomers will switch to another brand, net sales will drop, and
will continue to do so over time). But it is all too clear
that people mistrust apparent "bargains," unless they have
knowledge of and confidence in the firm whose reputation stands
behind the product. For a manufacturer, this itself requires
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either continuation of its institutional promotion or willing-
ness to supply the product to other marketers who sell the good
as if it were their own. And this is precisely the case of
private label goods, many of which, as noted earlier, are sup-
plied by large and otherwise well-known firms.
The growing importance of and increase in private label
products, both in reference to numbers of brands and total
volume of such goods sold, has already been discussed. This
success, however, is due not only to their demonstrated ab-
ility to provide the product at lower cost (which alone is
often not sufficient) but also to the credibility of the re-
tail outlet offering them and, in effect, assuring their re-
liability and quality. In short, the retailer acts as a sort
of proxy for the community itself and is effective to the ex-
tent that it builds on local good will and its relationship
to customers. Thus, public acceptance of such private brands,
according to one study:
hinges on the existence of either customer need,
or the fact that customer good will and confi-
dence in the retailer is so strong that con-
sumer acceptance of the private brand is as-
sured...In other word...consumers strongly as-
sociate the fulfillment of their needs with a
retailer, and not...with a manufacturer who
most often is at a distant place from the con-
sumer-retail community.(22)
But the process described above, which forces firms to com-
pete via artificial differentiation or identical products,
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sold to a virtually static market, results in a continuing in-
crease of the potential savings available from products not
saddled with such costs. It is this growing gap between the
cost of name-brand products, and that of the same product made
expressly by or for a retailer, that underlies burgeoning
private-label sales.
This situation offers a real and powerful opportunity for
community-based ventures to attain for themselves these same
strong advantages, by building on the commitment of community
members to enterprises perceived as operating in their in-
terest. These same advantages are not available either to
larger more remote entities without the same ties to the com-
munity, or to private entrepreneurs who, though resident in
the community, are operating in their own private interests.
Over time, these are certain to diverge from the interests of
the community at large, and in any case, are unable to truly
tap the community's self-interest.(23) The special value of
community-based ventures follows from the very fact of commun-
ity control and participation. As people perceive that such
ventures operate for their benefit, respond to their needs,
are controlled by their decisions, and provide them with de-
sirable goods and oppo'tunities, they will support and main-
tain them.
This contrast with the usual case in which customers and
producers are related only through the impersonal medium of
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the market. Customers' interests here are solely concerned
with the product or service; if these are inadequate or un-
satisfying, another source will be found. There exists nei-
ther the commitment nor the means to maintain or build a re-
lationship to the producer of those goods.(24) All in all,
then, the distinction between tailored and commodity goods
leads to the following hypotheses concerning the potential op-
portunity they might offer community-based producers.
Tailored goods are likely to be characterized by substan-
tial competition, including compeition based on price. That
is, it is reasonable to expect many suppliers of such goods,
since they themselves are by definition easily differentiated
along useful and significant (to consumers) dimensions. That
competitive situation arises in turn because of both the less-
ened scale and aggregation advantages in manufacture of such
products and the more specific links that can be formed be-
tween firms and clusters of consumers, Moreover, as implied
earlier, the structure of such industries should ideally in-
volve different scales of production, and perhaps different
forms of organization, at each step in the transformation of
raw materials to final tailored products, through several in-
termediate stages. One would therefore expect that the cost
of these goods to consumers would reflect reasonably high pro-
duction efficiency, both because entry of new producers should
be relatively easy, and because the competition to supply dif-
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ferentiated consumer needs of this type should be vigorous.
As an opportunity for community-based enterprises, then, the
prognosis is mixed. On the positive side are the small scale
needed, and (most important) the close links with consumers.
On the negative side, there are not likely to be large ex-
cess costs, which could offer a cushion to new entrants.
Economic advantages, therefore, will have to be achieved
through new organizational or production methods. And in-
deed, community-based enterprises probably have an advantage
in this regard. The small scale of such ventures inherently
makes possible the kinds of innovative developments needed,
because of the size effects noted in chapter II. The partic-
ular advantage of committed workers exercising collective con-
trol could then readily benefit from that opportunity. In the
production of such goods, there will also inevitably be a trade-
off between competely custom-made products and the lower costs
achievable by a degree of standardization, but the details of
that could well be different in the case of community-based
ventures, -as against private entrepreneurial equivalents.
In the case of commodity products, the situation is quite
different. As already noted, such industries are likelier to
be relatively concentrated, and to consist of larger manu-
facturing units designed to capture all possible advantages of
mass production. Competition will in general therefore be
brand-name based, and will tend to be regional or even nation-
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al in character, since there is no real opportunity to tailor
the products to particular groups or clusters of consumers.
Entry of new firms would therefore seem more difficult, not
only for obvious reasons of size, but also by virtue of the
issues raised earlier. In the more particular case of mature
commodities, the opportunity for community industries is, how-
ever, enhanced very substantially by the inflated prices due
to competition based on artificial differentiation. It has al-
ready been indicated that these costs are so great that what
appears at first as a limitation (large production facilities)
is in fact decidedly less so. Moreover, although such goods
in fact require some reasonable scale for technically efficient
production, that size need not be outside the capacity -of mod-
est sized communities (see below). In some cases, in fact,
(e.g., compounded products such as aspirin and cleaning ma-
terials) that size is very small. Consideration of total cost
to consumers suggests that even if there is an optimum pro-
duction scale, operation below it would often be more than com-
pensated by economies deriving from changes in distribution and
promotion. All in all, then, there are also opportunities here,
although for very different reasons explored more concretely
below.
CONSUMER VS. PRODUCER GOODS
The foregoing argument implies that community enterprises
should preferentially focus on consumer goods rather than in-
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termediate or producer goods. This point should be made ex-
plicitly. Such a focus is highly appropriate for several rea-
sons. First, one of the key strategies which has been recom-
mended for community-based enterprises (and for CDC's specif-
ically) is development of a captive market; for example, by
contractual relationship with other firms. But the essence of
this strategy is to bind customers to producers as strongly as
possible, and that can be accomplished directly by building
commitment to the firm itself as a social institution.(25)
The production of producer goods, even if based on a contrac-
tual or legal arrangement which guarantees a market for a cer-
tain volume and time is not equivalent. It is not possible in
this case to develop the same commitment of community residents
to the venture, since they cannot experience directly the util-
ity of the enterprise. Also, of course, viable ventures based
on producer goods are ultimately dependent on other firms over
which the community has little influence.
Second, as has been noted, it is precisely in these con-
sumer good, and specifically mature ones, that prices are most
often inflated over what is technically necessary. Because of
the need for large external producers to maintain strong brand
images and to occupy large production facilities serving ex-
tensive areas (and thus requiring high costs of physical dis-
tribution), overpriced but routine consumer goods offer the
best opportunity to help poorer residents increase their real
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incomes. Witness the price comparisons of private vs. na-
tional brands for indication of the potential savings. In
that strategy, as national labels lose ground, manufacturers'
unit costs go up, greater expenditure on brand promotion is
needed, and the competitive balance tips still futher. Com-
munity enterprises offering such consumer goods, to the con-
trary, will increase their market loyalty as a result of the
very nature of the enterprise. Its unit costs over time, ac-
cordingly, can be expected to show a relative decrease, as
both learning and growth (at least up to a point) takes place.
Depending on the product, one might utilize retailing or man-
ufacturing as an entry.
It is also in this area of consumer goods that smaller
scale enterprises make best sense, since it is here that one
can take maximum advantage of basic materials and intermediate
products produced by large firms as commodities, and which are
more cost-efficient than the artificially differentiated final
products to which they are converted. These in turn can be
modified or finished in whatever way is appropriate to the lo-
cal market. Bulk industrial chemicals can be mixed and pack-
aged for household and/or agricultural needs; steel strip can
be cut, painted, and assembled into venetian blinds; or bolts
of fabric could be cut, dyed and sewn for a multitude of pur-
poses. This is not a matter of cottage industries; significant
enterprises can be generated in these and similar areas, em-
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ploying anywhere up to a hundred or so, taking full advantage
of modern technology and industrial organization, and produc-.
ing for the community's needs.
As to the size of community which could offer an adequate
potential market for consumer products seeking to meet local
needs, available data are few and far between, and in any case,
that size will differ enormously from one good to another.
However, some preliminary indications can be offered as an il-
lustration of possible community scale effects. Much more re-
search is needed before anything can be said with confidence.
Work presently underway suggests that in consumer goods, at a
four-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) level of
aggregation, the following generalizations hold. Out of a to-
tal of 442 SIC categories, about 100 primarily concern con-
sumer goods. Conservative estimates indicate that 27 of these,
accounting for about 30 percent of total final consumption ex-
penditure, could be efficiently produced for market areas with
a half-million peole or less. A further 33 industries, yield-
ing almost an additional 30 percent of consumption expenditure,
require market areas up to two million people. To put it an-
other way, it appears that about 60 percent of the consumption
needs of two million average consumers could be met by inte*-
nal production with no less in economic efficiency. These
figures suggest that, even with highly conservative assump-
tions, small or modest-sized areas could produce a substantial
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fraction of their own final goods demand. Equally clearly,
however, the areas involved are fractions of states, or small-
ish urban areas, and not rural villages or city neighborhoods.(26)
One benefit of routine consumer goods as a focus for com--
munity enterprises lies precisely in their prosaic nature.
They are generally those goods or services the need for which
is long-standing, predictable, basic, and not subject to rapid
change. They are not, in short, glamorous products out of
which new growth industries will-develop, although there may
be exceptions. This approach assures a minimum risk of mar-
ket failure; that is, that the expected/needed market will not
develop. It follows that the advantage which large firms have
in financing extensive development programs or in taking a
series of new product risks is of small consequence here. More-
over, since such goods are, by and large, relatively easily
tested and evaluated by the consumer, the impact of large scale
promotional campaigns aimed at convincing consumers that "Brand
A" has special features which differentiate it from all others
is less likely to be successful. The great increase in "con-
sumerism," as indicated by the large sales volume of private
or off brands, clearly suggests a more sophisticated and know-
ledgeable consumer; a development which community ventures
should support and on which they can build.
There is also a point of particular importance -in terms
of poorer members of a community. Since advertising and pro-
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motional costs are passed on willy-nilly to each purchaser of
the product being advertised, there exists the possibility that
this creates a highly regressive income redistribution scheme.
That is, to the extent that a particular product category is
more important in the consumption pattern of lower-income than
higher income groups, then the former are subsidizing both
those with higher incomes and the firms in question. There are
in fact data suggesting that e.g., urban blacks, preferential-
ly purchase national instead of local brands because of their
importance to maintenance of an adequate self-image. Wealth-
ier consumers, not confronted with the same problem, therefore
benefit more from the availability of equal quality products
at lower prices. A basic consumer goods strategy may thus of-
fer preferrential benefits to low-income persons, while gen-
erally beneficial to all consumers.(27)
Finally, it should be noted that products or services
meeting direct consumer needs offer a significant option for
the members of the community to participate in novel ways in
those enterprises. Victor Fuchs pointed out that the
study of productivity in the service industries
(demonstrates)...the importance of the consumer
as a cooperating agent in the production pro-
cess...this point is neglected in the analysis
of productivity in goods-producing industries.(28)
And, as he also has indicated, this is understandable in the
case of such industries as automobile production. The con-
sumer is effectively isolated from the production process in
those areas. However, it is arguable that this isolation is
precisely at the heart of the failures of much of industry to
effectively meet individual and social needs.
In the final analysis, all goods are useful and desirable
only to the extent that they offer a service to the consumer.
No material product is produced or used as an end in itself.
As Alfred Marshall pointed out:
Man cannot create material things...when he is
said to produce material things, he really only
produces utilities; or in other words, his ef-
forts and sacrifices result in changing the
form or arrangement of matter to adapt it better
for the satisfaction of wants.(29)
Industry and enterprise thus exist only to carry out those
satisfying adaptations or, to put it another way, to provide
the services desired through whatever intermediary physical
or social arrangements are required. One of the major bene-
fits to be gained from smaller enterprises, oriented to the
satisfaction of direct consumer needs, is that they make the
value of the service more clear, while providing the real op-
portunity for members of the community to influence both the
goods produced and the means used to produce them. Small
scale thus has beneficial properties vis-a-vis consumers quite
as much as earlier noted for workers. The focus of community
enterprises on provision of those goods and services which the
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members of the community themselves desire and can use di.
rectly, ultimately makes of the economic system something more
consistent with its basic social purposes. It remains to dis-.
cuss briefly the implications of such a strategy to trade across
community boundaries.
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION AND EXPORT PRODUCTION
Theories of economic development generally differentiate
production of goods and services for export from that expected
to serve local markets. Moreover, the former (export produc-
tion) is labelled "primary" because such activities are seen
as the base necessary for any local area to participate in the
complex web of economic interdependence characteristic of in-
dustrial societies. To quote Tiebout:
Export markets are considered the prime mover
of the local economy. If employment serving
this market rises or falls, employment serv-
ing the local market is presumed to move in
the same direction...(Therefore) export em-
ployment is considered as "basic." Employ-
ment which serves the local market is consid-
ered adaptive and..."non-basic."(30)
This follows from the fact that no area can be independent, ex-
cept through great waste of resources and the inevitable recog-
ntion that many material benefits will be lacking. On the con-
trary, it is argued that to reap these fruits, each person,
each group, each region, each nation, should specialize in pro-
duction of those economic goods in which he, she, or it has a
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comparative advantage. For clearly, as the theory puts it,
more can be gained by selling that advantageous product to
others and using the funds gained to purchase for local needs
from still other producers, than by attempting to produce for
those local needs on a more costly, less productive, self-
contained basis.
Obviously, there is much truth to this, and it becomes
more true, the smaller the area considered. However, it is
also true that depending solely on export industries would be
equally foolish; in point of fact, it is impossible. Many
goods and services are produced locally for local consumption
and some of them could not reasonably be provided except that
way. The plain fact is that all economies, except that of the
world taken as a whole, or a few extremely remote and primi-
tive settlements, are composed of a complex mixture of pro-
duction for both local consumption and export markets. More-
over, many of the really interesting questions about the ap-
propriateness of a given combination depends on environmental
factors (including size) which are location specific.
As to the concept of comparative advantage, full discus-
sion is not appropriate in this dissertation. However, sev-
eral brief points should be made. For one thing, as Grunwald
noted:
The concept of comparative advantage has been
developed within a static framework, but.., we
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cannot apply it in that form to problems of
economic growth. To a great extent, policies
for economic development are directed toward
changing existing comparative advantages.
But existing theory does not help us to de-
termine the direction of this change.(31)
In American communities, particularly, overdependence on
trade may be as much (or even more) of a danger than too great
independence. The risk in the latter case is merely one of
inefficient economic resource utilization. The area of com-
munity would merely be somewhat poorer (but perhaps not by
much, if Leibenstein's data on the relative welfare losses
from allocative and x-inefficiency are at all accurate).(32)
In the former case, however, the local economy can (will)
go through violent swings as the market for those specialized
exports changes. Ultimately, if the market is dissipated or
if other specialized sources replace the product/service of-
fered, the area's economy will come to a virtual halt. This
I
process is highly visible in American communities (and regions),
as well as in many smaller countries. Moreover, in the special-
ized case, local skills tend to be highly oriented toward that
productive technology, and of small utility elsewhere. Finally,
this specialization tends to focus on people's value largely
as a cog-in a dimly visible wheel, a feeling which is often
I
profoundly debilitating.(33)
A realistic aim for communities and regional alike must
be to strike a better balance between the two extremes. In
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the case of depressed communities, the balance is so lop-
aided as to admit of little debate. Its redress requires at-
tention to local production for local needs, rather than for
export. The latter will, in any case, automatically follow
if efficient production is demonstrable in the home market.
Since it is clear from all of the foregoing that necessities
of scale do not prevent small or modest sized enterprises from
competing successfully, it thus appears plausible to move to-
ward the replacement of imports rather than the generation of
exports.
This is, of course, not quite the same thing as the "in-
fant industry" argument, typically advanced for underdeveloped
countries. In the present case, the industries in question
are not likely to be less efficient if run in competition with
producers of similar goods outside. Quite the contrary, in
fact. Protection is therefore not needed, except in the sense
that more powerful enterprises may attempt to utilize that
power to prevent erosion of their markets. Similarly, though
it has been argued that the failures of import substitution in
Latin America partly stem from the ability of commodity pro-
ducers (e.g., steel) to cut off supplies, that is not a danger
within national boundaries. The proper role for government,
therefore, is assurance and maintenance of an open marketplace,
rather than the opposite (e.g., by tariffs).(34)
Since communities in the sense used here are already com-
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pletely embedded in the economic system, from a strictly fi-.
nancial point of view (at least in the short run), these two
strategies would be precisely equivalent means of generating
capital which could be invested elsewhere, but the overall
social and psychological benefits mentioned, coupled with the
basic findings on scale and competitive efficiency, argue
strongly for the import substituting approach. Jane Jacobs
has, in fact, proposed that the growth and prosperity of
cities and their hinderlands is due to the continued gener-
ation of new kinds of work to meet the city's own needs, in
conjunction with development of exports based on indigenous
and locally oriented kinds of businesses. And she added the
following in connection with the value of large organizations
in this regard:
It is not the success of large economic organ-
izations that makes possible vigorous adding of
new work to older work. Rather...it depends upon
large numbers and great diversity of economic
organizations...(35)
As earlier figures have indicated, many such consumer
goods could both be produced in and marketed to surprisingly
small areas. And, if the focus rests particularly on rela-
tively poor or deprived communities or regions, then mature
goods in particular make up the bulk of local consumption ex-
penditures. Accordingly, the production of such goods by a
community-based enterprise, for the use of that resident group
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would in the aggregate significantly reduce the flow of funds
out of the community itself, thus both improving its economic
position vis-a-vis wealthier areas and providing a degree of
local autonomy.
The savings to be gained by this strategy, so far as con-
sumers are concerned, are thus in principle very great. For
this reason, people in the first instance will purchase such
goods because the products are of lower cost and represent
more value per dollar. That in turn provides the necessary
time for the more important long-term support for such enter-
prises to come into play. That is, of course, the very com-
munity focus itself; such enterprises, controlled by community
members, will become perceived as an integral and important
aspect of the community itself. Workers, owners, managers
and others depending on those ventures will be more personally
known to customers, and identified as members of their com-
munity. People will thus buy because it is psychologically
and socially meaningful for them to do so. And that, in the
long run, is what is needed.
Chapter V, next, summarizes the overall argument and the
major conclusions which follow from it.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
1. The present argument does, however, strongly dissent from
the view that these considerations determine, in effect,
the shape of industrial structures and economic organiza-
tions at any point. If anything seems clear, it is that
more real options and choices exist in this realm than are
usually assumed.
2. Edward D. Hollander et al., The Future of Small Business,
N.Y., Praeger, 1968, p. 5.
3. For a thorough discussion of the definition problem, see
Goerge A. Hillery, Jr.,(Communal Organizations: A Study
of Local Societies, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1968) who utilizes 94 different meanings.
4. The focus on a defined area is one of the few elements
p common to most definitions. See, on this subject, Willis
A. Sutton, Jr., "Toward A Universe of Community Actions,"
Sociological Inquiry 34, (Winter 1964). More generally,
Roland L. Warren has written perhaps most extensively on
this subject. See, in particular, his The Community in
America, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963. It is probably un-
necessary to note that the particular meaning here at-
tached to "community industry" would not be widely accepted,
but in the writer's judgement, this must ultimately be the
issue faced if the concept is to be more than cosmetic.
5. In fact, the single most difficult problem associated with
this decentralist strategy concerns the interaction among
these different levels or sizes of community or region.
The simple solution is to collapse the multiple levels into
a few well-bounded areas which divide the total. But this,
of course, merely recreates political/economic units or
small states. See Gar Alperovitz, "Toward A Pluralist
American Commonwealth," in Alperovitz and Lynd, Strategy
and Program, Boston, Beacon Press, 1973.
6. See, for example, Abram Chayes, "The Modern Corporation and
the Rule of Law," in E.S. Mason, ed., The Corporation in
Modern Society, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959.
7. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1963, p. 119.
8. For anyone who wishes to pursue this line of radical crit-
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icism, with which the writer largely agrees, see R.C.
Edwards, M. Reich, and T.E. Weisskopf, eds., The Capi-
talist System, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall,
1972, and The Review of Radical Political Economics.
9. Robert Dahl, After the Revolution?, New Haven, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1970, pp. 64ff.
10. Andre Gorz, Strategy for Labor, Boston, Beacon Press,
1967, p. 126. One of the key points in this connection
is that only when the firm is seen as a part of the com-
munity and as having a substantial influence over its
economic (and therefore social) well-being will atten-
tion to community priorities assure that the firm's
future remains connected to that of the community. (See,
on this, Barry Stein, The Community Context of Economic
Conversion, Cambridge, CCED, 1971.) But, of course, this
need for continuity and association must be balanced by
some attention to efficiency and use of resources. There
is therefore necessarily some political process involved
that balances one consideration against another. This
shows up particularly well in the Yugoslavia case. See,
for example, Gerry Hunnius, "Workers' Self-Management in
Yugoslaviia," in G. Hunnius, G. David Garson and John
Case, eds., Workers' Control, N.Y., Vintage Books, 1973.
11. Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy, Ithaca, Cor-
nell University Press, 1971, p. 38.
12. Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of
Participation, N.Y., Schocken Books, 1969, p. 1.
13. Work in America, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1973, p. xvii.
The basic point here is, of course, widely agreed
to in principle if not in practice. Decentralizing de-
cision-making to include those who possess the most rele-
vant information, are in the most direct position to
implement decisions and gain feedback as to the effect is
standard operating ideology, even though the practice is
rarely applied as consistently as it could and should be.
The literature on participation (industrial democracy)
is replete with examples indicating the benefits from such
a strategy. It is equally clear that the reason more such
ideas are not implemented has to do with control preferences
and power issues rather than operating efficiency.
14. One theory of differentiated products was developed at
very great length by Edward H. Chamberlin who, in his
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pioneering work, The Theory of Monopolisitic Competition,
(8th ed., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962). He
went so far as to suggest that virtually all products were
in fact virtual monopolies in some sense, always being
differentiated to a degree from other products (hence the
expression "monopolistic competition"). But this cate-
gorical statement washes out crucial distinctions about
the nature of such differentiation. Similarly, Paul Sam-
uelson (Economics, 8th ed., McGraw-Hill, 1970, p. 498)
uses a typology of this sort to distinguish products and
markets on the basis of product differentiation strategies.
15. Joel Dean and Winfield Smith, "The Relationship Between
Profitability and Size" in William W. Alberts and Joel
E. Segall, eds., The Corporate Merger, Chicago, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1966, p. 11.
16. This is a difficult point to formulate precisely, in part
because of an ongoing debate as to whether consumers'
"preferences" are endogenous or exogenous, about how they
can be changed, and their stability over time. However,
the point can be made more narrowly: whatever the struc-
ture of preferences existing at a given moment, perfect
efficiency implies an exact matching of these preferences
with goods at the lowest prices associated with the set of
existing preferences.
There is also a radical critique possible in this
regard to the effect that there is such a thing as pseudo-
individuality, whose hallmark is the attempt to suggest,
by such devices as different shirts or colors, a differ-
ence that does not actually exist. It is, therefore,
still a form of artificial product differentiation, whose
real purpose is to create continually expanding markets
for the benefit of capitalists, but whose real effect is
to waste resources.
This seems a matter of degree; excess and disfunc-
tional distinctions certainly are wasteful. On the other
hand, the ability of persons to differentiate themselves,
in part by personal property, seems a requisite for
healthy human development, although the extent is some re-
flection of the historical situation.
17. Elsewhere in this work is a discussion about whether or
not large firms compete in price and related to that, the
issue of consumers' sovereignty (in chapter III). The
conclusion to the former is "not enough" and to the lat-
ter, "not generally present." Whatever it is that firms
attmpt to maximize (if anything), whether profit, growth,
assets, or managerial utility, the effect noted here as-
sures their ability to do so at the expense of the con-
sumer.
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18. Another way to look at this situation is that people are
more concerned with and influenced by their relative
position in the status or income hierarchy than by abso-
lute measures. See Lee Rainwater, "Economic Inequlality
and the Credit Income Tax," Working Papers 1, (Spring
1973), pp. 50-59.
19. Conventional Theory distinguishes necessities, luxuries,
and inferior goods on the basis of their elasticities of
demand with respect to income, which would respectively
be zero, positive or negative. What is needed is a bet-
ter basis for placing goods in categories of this sort,
since most present methods are tautological.
20. Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 142.
21. In regard to the comment on industrial development, see
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure, Cambridge,
M.I.T. Press, 1969; or Nicholas Kaldor, "The Economic As-
pects of Advertising," in his Essays on Value and Distri-
bution, N.Y., Press Press, 1960.
22. Robert S. Hancock, "Factors Motivating Consumer Choice
of Private Brands," in R.C. Anderson and P.R. Cateora,
eds., Marketing Insights, 2nd edition, N.Y., Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1968p. 335.
23. This notion in particular critically assumes existence of
a collective unit, to which people can be committed, as
against individual self-interest alone. It does not as-
sume, however, that community ventures, or cooperatives,
automatically promote that commitment. It takes attention
and directed effort. Without that, they can be just as
bureaucratic, impersonal, and privatized as conventional
entities. The point is that they also offer the potential
to engage people in general in more rewarding and meaning-
ful relationships.
24. The very essence of the market system is its impersonal-
ity; as soon as personal relationships develop among par-
ticipants in the marketplace, the system's theoretical
virtues disappear. However, the advantages of such re-
lationships to particular participants has always been
clear, which is the explanation for much observed behavior.
In effect, the relationship offers one (possibly meaning-
ful) method for differentiating among otherwise indis-
tinguishable supplies and suppliers of a given good. See
also Charles Hampden-Turner, "A Proposal for Political
Marketing," Yale Review of Law and Social Action, (Winter
1970), pp. 93-100.
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25. For example, such a recommendation was strongly made by
Abt Associates, Inc. (Cambridge, Mass.) following their
threee year study of the OEO Special Impact Program sup-
porting CDC's.
26. These data are taken from an ongoing study by Barry A.
Stein and Mark Hodax (Center for Community Economic De-
velopment, Cambridge, Mass.). The methodology involves
evaluation of the size of plants actually being installed
in various industries by businessmen, compared to con-
sumption expenditure figures generated by various studies.
Results are felt to be conservative, in the sense that it
should be possible to produce many such goods efficiently
at still smaller scales.
27. The finding about urban blacks was contained in a study
by Lee Sturzberg Research Co., New York City, and re-
ported in "Blacks Favor National Brands," Bay State Ban-
ner, Sept. 14, 1972. The notion about the possibly re-
gressive nature of advertising costs is due to Mark
Hodax, Center for Community Economic Development, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
28. Victor R. Fuchs, The Service Economy, N.Y., National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1968, p. 194.
29. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 9th (variorum)
edition, N.Y., The Macmillan Co., p. 63.
30. Charles M. Tiebout, "The Community Economic Base Study,"
Supplementary Paper #16, N.Y., The Committee for Economic
Development, 1962, p. 13.
31. Joseph Grunwald, "Some Reflections on Latin American In-
dustrialization Policy," Reprint 203, Washington, D.C.,
The Brookings Institute, 1971, p. 828. The doctrine of
comparative advantage, that is to say, inherently assumes
first, that the advantageous situation can be reached be-
fore changes which might reduce it (legal, political,
economic, or technological) take place; second, that once
achieved in this static sense, modifications can be made
fast enough to maintain quasi-equilibrium; and third, that
all interactions among the parties (nations, generally)
are carried out purely on the basis of the competitive
economics of the situation (e.g., military, political or
economic power action is ruled out). None of these con-
ditions holds in practice.
32. Harvey Leibenstein, "Allocative vs. X-Efficiency," Amer-
ican Economic Review (June 1966).
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33. See earlier, the section on firms as human organizations,
chapter II.
34. This does not imply that government action should be limited
to sanctions against those who violate the terms and con-
ditions, which is essentially its present role (in the U.S.).
On the contrary, government must act so as to enable dif-
ferent competing groups to gain access to the market and
its resources (e.g., capital) in ways that are equivalent.
Also, there are many goods and services (public goods,
social overhead capital, etc.) which cannot be well organ-
ized through the market mechanism and it is therefore neces-
sar.y, even accepting the principle that markets should exist
where they make social and economic sense, for government
(really, the collective society) to directly coordinate
or control other important aspects of the social welfare.
35. Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities, N.Y., Vintage Books,
1970, p. 79.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study set out to evaluate the potential viability of
decentralized community industry, in particular by exploring
the effects of size and scale on the efficiency and competi-
tive ability of enterprises. This issue is fundamental to the
broader question, since whatever else may be involved in de-
centralized community-based firms, they would at least need to
be smaller than those presently composing the American economic
system. Were that reduction in size not theoretically practi-
cal, such strategies would not be promising candidates for the
revitalization of depressed areas and the expansion of rewards
and opportunities for impoverished persons. In addition, this
study proposed to apply the findings to the broader problem,
not in a comprehensive way, but to indicate a framework for sub-
sequent research and theory. This chapter summarizes the over-
all findings and presents the final conclusions.
With respect to the effects of size and scale, the general
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findings include the following. All empirical studies indi-
cate that below a certain size manufacturing firms (or plants)
on the average are less efficient, but that certain size is not
known with any precision. Moreover, it differs markedly with
the specific industry evaluated. That very uncertainty and
variability, among other things, suggests that such economies
of production scale are not the primary determinant of either
competitive ability or true efficiency. Specifically, avail-
able data indicate first, that in most industries the penalties
for operating plants well below apparent optimal scale are not
great; second, the presence of substantial relatively constant
costs (added to those directly associated with production) di-
lutes even those clear advantages of greater production scale;
and third, the empirical evidence suggests the presence of
diseconomies of firm (as against plant) scale. It is, however,
difficult to determine the exact result (or even a reasonably
good approximation) of the combined effects of scale in any
given case. This is due in part to the difficulty of disag-
gregating economic data on firms and economic sectors, and in
part to the inadequacy of the measures typically used (e.g.,
profits) as a proxy for efficiency.
These data, however, are derived from studies which make
the conventional assumption of economic theory that businesses
operate efficiently within their own boundaries. The base to
which economic scale studies refer, then, generally concerns
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the ideal allocation of resources to the various entities com-
posing the economic system. In fact, the basic assumption is
so misleading as almost to vitiate the conclusions derived.
The minor error is that plants are assrmed to be operating at
capacity, whereas they generally are not. The major error is
that internal (intrafirm) efficiency is probably far lower
than allocative (interfirm) efficiency, and there is reason to
believe that large gains in productivity are always possible;
the more so as size of unit increases. These gains can come
from individual learning and motivation, from organizational
or systemic change, and from continuing minor modifications in
the way things are done. Such useful changes themselves be-
come more difficult as unit .size increases.
It has also been argued that innovation is increasingly
the province of the large entity, and that increasingly so-
phisticated technology and highly specialized functions con-
tinue to reduce the small firm's opportunity to compete by
developing improved products or processes. The data do not
substantiate these claims; on the contrary, there is every
reason to believe that smaller firms or private individuals
have as much as, or more opportunity in this regard than gi-
ants. In fact, there are probable diseconomies of scale due
to the difficulty of accepting or implementing change in large
entities.
As to planning, large firms are said to be needed, because
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the requiremtnts of sophisticated technology and increasingly
specialized knowledge call for long lead times to develop, de-
sign, and produce products. Firms must therefore have enough
control over the market to assure that the demand needed to
justify that time-consuming and costly investment will exist.
This argument rests on a foundation of sand; first, because
the needs of society should precede, not follow, decisions a-
bout what to produce, and second, because the data do not sub-
stantiate that argument except in rare and unusual instances,
like space flight. On the contrary, planning for social needs
requires organizations and decision-making capabilities in
which the feedback and interplay between productive enter-
prises and the customers in question is accurate and timely -
conditions more consistent with smaller organizations than
large ones.
Finally, large size in and of itself is a decided deterrent
to worker satisfaction (blue and white-collar) and motivation.
Rates of absenteeism, grievances, and strikes all have been
shown to be correlated directly with size, mental health is in-
versely correlated. Moreover, competitive efficiency based on
new product utility as well as internal innovations in process
and technology is more consistent with small firms, in which
workers can better understand the relationship of their work
to both the organization and its market.
Additional support for this argument comes from consider-
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ation of the relationship between firms and consumers in the
marketplace. In the present state of development of the Amer-
ican economy, consumers are increasingly using their growing
purchasing power to acquire goods and services uniquely tailor-
ed to their interests. This is consistent with and related
to the steadily rising rate of introduction of new products
and greater varieties of options or modifications of existing
products. The same statement applies to industrial as well as
consumer goods. The result is that the advantages of true
mass production are decreased, since markets for a given pro-
duct actually tend to become smaller and more specialized. In
response to this, many large firms are dropping such goods
where competitive pressure is high.
It is also clear that costs directly related to produc-
tion as.-such, are on the average a relatively small fraction
(about one-third) of final total price in the market. This
is true for two reasons; additional costs of overhead, dis-
tribution, and markup for wholesale and retail trade, which
dilute the effect of production costs as such, and costs of
advertising and promotion. The latter, although they differ
widely among products and market, are very large in some impor-
tant product classes. Therefore, even if production were slight-
ly more costly in a plant of less than optimal efficient scale,
the incremental final cost would be small. Market evidence
for the potential of community industries to compete in certain
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such markets is well shown by the enormous cost savings avail-
able from private labelled products, compared to nationally
promoted goods of similar quality. Large firms, then, are often
quite inefficient.
Much of this inefficiency, however, is masked by the power -
market and financial - of large firms, which can continne to
make profit and increase their scope and extent quite aside
from their true efficiency. This is particularly true in con-
centrated markets, which exist more in consumer than producer
goods. It has been estimated that some 40 percent of market
activity is carried out by firms with considerable market power.
Although, as noted, there are substantial data indicating that
profitability and size are inversely related, large firms tend
to have less variation of profits over time, a finding which
can be interpreted as showing that large firms have greater
capability to take a series of risks (because of financial
strength) and perhaps, that they are less capable of unusually
strong performance. Size alone, it is clear, is a decided ad-
vantage, at least in the service of risk pooling, staying power,
and sheer muscle.
As to the specific implications for community industries,
as contrasted to those of conventional entrepreneurial cast,
real differences in opportunity and value exist. This, ulti-
mately, is the heart of the matter and it is appropriately
discussed as the final element of this work. First, however,
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one important conclusion from the foregoing should be noted.
The economy and society would both benefit from simple divesti-
ture, by multi-facilitied firms, of the bulk of their produc-
tion units. That is, even if industrial plants remained at
their present scale, but in general became independent single-
plant firms in the marketplace, competition would increase,
concentration would drop (greatly), costs to users would be re-
duced, and consumer sovereignty would increase. It is also
clear, especially in certain industries, that plant scale could
itself be reduced further without loss of efficiency. However,
even the present size of plant is often not large and most
could certainly be established or operated by community insti-
tutions. There are other benefits from collective, as against
individual entrepreneurial control, which add to this straight-
forward possibility. They offer the prospect of strengthened
communities; in fact, of productive communities.
The Productive Community
Analysis of the meaning of community-based enterprise, and
of their social and economic functions, leads to the recogni-
tion of substantial opportunities for such enterprises to offer
benefits in both spheres. However, many details remain to be
explored, and any specific combination of community and pro-
duct orientation will need to be analyzed on its own terms.
In any case, what is meant by community is fairly broad, and
is inherently an extensible concept. Centrally, it concerns
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actions relevant to a defined geographical area (though the
size of such areas would vary widely depending on the particu-
lar issue), and on the social system of which the economy is
only one aspect. Thus, to speak of community industries is to
address potential social implications and not merely economic
ones. Community industries, if the name is to have meaning,
must be more than independent firms seeking to carry out pri-
vate purposes, whether directed toward profit or power.
The need for strong social links between the enterprise
and the community is thus great. Two criteria can be laid
down for such links to be effective. First, it is necessary
to provide as much feeling of and opportunity for involvement
of community members in the enterprise as possible (an important
innovative task). This follows from the great importance of
shaping the venture into an instrument of perceived opportunity
for the citizens whose interest it is intended to serve. That
will largely determine its real impact. Moreover, such an ap-
proach helps to build the sense of community. Second, the pri-
orities which determine the relationship of the enterprise with
the community and the region, and which in turn shapes the use
of profits or other resources, must be set by the "community"
itself. No other arrangement can build the commitment of com-
munity members to the organization, or accurately respond to
their wishes, no matter how "reasonable" or "appropriate" they
seem to an outside agency, and regardless of the similarity of
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the end result. It is the process which build commitment.(l)
Community-based enterprises of this sort can serve as a
source of pride to the community as well as of economic power
for it and its citizens. The very fact of such an enterprise,
producing goods and services of significant value to local
consumers, competing effectively with distant and previously
invincible powers, and yielding returns which the community can
use in its own interests, can transform the attitudes of mem-
bers of the community (as well as those in the larger setting
of the nation). Since any economic development strategy re-
quires that the social system also be changed and further,
that individuals be enabled to combine and act as collectiv-
ities, then the demonstration that such possibilities are real,
and can be seized on the community level, is of central impor-
tance.(2)
In general, such enterprises offer the potential for high
social efficiency, for a number of reasons. Community ventures
in principle are more consistent than entrepreneurial ones with
the more stringent meaning of "efficient" discussed throughout
this dissertation. It has long been recognized that a pro-
ductive and fruitful economic system rests, among other things,
on the widespread ability of citizens to afford the output of
the productive apparatus. Walter Hoving (ex-chairman of Tif-
fany and Co.), referred to this as the principle of self-con-
sumption; "the man who makes the product must be one of its
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major consumers."(3)
There is more to this than general rhetoric. In the sense
of consumers in the aggregate being able to use the productive
output in the aggregate, it is merely an obvious statement of
overall system requirements. However, its greater signifi-
cance lies in the personalized application to specific individ-
uals and the efforts in which they are specifically engaged.
This is a critical point; the social supports which define and
shape a person's self-identity and sense of value are pre-em-
imently rooted in the communities in which we live. In that
connection, one of the important virtues of community-based
enterprises is related to their potential for involving peo-
ple in work whose meaning and value is clear. There are many
ways to do this, but if one aim of community ventures is to
reduce dependence on others, then the value of producing goods
which not only the producers (i.e., workers) but members of the
general community, routinely utilize in their own affairs, be-
comes clear. Again, this is not suggested merely as a social
desideratum, but a direct response to the low efficiency and
destructive (to human growth) aspects of large-scale, imper-
sonal enterprises in which work is purely instrumental. Peo-
ple work because otherwise they could not eat (at least, above
some minimum threshold).(4)
Another important advantage of community-based enterprises
in the sense of social efficiency, is that they convert what
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are ordinarily externalities into internalities of the firm.
That is, by virtue of community control and participation
in a venture, many factors which usually are not taken into
account in the firms' decision-making process must become so.
Such factors include, for example, pollution, the effect of
the firm on other local businesses, and the impact of work on
other aspects of life. Kapp, in stressing the need for a re-
formulation of basic economic concepts to include social costs
and benefits has written that
Instead of conceiving wealth and production
merely in terms of exchangeable utilities,
the new concepts of wealth and production
will have to be defined in such a manner as
to include also nonmarket values...Similarly,
the principle of economy (that is, "econo-
mizing") will have to...take account of
social costs and returns.(5)
By their very nature, true community enterprises operate
on concepts redefined in this way. One virtue of such a sys-
tem is evident: to the extent that individual enterprises op-
erate on the basis of these broadened concepts, more formal
and inherently less flexible regulatory measures are unneces-
sary. However, by the same token, this broader view may in-
crease the narrowly defined economic costs of doing business,
as contrasted to more conventional organizations. The very
special problem of community enterprises, then, is to balance
these two conflicting (at least in the short run) tendencies.
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It means, in essence, that community ventures must either be
sufficiently efficient to be able to maintain their products'
prices at or below other equivalents while in fact absorbing
additional social costs, or the customers must be willing to
pay a premium because of the nature of the enterprise and
their relationship to it, or both.
For reasons already described earlier, there is every pos-
sibility that a strong commitment of community citizens to
their ventures/institutions can be developed, but this also
takes time. It is therefore all the more important for initial
enterprises to be selected from those that maximize immediate
visibility and connections to the community, while providing
direct savings to customers at the scales appropriate to the
community in question. In the long run, if Federal, state and
local governments move towards techniques to force private en-
terprises to account for present externalities, these start-up
problems will disappear, or at least, become markedly reduced
in importance. It would be a tragedy indeed if community ven-
tures which are equally as or more efficient than larger pri-
vate enterprises - all things considered - were unable to sur-
vive because of temporary defects in the cost system.
It is therefore necessary, especially initially, for com-
munity ventures to offer their goods and services at a price
equal to or below that for similar goods available from other
sources, since, although people are often willing to pay more
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for products because of perceived non-economic or quantifiable
value (as in the case of national brands vis-a-vis unknown but
less expensive equivalents), it is not likely to be a perma-
nent choice. In any case, competition on the basis of price
alone is neither typical of large producers nor adequate as-
surance of permanence and opportunity for growth and resource
development. Larger firms with greater resources can, if they
choose, always underbid much smaller firms in the interests
of maintaining or extending their markets.(6) What is appro-
priate is instead that products of a community enterprise be
differentiated from all other similar products, but by a social
process rather than by the expensive promotion, advertising,
and branding incorporated in products of more conventional en-
terprise.
It is the conclusion of this analysis that in certain in-
dustrial sectors, as described in chapter IV, the potential cost
saving to customers is sufficiently great to minimize or elim-
inate the theoretical risk of apparent short-term cost inef-
ficiency. For example, production of basic industrial raw ma-
terials (e.g., steel, sulfuric acid, plastic resins) can not
be as efficiently carried out in very small and highly decentral-
ized plants, although as has been shown, the present scale is
certainly not justifiable on grounds either of technical or so-
cial efficiency. However, the conversion, combination and mod-
ification of such products to meet final market demand does
258
ei
offer significant jnd immediate opportunity. Moreover, in con-
sumer goods, especially those which are seen as necessities
of life, and which are now provided largely by nationally-known
manufacturers, community enterprises could compete effectively
on several levels. Lower prices permitted by savings on pro-
motion and distribution would offer tangible and immediate
benefits to consumers while allowing time to develop and ex-
tend other commitments needed to sustain the institution.
Here, then, is at least one example where scale effects favor
decentralized community industries. There may well be others.
A Few Final Words
Large organizations are not, by virtue of their size, in-
herently superior to smaller ones. Indeed, as this paper has
attempted to show, the reverse is often more nearly the case,
at least within certain segments of the economy and above cer-
tain very modest limits on smallness. Economic institutions,
or businesses, exist for social purposes and it is therefore
appropriate to evaluate the virtues of size - or for that matter,
any other characteristic - as it influences those purposes.
Nor can size, taken alone, serve as an adequate differentiating
feature of organizations. One must consider instead:
the balance between growth and form. ...contrary
to contemporary social though, which becomes hys-
terical if it fails to push it at constantly ac-
celerating rates, growth must actually be stopped
when a thing reaches the form best suited to its
function. (7)
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If size is seen as the servant of function, then, as the
foregoing discussion has attempted to indicate, it is not in-
dependent of the nature of the system in which that size is to
be realized. Community-based enterprises will, not surprisingly,
have options and advantages at a given scale quite different
from those which would attend the same type of venture if en-
trepreneurially controlled and owned. That is not to say that
the conclusions on size and efficiency are irrelevant to pri-
vate enterprise, for they are not. Rather, it is more appro-
priate to consider alternatives of modest size as tools which,
in the hands of communities, can offer more benefits than
those which would accrue to it in any case.
The most basic and elementary functions of industry, to
which all other considerations should be subordinated, have
been eloquently described by R.H. Tawney:
...the principles upon which industry should be
based are simple...they are simple because in-.
dustry is simple. An industry, when all is said,
is, in its essence, nothing more mysterious than
a body of men associated...to win their living
by providing the community with some service
which it requires... Because its function is
service, an industry as a whole has rights and
duties towards the community, the abrogation of
which involves privilege...
The conditions of a right organization of
industry are, therefore, permanent, unchanging
and...elementary...The first is that it should
be subordinated to the community in such a way
as to render the best service technically pos-
sible...because it is of the essence of a func-
tion that it should find its meaning in the sat-
isfaction, not of itself, but of the end which
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it serves. The second is that its directions and
government should be in the hands of persons who
are responsible to those who are directed and
governed...(8)
By separating the bulk of economic enterprise from its direct
functional roots in the society, and by appraising its vir-
tues by measures remote from those functions, we have perforce
created a situation in which the profits and sales figures -
which are poor proxies for the measurement of the satisfaction
of social needs - have indeed become ends in themselves. The
reestablishment of enterprises in functional relationship to
the community served can make more clear the essential inef-
ficiency of many present organizations, while providing more
meaningful benefits for members of the society, and of the
communities composing it.
261
It I - I . - q "P.M -
NOTES TO CHAPTER V
1. See, for example, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and
and Community, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972;
and "Some Social Issues in the Community Development Cor-
poration," in C.G. Benello and D. Roussopolos, eds., The
Case for Participatory Democracy, N.Y., Grossman, 1971,
pp. 65 ff.
2. See, for example, Elliot D. Solar, The Community Basis
for Economic Development, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center
for Community Economic Development, 1970).
It is interesting to note that Arnold Toynbee, in search-
ing for the historical roots of the rise and fall of
societies, concluded that the growth of civilization was
intimately interlinked with progress towards self-deter-
mination. See Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, in
the abridgement by D.C. Somervell of volumes I-VI (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 198ff.
3. Walter Hoving, The Distribution Revolution, N.Y., Washburn,
Inc., 1960, p. 12.
4. This view of the importance of community to persons' self-
value derives from a long tradition in social science.
See, for example, Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organiza-
tion, N.Y., Schocken, 1962; or Robert Redfield, The Little
Community, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960.
See also Barry Stein, The Community Context of Economic
Conversion, Cambridge, CCED, 1972. On the importance of
work, much has been written. This has been discussed in
more detail in chapter II, but for a general reference,
see Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man, N.Y.,
World, 1966; Abraham Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being,
2nd ed., N.Y., Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1968; Erich Fromm,
p The Sane Society, N.Y., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955;
and Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, N.Y.,
McGraw-Hill, 1960.
5. K. William Kapp, The Social Costs of Private Enterprise,
N.Y., Schocken Books, 1971, p. 254. See also, in this
regard, Ezra J. Mishan, Technology and Growth: The Price
We Pay, N.Y., Praeger, 1970.
6. Whether and under what circumstances firms actually do
underbid (sell below cost) is a subject of much dispute.
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It is clear that the practice of selling products below
average (but presumably not marginal) cost, which is
called dumping, is widespread, as witness all the laws
preventing it. Similarly, it is obvious that firms will
bid low for an initial piece of work if it appears that
the profits or other returns can be recouped later by
being locked-in (having market power) to that situation.
Indeed, from the perspective of individual firms, all
these and related strategies (e.g., complex transfer
pricing) are rational, From the standpoint of social
welfare, they are pernicious, but very difficult to con-
trol precisely because of their individual rationality.
7. Leopold Kohr, "Wales Free: The Politics of Permanence,"
in Resurgence, Vol. 3, #2 (July/Aug. 1970), p. 9.
8. R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, N.Y., Harvest Books,
1948, pp. 6-7.
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